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Abstract 
Although Bayesian Networks (BNs) are increasingly being used to solve real world 
problems [47], their use is still constrained by the difficulty of constructing the node 
probability tables (NPTs). A key challenge is to construct relevant NPTs using the 
minimal amount of expert elicitation, recognising that it is rarely cost-effective to elicit 
complete sets of probability values. 
This thesis describes an approach to defining NPTs for a large class of commonly 
occurring nodes called ranked nodes. This approach is based on the doubly truncated 
Normal distribution with a central tendency that is invariably a type of a weighted 
function of the parent nodes. 
We demonstrate through two examples how to build large probability tables using 
the ranked nodes approach. Using this approach we are able to build the large probability 
tables needed to capture the complex models coming from assessing firm's risks in the 
safet:v or finance sector. 
The aim of the first example with the National Air-Traffic Services(NATS) is to 
show that using this approach we can model the impact of the organisational factors 
in avoiding mid-air aircraft collisions. The resulting model was validated by NATS and 
helped managers to assess the efficiency of the company handling risks and thus, control 
the likelihood of air-traffic incidents. In the second example, we use BN models to capture 
the operational risk (OpRisk) in financial institutions. The novelty of this approach is 
the use of causal reasoning as a means to reduce the uncertainty surrounding this type of 
risk. This model was validated against the Basel framework [160], which is the emerging 
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Since the 90's, the complexity of the BNs has increased noticeably [47]. Mahoney and 
Laskey [198] commented, early in that decade that a network with over a 100 nodes 
(e.g. Pathfinder with 109 [51,96]) was considered a large network. It is only in recent 
years that BNs are able to handle complex real world networks with thousands of nodes 
[6,139,187,188]. The developing of large-scale networks have been possible thanks to 
the modularity of BNs [108], the improvement in the propagation algorithms [108,112] 
and to the development of ideas such as Object Oriented Bayesian Networks (OOBNs) 
[19,122,158]. Also tools such as Hugin [13] and AgenaRisk [134] helps make these models 
possible. 
A consequence of large networks is the need to fill the large probability tables that 
the complexity of the node's relationship produce [57,61]. There are different ways to deal 
with these large tables that range from using statistical functions based on data [146], 
reducing the size of the probability table by making the nodes' state boolean, to interpret 
the network as a qualitative network whose nodes' relationships influence are noted using 
arithmetic signs, e.g. {+,-} [107, 223] or using techniques such as divorcing [112] or 
OR-gates/AND-gates [178]. 
However, there is no available answer to those networks with large probability tables 
where the data is scarce and has to be complemented by experts' qualitative knowledge. 
l.c!. Rf.'iCarrh HYIJotlu8i.<; 8 
The key challellge is to construct relevant NPTs using the minimal amOU1lt of expert 
elicit cltiOll. H'COgllisillg that it is rardy cost-effective to elicit complete sets of probabilit~· 
values. 
This thesis puts forward an approach that uses experts' qualitative information to-
gether with statistical functions to build large probability tables. The methodology de-
fines NPTs for a large class of commonly occurring nodes called ranked nodes. This 
approach is based on the doubly truncated Normal distribution wit h a central tendency 
that is invariably a type of weighted function of the parent nodes. This approach has 
been tested during our research project with NATS and in our OpRisk model and has 
been formally incorporated into the AgenaRisk tool [134]. 
1.2 Research Hypothesis 
The aim of this thesis is to produce a method to help building large NPTs based largely 
on expert's knowledge with the following characteristics: 
• easy to elicit, in the sense that experts need only to provide a few cues in order to 
build a NPT; 
• accessible method to compute NPT, given that the BN models are used and main-
tained, in most cases, by people without much knowledge on statistics; 
• fast feedback by showing to the expert the results of his assessments on the model 
through a BN programming tool; 
• ablility to develop large BN models requiring less expert time thus producing less 
costly networks while maintaining the quality of the outcome. 
This thesis contributes to a number of fields: 
1. to the field of Computer Science in that it provides a new approach to build NPTs 
from expert elicitation; 
2. to the field of knowledge elicitation in that it helps the extraction of experts' judg-
ment in the context of building large BNs; 
3. to the field of risk analysis in that it shows how this approach can be applied to 
assess the risks on the safety critical industries and financial institutions. 
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1.3 Synopsis 
Part I. This part introduces the domains of critical safety risk and operational risks in 
financial institutions and explains t he need for techniques to measure the risk in 
these domains. These domains are characterised by the lack of data and the 8Tail-
ability of expert knowledge. BN is introduced as an alternati\"e to model these 
risks. 'Ye explain Ba~"('s theorem and how it handles uncertainty. This explanation 
includes the use of graph theory, the concepts of variables: (in)dependencies and 
the semalltic interpretation of BN as causal networks. 
Chapter 2. This chapter argues that accidents in the safety critical industries and/or monetary 
losses in the financial sector derive from the accumulation of minor events that 
go unnoticed. These minor mishaps form a causal chain that ends in a bigger 
breakdown: safety breaches resulting in putting people's lives at risk or monetary 
losses that can end in firm 's bankrllpt('~". Thus the need to reduce or avoid these 
risks. To this end, we advocate the use of BNs whose characteristics we argue are 
suitable for this job. 
Chapter 3. Introduces Bayes Theorem. This chapter assumes probability theory as the optimal 
paradigm to handle uncertainty. We explain BN and its interpretation by AI to 
model uncertainty; this explanation includes Nai"ve Bayes (NB) and BN. 'Ve com-
ment on the contribution of graph theory to develop BNs including the concepts 
of (in)dependence and directional separation. We also have included a section on 
Causality. There we comment on the advantages of interpreting BNs as a causal 
probabilistic net. 
Part II. This part highlights the need to rely on domain experts' judgments to inform NPTs 
in the absence of hard data. It focuses on modeling BNs using knowledge base. It 
discusses the problems with expert elicitation and, within this context, reviews 
the techniques currently available to elicit and produce NPTs. This review shows 
the need for methods to build NPTs based on qualitative information. For that 
reason we put forward a new approach that, using the minimal amount of expert 
elicitation, can build large NPTs. 
Chapter 4. This chapter focuses on knowledge based Bayesian models. We discuss the subjec-
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tive nature of these models and the problem of human bias during the elicitation 
process. We also comment on Ontologies a.''; a possible unifying methodology to 
build them. We then review the available methods to elicit probabilit~· estimations. 
This review covers methods that use graphical clues. e.g. slide bar, probability 
wheel; verbal/numerical method (recognising its shortcomings and considering its 
benefits); statistical tedllliques that elicit interval's quantiles or distribution pa.-
rameters. 
Chapter 5. In this chapter, we describe a simple approach to defining NPTs for a large class 
of commonly occurring nodes that we shall call ranked nodes. The approach is 
based on the doubly truncated Normal distribution with a central tendency that 
is invariably a type of weighted function of the parent nodes. \i\rith this approach, 
we are able to complete a NPT by eliciting a few probability estimations, which in 
the context of building large probability tables represents a reduction in time and 
costs. 
This approach was put into practice, tested and validated during the development 
of the National Air-Traffic Service (NATS) model, documented in chapter 6. Us-
ing ranked nodes we were able to develop BNs models within time and budget 
constraints whilst obtaining results that were deemed successful by the experts at 
NATS. 
Part III. This part provides two examples of modeling BNs in the field of safety and finance 
industries. The first example explains the use of the ranked node approach to 
measure the impact of the factors that intervene on the avoidance of mid-air aircraft 
collisions. The second example discusses the use of BNs to model financial risk, 
in particular Operational Risk. It reviews current techniques used to measure this 
type of risk and puts forward the use of BNs models as an alternative to them. 
Chapter 6. The motivation for the BN model in this chapter is to reveal the contributions and 
the relative importance of "up-stream" factors in air traffic management to the risk 
of air incidents. The aim of the chapter is to demonstrate that subjective factors 
such as a company's culture can be measured, hence deriving in better control of 
safety risks. 
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This model \vas d('\'eloped with the help of the experts at the NATS. \\'ith their 
help we built the topology, probability tables and validated the model's predictions. 
The experts at NATS described the BNs model as a useful decision making tool for 
identifying potential safety risks and allocating resources. 
Chapter 7. This chapter explains the use of BN models to assess operational risk in financial 
institutions. The need to identif~T and measure this risk is given by the introduction 
of new regulatory measures by the Basel Committee to be effective by 2007. \Ye 
discuss the content of such regulation and the framework the Committee introduce 
to assess this type of risk. The aim of this chapter is to compare the current 
methods against BN models and to show that BNs can offer a viable alternative to 
them. 
To this end, we have built a BN model that combines data and experts' judgment 
in compliance with the Basel Committee requirements. By combining these infor-
mation sources, we improve the accuracy of the predictions while increasing our 
knowledge of the domain area. Furthermore, the BN model explicitly highlights an 
organisation's weaknesses showing how potential risk emerge from their interaction, 
thus making the model an essential tool for risk management and for the regulatory 
body. 
Chapter 8. In this chapter we give a summary and we draw the conclusion of this thesis. We 
comment on the lessons learnt during the development of the NATS project. 
Appendix A As part of this thesis we develop a BN tool to help elicit and build the NPTs 
needed for the NATS project. This tool implements the ideas originated from this 
project. Ideas such as the ranked node approach. Thanks to this tool we were able 
to built the NPTs and to run sensitivity analysis. As part of the lessons learnt and 
the research study we implemented also a Bezier curve, Histograms and Normal 
distribution to elicit experts' opinions. These tools are now part of the AgenaRisk 
tool [134]. 
Appendix B The Safety Attitude Questionnaire (SAQ). This appendix shows the set of questions 
on SAQ. 




Problem domain and BNs 
Chapter 2 
Risks in the Safety industry and Operational 
Risk in Financial institutions. 
2.1 Introduction 
1-1 
Since the 90's we have been more aware of the role that socio-technical factors play within 
the domaill of the safety industry and financial institutions. The Bhopal chemical plant 
disaster [145], the Ladbroke Grove rail accident [44], the collapse of Barings bank [67], 
or more recently, the frauds at Allied Irish Bank [10], and ENRON [194] to name but a 
few, add perspective into this role. 
These "breakdowns", whether financial or safety critical, are a burden to society 
hmvever differently they are perceived. The investigations on these breakdowns often 
concluded that mishaps are not solely the result of human fallibility, but are supported 
by organisational features that fail to defend themselves against all-too-human mistakes, 
slips and (in the case of fraud) malicious acts. From this we can conclude that risk 
prediction is inextricably entwined with good management practice. That is why the 
search for improved internal control measures, whether it is in safety hazardous or finan-
cial industries, has focused on the underlying organisational structure where those risks 
occur. 
Furthermore, the development of more highly automated technology, the growth of 
e-commerce, large-scale mergers, the planning of new airports or the re-opening of nuclear 
plants, all suggest that the risk exposures may be substantial and growing [164]. 
2.2. Bad'ground 1,) 
However. the evaluatioll of t 11 ('s(' events cannot readil~' be handled by traditional 
statistical methods given that these methods rely on historical data. The novelt~· of some 
of the risks together with the lack of data that is associated to safC'ty and operational risk 
events prevents the use of such methods. Hence traditiona1 statistical techniques often 
find illsufficient data from which to build a sensible model. .\Ioreover, these techniques 
have failed to capture the interactions between the probabilitv of a risk event and the 
orgallisatioT1rd cllltUH' where t hose risks flourish. 
Thus. the need to account for the importance of the management practices in shaping 
the compam"s risk profiles. the subjective nature of its lIJ('asuring and the lack of data 
regarding these domains, makes the use of Bayesian Networks(BNs) a suitable alternative. 
Even more so if we consider the importance of risk management in a firm. on one side 
averting and controlling the threats and on the other transforming threats into a strategic 
business advantage. 
2.2 Background 
It is commonly agreed by the academics Reason [190], Whittingham [227], Perrow [182] 
and Dempsey [5:3]. acknowledged in the field of finance by its regulatory body [162,163] 
and by government commissioned reports Turnbull [214], Cadbury [25] that these break-
downs should be attributed to a number of factors among which \VC find the underlying 
structure of the orga.nisation. In most cases, we find common factors such as "lack of man-
agement commitment and involvement to implement and supervise control risk policies 
and procedures", "lack of communication between management and employee" or "poor 
reporting practices", among others, that can be causally linked to the actual failure [213]; 
they highlight that these human errors may have to do more with the environment where 
they occur than with the person(s) that caused the mishapl [23,102]. 
The challenge is to find out the causal sequence of events that lead to the breakdown. 
In order to better understand this causal chain, we can group the risk an organisation 
can face into two categories [192]: 
• High frequency and low severity events. These are the kind of losses that are usual 
in the day-to-day running of an organisation, including direct failures such as an 
lSee [78J for a literature review on the subject 
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operative failing to enter the correct da~' for a transaction and /utf.nt conditions 
due to over-complicated procedures or bad designs, causing errors in t he long nlll. 
To ,Ill extent the firm expect. to 1'1l11 into thf':-;e type of risks and this is one of the 
reasons why these events are not even recorded. For many companies. thc:o;c are 
seen as the running costs of the business. 
• Low frequency and high impact events. These' are unexpected cn'llts that occur 
ra.rel~· a.nd with a high level of severity for the firm. These risks lIlay cause t h(' firm 
to go out of business and/or to put at peril the life of people. 
1'here are different ways to monel these risks depending on whether we interpret 
these two categories as independent or as causally related: 
• Both risks are independent and there is no causal link between them. That is, 
unexpected failures are inherently random events. \Yhich implies that management 
cannot do much about preventing these risks other than taking insurance. 
• Both risks are causally related. That is, unexpected failures are caused by i:1 number 
of expected ones that went unnoticed over a period of time. Which implies that 
studying the causal chain of those events can prevent or at least reduce unexpected 
breakdowns. 
In this thesis we agree with J.T. Reason [190,191] view who sustains that accidents 
are causally related. He uses the "Swiss-cheese" analogy to illustrate his idea, see Figure 
2.1. According to Reason, an accident or active failure is the "consequence" of the addition 
of latent failures that were not identified on time. Reason describes four layers of human 
failure [190]: 
• Organizational Influences; 
• Unsafe Supervision; 
• Preconditions for unsafe acts and 
• Unsafe acts. 
Shappell and Wiegmann [205] give a more pragmatical interpretation to Reason's 
model. They elaborated the Human Factors Analysis and Classification S~'stem (HFAC'S) 
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Figure 2.1: Thi::; figure shows an accident trajector)' passing through corresponding holes 
in the layers of defense, barriers and safeguards. Adapted from [190]. 
based on Reason·s model of active and latent failures. They divided these layers into 
more detail that could be mapped with current operation tasks. For instance, the "un-
safe acts" category is divided into two subcategories: Errors (skill based errors, decision 
errors and perceptual errors) and Violations (routine and exceptional), "preconditions 
for unsafe acts" or performance shaping factors (PSF) are divided into adverse mental 
state, resource mismanagement, environmental conditions and distractions, among oth-
ers. It is interesting to note on this point, D O'Hare [157] research's findings. Apart 
from showing a high correlation between PSF and the likelihood of an aviation mishap, 
he also comments on the difference between the PSFs found on an accident (e.g. mid-air 
aircraft collision) with the PSFs found on an incident (e.g. loss of separation between 
two planes), thus showing the relevance of PSF on an accident or incident. The "Unsafe 
Supervision" layer is where PSFs take place and this level of supervision is the result 
of the '-Organisational Influences". Using this hierarchical sequence of events motivates 
management to intervene on the weak points on the chain. 
HFACS has, since, been used as a framework to investigate breakdowns [56,205] 
on different domains where human error has an input in an accident. For instance, the 
US Navy/Marine Corps used the same framework to investigate 181 helicopter accidents 
between 1991 and 1997 35% of those accidents were associated to at least one violation of 
rules and regulations [205]. HFACS was also used to study 523 aviation accidents in the 
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republic of China Air Force through ID7:-; to 2002. The results show a kc~· relationship 
between accidents and errors at the operational and organisational levels that could 
explain these accidents [131]. Thanden et al [211] obtain similar results after reviewing 
commercial aviation accidents in US from 1990 to 2000: from the 1:322 accidents 781 ,,·pre 
identified as a result of human factors aft('[ using HFACS: 60 of them \\"erE:' associated 
with 70 organisational factors. For morc examples see [28,120]. 
S. A. Shappell and D. A. \Yiegmann [205] conclude 
... HFACS framework has resulted in the improved quality and quantit~· 
of information gathered during aviation accident investigation ... In addi-
tiOIl, it has proved to be (Ill effective instrument to monitoring the success 
or failures of specific intervcntion programmes ... 
Hence, wc can conclude that finding out the "causal links·· between expected and 
unexpected failures will help managers to identify possible weak points in the system 
[56,58,64,104,174]. However, this causal reasoning is not often used to identify and 
measure rare events because it has proved difficult to find this "link' and to assign a 
value to it [119]. We argue that this is because traditional statistical methods used to 
measure "unexpected" risk fails to capture the complexities of the domain of safety risk 
and operational risk and not because risk is inherently random in these domains. Ana-
lyzing this causal chain of events would help to separate the events into either "natural" 
(i.e. random) or "man-made"(i.e. causally explained). 
Furthermore, from the point of view of risk management, interpreting unexpected 
events as single, random events brings a number of problems as the Health and Safety 
Executive (HSE) comments [95]: 
• It often underestimates the true impact of a problem overall. It only focuses on 
one unexpected risk and ignores the others. 
• Treating unexpected risks as being inherently random it undermines the adoption 
of a precautionary approach based on anticipating and averting losses. 
• Measuring only the unexpected losses is inadequate since it often reduces the char-
acteristics of what is a complex issue to a "single number" without analysing other 
factors such as the organisational factors that contribute to those losses. 
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In the llE'xt section, we review the characteristics of these domains. Studying their 
features will help us understand wh~' classical statistical methods (Ire Bot the most suitable 
candidates to de(ll with risks in these domains. 
2.3 Problem domain: features 
The domains of safety and operational risk domains are characterised hy the following 
features: 
1. Emergent nature of risks. That is, it is in conjunction with others risk \\'hen an 
incident happens. For example, as we explain in chapter 6. \\'e see t hat the risk of a 
mid-air traffic collision depends on a number of factors. ('.g. complexit~· of air space 
(whether this space is shared, for instance, with the militar~' air force), hard\\'i:lrc 
support ( e.g. the Short Term Collision Advice), pilot's skills. 
2. Lack of qualitative reporting. There is little information on the causal chain of 
events leading to a breakdown given the lack of qualitative reporting. As Haas and 
Kaiser [89] point out 
... the major obstacle to a sound data collection process is an under-
developed risk culture, which for many years has encouraged bank 
employees to provide overly positive risk reports, and to hide errors 
and potential losses from their respective superiors ... 
3. Sparse data. There is not enough data to build a database from which to extract 
a pattern of behaviour. Therefore, we need to complement this lack of data with 
expert's knowledge. Also, the novelty of some risks, e.g. large-scale mergers, new 
airports, makes way to new possible threats that have not been recorded yet . 
..:1. Subjective information. A good deal of the information available is subjective, 
e.g. a company's internal control standards, self-assessment questionnaires. key 
risk indicators, etc. 
5. Regulatory body demands. In the case of finance, only recently and due to the 
demands of the regulatory authorities banks started to document these events with 
a view to building a database that different financial institutions can share. Hence. 
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the amount of loss data. required h~· traditional statistical methods. is not going to 
be enough, at least not until a few years have passed. And even then, (IS Fellton [IOJ 
COmnH'llts 
As industry improves there will be less data from which to draw 
credible st atistical estimates. 
It is for these reasons we advocate the use of BNs. 
2.4 Why Bayesian Networks? 
The usc of BN to model the risks ill the safetv and finance industrv offers several (ldvan-
'./ ./ 
tages: 
1. Given the emergent nature of the domain and hence its complexity, we could use 
BN's modularity to breakdown the problem into smaller sub-process/potential fac-
tors that could contribute to the overall risk. 
2. BNs allow us to integrate qualitative information, expressed as experts' opinions, 
and quantitative information, however small. As Giudici and Bilotta [84] point out, 
the combination of both sources of information has an advantage: 
historical measure is statistically precise but backward-looking, 
as it takes into account past data; the self-assessment measure is 
statistically imprecise but forward looking, as it may incorporate 
knowledge on the future strategy of the bank. 
3. Using our ranked node approach, introduced in chapter 5, we can quantify this 
qualitative information by asking the experts to score their belief about an event, 
in a similar fashion as the Scorecards approach already used in many management 
systems [50]. 
4. Uncertainty surrounding the domain: Bayes theorem allows us to reason under con-
ditions of uncertainty. The uncertainty produced by the lack of data can be reduced 
using the experience and knowledge of the experts in the problem domain. Using 
Bayes Theorem, experts' judgments are expressed in probabilistic terms which could 
be conditioned on the available data, 
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:). Uncertainty of the model dnived f}'(JIll the difficultv tu find nIl possible factors 
that contribute on a breakdown. Using BN helps HS study the possible models bv 
maximizing the most probable explanation. 
6. It can perform "what if' scenarios to test models' predictions2 . 
7. Graphical representation shows explicitly the operational process involved in C1 busi-
nC'ss unit and its expected outcome. In the field of flnanee this is of particular 
interest. The methods, required b~' tlw financial regulCltors [164]' must be able to 
perform such an analysis for auditor~' reasons. 
Also from the point of view of risk management and decision making [123]: 
• Subjective estimation encourages ownership of the risk. 
• De-centralises responsibility: within the organisation we find different subcultures 
that reflect the particular environment of that part of the company. It is better 
for them to identify and measure their own risks rather than having one measure 
to "flt all". For these reason we modeled the impact of organisational culture, in 
the NATS project, as the result of an organisation-division culture which is how a 
particular set of people interpret that mainstream culture. 
• Better controls: it focuses in control weaknesses thus optimising the risk manage-
ment. 
However, the use of BN leaves us with a number of challenges: 
1. Eliciting networks. Given that BN models are a semantic representation of the 
domain, we face the problem of defining the meaning of qualitative inputs and 
estimating the value of the quantitative ones. 
2. Building large NPTs. One of the biggest obstacles to building large BN models is 
to provide the NPTs. In some cases, these NPTs need thousands of probability 
estimations. To elicit each value would at best represent a time consuming and an 
error prone task and at worst is impossible. 
We study these challenges in the following chapters. 





Up until the 1970's, the aim of artificial intelligence (AI) was to produce expert s~rstems 
(ES) that depended more on reasoning than on domain knowledge. An example of these 
systems is the game of chess, where the domain knowledge is replaced by a brute force 
search of possible move combinations. 
Although the use of search algorithms proved useful, it was soon realised that ES 
could not rely entirely on reasoning alone; it also needed to take advantage of the expert's 
knowledge and experience. As research showed, reasoning plays a relatively small role 
on the solution of a given problem [81]. For this motive, AI started during the 70's 
to acknowledge experts' opinion and heuristic knowledge of the domain, and began to 
incorporate them into the ES. 
In the early 1970s, ES started to incorporate expert's knowledge using Classical 
Logic reasoning. However, it soon became clear that this approach was impractical to 
handle the uncertainty. In Classical Logic, a proposition is true or false when the "facts" 
that support it are either true or false respectively. This approach proved to be too coarse 
to represent real world problems. 
A more flexible approach was provided by the interpretation AI made of probability 
theory based on Bayes theorem to build ES. Other approaches were also used to build ES 
such as Certainty Factors [55,81,206] based on logic rules, Fuzzy Logic methods [55] based 
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011 multi value-logic rules or Dempster-Shafer's theory [81, 204~ 2U9] which incorporCltes 
the concept of ignorance to probabilit\, reasoning. 
In this thesis we arc focusing on the use of Bayes theorem to model uncertainty. \Ye 
view probability theory as the optimal approach to represent uncertainty. 
In section 3.2 we explain Bayes theorem and its role developing ES. Section 3,3 intro-
duces graph theory. \Vc included this section as we understand that this is fundamental 
to understanding the building, elicitation and interpretation of BNs models and CIS such 
integral part of this thesis. For the same reason we included in section 3.4 the concepts 
of (in)dependence and conditional dependency and their role on building BN models, "'e 
also explain hmv to find these (in )dependencies through directional separation. \Yc finish 
this section comparing two models based on Bayes theorem: using NaYv(' T3a~'('s (NB) 
and BN. The aim is to observe the different types of models they both produce and their 
associated joint probability. In section 3.5. we define BN and the characteristics it has. 
In section 3.6, we explain the convenience of interpreting BN as a causal network and in 
section 3.7 we give a summary. 
3.2 Bayes Theorem and Reasoning 
3.2.1 Bayes Reasoning 
The terms objective and subjective probability describe two schools of thought which 
have been dealing with the interpretation of probability. 
The frequentist or "objective" school assigns probabilities to random events according 
to their frequencies of occurrence. This school assumes that the frequency count of the 
event reveals the physical properties of that event. So, for them it is meaningless to use 
probabilities to single events, which means that only repeatable events have probabilities. 
Using Bayesian reasoning, however, we do not need to have a 100 mid-air aircraft 
collisions to build a frequency count on which to base the probability of mid-air accidents. 
We know that accidents occur but we are uncertain about their likelihood, for that reason 
we condition this fact to the evidence we have. We can do this because for Bayesians, 
randomness refers to the uncertainty surrounding the true value of the parameter and not 
with its physical random nature. This is possible because probabilities are identified with 
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degrees of belief (as long a;) it follows Cox's rules!). The uncertainty about a proposition 
depends on the degree of belief we a;)sign to it. 
As we can see. the t crm uncertainty can be interpreted i'lS an event subject to random 
variability or as (Ill event whose knowledge about it is imperfect/incomplete_ The fir:-;t 
interpretation of uncertainty is the one accepted by the objective school while Bm-esialls 
accept both interpretations [36]. 
The following example illustrates this point: Laplace used Ba~-esian interpretation 
of probability theory to estimate the mass of Saturn, given the data from various astro-
nomical observations and relevant background information available, e.g. law of classical 
mechanics. Another 150 years' accumulation of data has changed Laplace estimate by 
only 0.63%. According to the frequencist school the laws of probability cannot be ap-
plyed to this problem. This is because the mass of Saturn is a constant and not a random 
variable, therefore, it has no frequency distribution and so the laws of probabilit~- cannot 
be used [208]. However, according to Bayes theory, randomness refers to the uncertainty 
on the variable's value. 
3.2.2 Bayes Theorem 
One of the main applications of the Bayes Theorem is to obtain the certitude, in prob-
abilistic terms, of an expert's belief (i.e. hypothesis) h given the supporting evidence e. 
In probability notation this conditional relationship is written as: P(hle). Bayes theorem 
obtains P(hle) using the product rule of probability. 
(3.1) 
This is done because in many situations where we want to compute P(hle) it turns 
lCox gave a set of rules to which degrees of belief can be mapped to probabilities if they are 
to satisfy logical consistency. Cox axioms are: Taken from [140J 
1. Degrees of belief must be ordered; if B(x) > B(y) and B(y) > B(z) then B(x) > B(z). Thus, 
belief can be mapped onto real numbers. 
2. The degree of belief in a proposition x and its negation --.x are related given a function, f(x) 
such that B(x) =f[B(--.x)J. 
3. The degree of belief in a conjunction of proposition x and y is related to the degree of belief 
in the conditional proposition xly and the degree of belief in the proposition y. 
In this context, Cox says that probabilities can be used to make assumptions, and to describe 
inferences given those assumptions. 
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out t hat it is difficult to do so direct Iy. \·pt we might h,we direct information (I bout 
P{elh) [69]. Bayes theorem says that P{hle), called the posteri07' probabilit~·. is related 
to Ollr prior assessment of the hypothesis P{h) and to the likelihood of this hyputhesis. 
P{elh). That is, P{hle) increases or decreases with P(h) and with P(elh) [1-16]. The 
denominator P( e) normalises the posterior distribution given that all probabilities are 
subject to the probability of its occurrence in the first place. Thus. given that the~' all 
share this common factor we can drop the common denominator from :3.1 and interpret 
the relationship in terms of proportions: the probability P(hle) is proportional of the 
hypothesis h occurring in the first place times the "portion" of this hypothesis occurring 
among all other hypotheses supported by the same evidence2 . Using x as a proportional 
symbol we have 
P{hle) C( P(h)P(elh) (3.2) 
This relationship becomes clearer if we are indifferent to any particular hypotheses, 
e.g. choosing a uniform distribution for priors. 
hML argmaxP(elh) (3.3) 
where argmax stands for the probability that maximises, better explains the hypoth-
esis. In this case, we evaluated a hypothesis h in terms of the Maximum Likelihood (ML). 
In equation 3.3, we see more clearly how Bayes theorem conditions the factual evidence 
on expert's judgment. 
Thus, using Bayesian theorem, we can describe by means of conditioning the expert's 
uncertainty on the available evidence all uncertainties present in the problem [20]. For 
instance, to diagnose an illness given some observed m symptoms sand n diagnosis d we 
have equation: 
P(SI, ... ,SmldI, .... ,dn)P(dI , .... ,dn) 
L P(SI, ... ,SmldI, ... ,dn)P(dI , ... ,dn) 
dl ... dn 
(3.4) 
However, this expression is not practical given the number of parameters it re-
2Being the evidence the universe of discourse and the hypothesis partitions of that universe 
which are supported by that evidence. Note that the hypothesis are exclusive and exhaustive. 
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qUIres. First. we need all prior values for d and all the conditional probabilities for 
(S\ .•.. , Sill Id\ ..... , dn ). In the case of binar~' variables. \VC hcwe 2n prior probabilities and 
2111+11 1 l't' 1 1. b'l't' D I f - cone IlOna prooa I lIes. rOr eXalllp e, or a small probabilistic model of 3 diag-
nosis and 10 symptoms we need around 8.000 parameters. The need for parameters would 
increase exponentially as the number of symptoms and diagnosis entered increases [55]. 
So, to reduce the number of parameters needed, it is assumed that the s~'mptoms 
are e:r:clusive and exhaustive, that is, only one symptoms is possible at a given time, i.e. 
not two SYlllPtoms can overlap, and all the possible symptoms are present in the model. 
It is also assumed the symptoms are conditionally independent for a given diagnosis. 
(3.5) 
n 
With these assumptions, we need n prior probabilities p( d) and 2m*n conditional 
probabilities p(sld), hence, we need, n-1+m*n parameters. So, for 3 diagnosis and 10 
symptoms we would need only 32 parameters [55]. See figure 3.1. 
Figure 3.1: NaIve Bayes for three symptoms. 
This type of probabilistic model is called NaIve Bayes (NB). In real world applica-
tions, these assumptions of independence are hardly tenable. That is the reason why 
this approach was termed "naIve". NB is still used although circumscribed to the field of 
medicine for "diagnosis-symptoms" models [62] or as a data classifier [199]. In chapter 6 
we give an example of NB as indicator nodes. 
In the late 80's, with the addition of new concepts such as d-separation and new 
algorithms like message-passing [178] we are able to build more complex network struc-
tures. Now, graph theory is used to code variable's (in)dependence. The result is BNs 
models that can capture more complex interactions. As Pearl [177] comments 
... the fundamental structure of human knowledge can be represented by 
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dependency graphs and that mental tracing of links in these graph~ are 
t he basic steps in querying and updating that knowledge;~. 
3.3 Graph Theory 
The way variable's dependencies are determined depends on the t~'pe of graph: direct or 
indirect. '''e are going to fOCllS on directed graphs given its relevancy from the point of 
view of expert elicitation. The use of undirected graphs are somehow constrained to the 
field of statistical modeling [170]. Note. however. that we can also derin' a BN from an 
undirected graph: for more information on this later point see [62.152]. 
To help the reader follow the discussion on the contribution of graph theory to BNs 
we are reproducing some definitions from the graph theory: these are taken from Castillo 
et a1. [62]. 
Definition 1. Graph. A graph G = (X,L) is defined by two sets X and L, where X is 
a .finite set of nodes X -XI ,X2, ... ,X;1 and L is a finde set of lin!,:.". that is. a subset of a.ll 
possible ordered pairs of distinct nodes. 
Definition 2. Directed Link. Let G = (X,L) be a graph. When Li.j ELand Lj.i tj. L, 
the link Li) is called a directed link. A directed link between nodes Xi and Xi is denoted 
Definition 3. Undirected Link. Let G = (X,L) be a graph. When Li) ELand Lj.i E L, 
the link between nodes Xi and Xj is called an undirected link. A n undirected link between 
nodes Xi and Xj is denoted by Xi - Xj or Xj - Xi 
Definition 4. Directed and undirected graphs. A graph in which all the links are 
directed is called directed graph and a graph in which all the links are undirected is called 
undirected graph. See Figure 3.2. 
Definition 5. Path between two nodes. A path from node Xi to node Xj is an ordered 
t 1 d IX X) start-ing -in X - X and ending in X/'r = XJ·, such that there is a se a no es {" iI' ... , ir , •• il - i . 
link from Xik to Xik+ 1 , k=l, ... ,r-l. 
The length of this path is (r-l), the number of links it contains. 
3Italics added 
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Definition 6. Cycle. A cycle is a dosed directed path in a directed graph. 
Definition 7. Cyclic and acyclic graph. A direct graph is said to be c.l/c1ic if it 
contains at least one cycle) otherwise it is acycl1:c (Cycle refeT's to a pathu'here the initiu! 
and teTTninal node is the same and that does not use the same link more thll 17 onu. .1 
path is a sequence of consecutive links in a graph). 
Definition 8. Parents and children in directed graphs. When there is a directed 
!'ink Xi -> Xj from Xi to Xj) then Xi is said to be a paTent of Xj and Xj is said to be (] child 
of Xi· See Figure 3.2b. 
(a) Undirected graph. Graph with 
undirected links. 
(b) Directed graph. Graph with di-
rected links. 
Figure 3.2: Nodes Pa and Pb are the paTents of node Cc and node Cc is their child. 
The nodes in a directed graph represent random variables, which can be discrete 
or continuous, and links denote the conditional dependency among the nodes. Thus the 
absence of links shows the absence of direct relationship between them. In the case of 
directed graphs, the node's dependency is given by the direction of the arrows, i.e. from 
parent to child4 . 
Definition 9. Tree. A connected undiTected graph is said to be a tree if for every pair 
of nodes there exists a unique path. 
Definition 10. Simple tree and poly tree. A directed tree is called a simple tree if 
every node has at most one parent. Otherwise it is called a poly tree. See Figure 3.3a. 
Definition 11. Trees and multiply connected graphs. A connected diTected graph 
is said to be a tree if the associated undirected graph is a tree; otherwise, it is said to be 
multiply connected. See Figure 3.3b. 
NaIve Bayes is an example of probabilistic model using tree graph. NB is constrained 
to one type of structure, see Figure 3.1. BN models, on the other hand, can be represented 
4For undirected graphs, this dependency is present in the nodes probability tables. 
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Figure :L~: The difference bet\\'een (a) and (b) is that the later contains a bucle formed 
by the nodes a, b, c, d. 
using a variety of graphs (constrained only on the availability of algorithms to calculate 
them) see Figure 3.3. 
The diffcrE'nce between NB and BN derives from the variable's conditional indepen-
dence rules. On NB this independence is "axiomatic" while in BN it derives from graph 
theory and follows the concept of d-separation. 
The next section reviews the concepts of independence, conditional dependence and 
d-separation which are central to the understanding of BNs. 
3.4 Independence, conditional independence and 
directional-separation 
Let us begin by providing some definitions, these are taken from Castillo et a1. [62]. 
Definition 12. Independence. Let X, Y be two disjoints sets of random variables, we 
say that they are independent, written as : X JL Y, if and only if: 
p(xIY) = p(x) (3.6) 
That is, the knowledge of Y does not influence, does not condition, our knowledge 
about X. In the case of disjoints sets of random variables Xl, ... Xn we can say they are 
independent if and only if: 
n 
p(Xl' ... Xn ) = ITp(Xi) (3.7) 
i 
that is, the combined probability is equal to the product of their marginals. The marginal 
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pmbability distTilYUtion P(Xi) is obtained lw 
Definition 13. Conditional independence. Let X. Y, Z be thTee disjoint sets of mndoTTl 
vaTiables, we say X is conditionally independent of Y given Z. wTitten as : X lL YIZ, If 
and only if: 
p(xlz,y) = p(xlz) or p(x.ylz) = p(xlz)p(Ylz) (3.8) 
Note also that if XI, "Xn are conditionally independent given another set, Y1, "~1 then 
we have 
n 
p(xl, ... xnIYl, .. Yn) = [lp(xiIYI'''YI7) (3.9) 
I 
How can we represent these node's conditional (in)dependence in a graph? Let us 
study the concept of d-sepamtion or (directional separation), first introduced by Pearl 
[178]. 
Definition 14. d-separation. Let X, Y and Z be thTee disjoints subsets of nodes in 
a diTected acyclic gmph G; then we say Z d-sepamte X and Y if and only if along the 
undiTected path between any nodes in X 01' in Y theTe exist an inteTmediaTY node A such 
as 
• A is a conveTgent node in the path and neitheT A nOT its descendants aTe in Z, 01' 
• A is not a conveTgent node in the path and A is in Z. 
Following this definition we can distinguish three types of connections in a direct 
graph: 
Serial connection. The nodes X lL YIZ, otherwise, they are dependent. That is, if 
we know about Z then, more information on X will not change our knowledge on Y: X 
becomes irrelevant to Yonce we know about Z. See Figure 3.4. Note that the relation of 
independence does not change if both arrows change direction. 
Divergent connection. The nodes X lL YIZ, otherwise, they are dependent. In this 
case X and Y share the same parent Z. If we know more about Y this will influence its , 
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Figure 3.4: Serial connection 
parent Z and in turn Z will influence its child X (and vice-versa from X to Y through Z). 
However, if we know Z then any additional information on either X or Y will not aff('ct 
each other. See Figure 3.5. 
Figure 3.5: Divergent connection 
Convergent connection. The nodes X,YIZ,Z\ , otherwise, th('~' are independent. In 
this case, X is independent a priory of Y and vice-versa X, Y10. However. if we know 
Z or any of its descendants ZI then X and Y become conditionally dependent, so that, 
any information on X will affect Y and vice-versa. This is what is called Inter-causal 
reasoning or explaining away. That is, if Z is explained by X alone then the probability 
of Y will be reduced, given that both X, Yare the only two available explanations for Z. 
See Figure 3.6. 
G 
Figure 3.6: Convergent connection 
P. Krause [170] points out 
... no rule for detecting independence in a DAG can improve on d-separation 
in terms of completeness. 
Figure 3.7 shows how two models based on two different assumptions of independence 
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(a): P(A.B.C~D) = P(A)P(BIA)P(ClA)P(DIB.C) 
(b): P(A.B~C.D) = P(D)P(AID)P(BID)P(ClD) 
Table 3.1: Joint probabilities. 
call reprf'sent thf' ~;lme prohlem domain. Notp the different joint probabilit~- distribution 
thc~' produce as a consequence on Table 3.1. 
(a) Bayes Network (b) N ai"ve Bayes 
Figure 3.7: a) l\Iultipl~--connected graph and b) Constraint to be represented with only 
one type of structure where the node D is the target node. 
We are now 111 a better position to understand how the AI application of Bayes 
theorem has evolved. On section 3.2 page 25, we commented how the joint distribution, 
see equation 3.4, conditioned all the variables on each other as opposed to the joint 
distributions on Table 3.1a) which uses the concept of d-separation. As Cooper [38] 
signals: 
A key advantage of a BN is that it represents probability relationships 
concisely. To build one, it is necessary to consider only the known de-
pendencies among the variables in a domain, rather than to assume that 
all variables are dependent on all other variables. This provides an effi-
cient and expressive language for acquiring and representing knowledge 
in many domains. 
That is, the information relevant to a node is provided by the parent(s) which are 
conditioning its probability [80]. This dependency is used during elicitation, as Krause 
[170] comments 
The notion of relevance embodied in the use of conditional probabilities 
also influences the elicitation of the probability values_ 
It also helps building and understandillg models as a concatenation of autonomous con-
cept5, i.e modules. Lask(-'~' and ~IaholH'~" [198] signal that 
The abilit.y to represent conceptuall~" meaningfnl groupings of nlTiables 
and their interrelationships facilitates both knowledge elicitation and knowl-
edge base maintenance 
In the context of building BN models~ the concept of (in)dependency, explicitly 
presented in the graph, is of particular interest if Olle thinks that assuming incorrect de-
pendencies. on its mn1. can affect the overall model's output eYen more than introducing 
wrong probability estimates [74]. 
3.5 Bayes Network 
A BN is an acyclic directed graph5 with its associated joint probability distribution 
that follows the rules of d-separation. The nodes ;U(' qUalltificd using data or expert's 
judgments or both and represent the strength of the relationship [62.111.152,178]. Note 
also that this asymmetric relationship between parent and child nodes can be read as a 
cause ---t effect relationship; which from the point of view of elicitation has a number of 
advantages. Section 3.6 expands on this latter point. 
The notion of a node's dependency has several consequences: 
• As a directed graph the arrows show the direction of the dependency or in their 
absence conditional independence. 
• Computational tractability. It makes possible the inference of reasonable sized net-
works. When variables are independent their joint distribution is just the product 
of their marginals. There are known exact algorithms, e.g. message-passing [176] 
or poly tree algorithm [178] that can perform probabilistic inference using singly 
connected networks in time that is linear as a function of the size of the belief 
network or in case of multiple-connected graphs by transforming the network into a 
singly connected one using a clustering algorithm6 [111,129] or using approximation 
5If the graph was cyclic, e.g. A +---+ B, the evidence on A wonld affect B and this new evidence 
on B would have an impact on A,thus, following an endless cy"cle. 
6This is because multiply connected graphs contain at least one bucle. Hence, the computation 
becomes NP-Hard as proved by Cooper [38J 
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lllcthods [G2]. The clustering or joillt tree algorithm is the one most often used to 
calculate BNs. 
• Localit,V. \Ve assmne that a node is independent of the rest of the noell'S in the 
network given its parents following Markov conditioning, thus equation 3.-1 on page 
25 becomes equation 3.10. 
n 
p(xJ , . ,Xi, . . xn ) = n P(Xi Ipa(xi)) 
i 
where n stands for the number of parent nodes pa of x. 
(3.10) 
• lVIodularity. A network can be explained as a joint set of several modules. each one 
explaining part of the model. 
From these properties we can derive a number of conclusions: 
• Computations can be done locally. This locality can be seen as groupings of inter-
related information captured in a network module. 
• 1Vlodularity helps us build the model following a divide and conquer approach. \\'(' 
can reason about parts of the model independently of the rest of the model. In this 
fashion, BN models can state very complicated hypotheses composed from simple 
elements. 
- Each part of the network is self-explained by the task they represent and by 
the causal relations that join them as Mahoney and Laskey [198] comment 
decomposition must be both semantically separable and 
formally separable. Semantic separability means that the sub-
problems into which the problem is decomposed are meaning-
ful to the expert and posed at a natural level of detail. Formal 
separability means that the subproblems are capable of being 
re-aggregated into a complete and consistent probability model. 
BN's modularity could be used to break the problem down into smaller sub-
processes, each sufficiently distinct to help the expert provide information 
[198]. As Pearl [177] comments 
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Human performance ... exhibits a different complexity order-
ing: probabilistic judgment.s on a small number of propositions 
... are issued swiftly and relin bly. while judging the likelihood 
of a conjunction of many propositions entails a great degree 
of difficulty and hesitancy. This suggests that the elementary 
building blocks which make up human knowledge are not the 
entries of a joint-distribution table but, rather, the low-order 
marginaJ and conditional probabilities defined over small dus-
ters of propositions. 
l\Iodules can be interpreted as classes following a Object Oriented Bayesian 
Network approach (OOBN) [19,122,158]: 
Following an OOBN Fenton and Neil [137] developed a set of heuristics they 
called idioms. They are a small number of natural and reusable reasoning 
patterns. The knowledge engineer simply compares their current problem, as 
described by the expert, with the idioms and reuse the appropriate one for the 
job. These idioms correspond to a concrete problem that can be captured in 
a small sub-net. These are then joined to create a large BN. This technique 
has been validated in numerous projects and has been formally incorporated 
into BN tools such as Hugin [13] and AgenaRisk [134]. 
- Sensitivity analysis can be conducted exploiting the dependency among the 
nodes in the path [40,41]. 
It can also help develop BNs Ontologies. In chapter 4 section 4.3, we explain 
how the development of ne'\' ontologies can offer an unifying methodology to 
building BN models. 
3.6 Causality and BNs 
Relationships among nodes can be interpreted from a probabilistic point of view, i.e. as 
conditional dependencies or from a subjective point of view as causally related [212]. 
The difference between probabilistic and causal interpretation is the same as between 
shallow knowledge based on correlation and deep knowledge based on causality. This is 
because using causality to build a model entails the knowledge (the structure of the 
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variables' relationship) of the problem domain [212] and a~ Pearl [179-181] argues thi~ 
deep knowledge regarding causation: 
• leaves little ambiguity bet\\TPll the knowledge engineer nnd the expert about what 
is being said; 
• guides the knowledge engineer determining which anah·si~ to conduct: 
• experts just have to follow the model's causal flO\\' to explain it and 
• consolidates the validity of the model. 
We agree with Druzdzel and Simon [59] when they comment that although causality 
cannot always be asserted it is always useful as a tool to elicit and understand BN models 
While it is certainly not the case that every directed arc in a BBN denotes 
causality, the formalism is capable of representing asymmetry among vari-
ables, and thereby, causality. 
Argument that it is also shared by Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter [129] 
"causality" has a broad interpretation as any natural ordering in which 
knowledge of a parent influences opinion concerning a child. This influence 
could be logical, physical, temporal or simply conceptual in that it may 
be most appropriate to think of the probability of children given parents. 
According to Pearl [181] to find causal relations we must 
.. .identify the clues that prompt people to perceive causal relationships, 
given that statistical analysis is driven by covariation, not causation, and 
assuming that most human knowledge derives from statistical observa-
tions. 
These clues can help gaining knowledge to elicit the model: 
• Temporal. The probabilities referring to the present time are conditioned only on 
what happened earlier, not on what happens later. Pearl's [178] sees a temporal 
feature as a more intuitive way to explain the model rather than a property of the 
model itself. 
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• Contextual. Causal networks have <1 context where the relations hold: outside t hi:-; 
context the moclel fails. As a result of this, causal moclels cannot be applied to 
other problems by "analogy" unless they share the same context. 
Note that in Bayesian probability all probabilities are conditional, I.e. they are 
contextual. The notation P(A) for the probability of A is based on the evidence 
P(AI~), where ~ is the context where the estimation is taking place. In the «be of 
eliciting a BN model it represents the expert knowledge about the domain. This 
contextual measurement is always taken into account, e.g. P(A IB, ~) and thus not 
always written, P(A IE) [36]. 
• Spurious correlations can disappear given that causality assumes a deeper domain 
knowledge that is able to explain this causal relation. 
• Asymmetric. The causal link goes only from parent to child. This assertion IS 
consistent with causal reasoning. For instance, we can assume that t Iw "finm1cial 
auditing" is caused by "internal fraud". An increase in frauds is followed by an 
increase in auditing. However, this is a wrong dependency assumption, i.e. "internal 
fraud" is caused by poor auditing. The lack of auditing increases the likelihood of 
frauds and not the other way around. 
• Manipulation. Two events are causally related when we manipulate one and see a 
change in the other. The relevance of this change is what makes two events to be 
causally correlated. 
• Weak transitivity. For instance, in the case of a serial connection if an event A has 
an impact on event B and event B has an impact on event C we conclude that A 
has an impact on event C. However, this transitivity is conditioned upon B and as 
we discuss in section 3.4 this dependency can be broken if B is known 7 . Thus the 
"weakness" of this transitive relation8 . 
7Note that this also applies to other types of connections where the path between two variables 
is d-separated. 
8There is a caveats on this point: It is also true that this weak transitivity may not hold when 
two events A and C are simply correlated. In this case, these two events may have a hidden parent 
node that makes them dependent in spite of knowing B. However, as Giarratano observed [81J 
.. the fact that this assumption is not followed does not affect the overall result 
when we are interested more on the general behaviour of the system rather than 
individual numerical results. 
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On building large-scale BN models Druzdzel et al [51,59] found that in practice it i:-; 
very useful to interpret BN models as causal models for the following reasons: 
• easier for the expert to understand and conceptualise: 
• facilitate the interactions among multiple experts inasmuch as causality provides a 
common language among the experts: 
• usuall~· it ensnres satisfaction of the J\larkov condition (variable independence is 
explicitly Shm\"11 in the graph [152]): 
• usually it is easier to obtain probability judgments following the causal direction. 
From the point of view of explaining the models, Lacave and Dfez [128] add other 
reasons: 
• the identification of invariant causal relationships in a domain allows the prediction 
of effects of both spontaneous causes and actions; 
• the concept of explanation is very closely tied to the notion of causation. 
3.7 Summary 
\Ve have explained how Bayes Theorem can condition domain uncertainties on observable 
events, thus allowing us to express in probabilistic terms rare events such as mid-air 
aircraft collision or financial breakdowns. 
The use of BN enables us to capture complex networks whose joint probabilities, 
explicitly represented in a graph, are the result of applying the concepts of (in)dependency 
and directional separation. Applying these concepts, we can think of a BN model as the 
addition of different modules and this makes possible the representation of real-world 
problems. 
A BN model can be based on quantitative or qualitative knowledge, or both. In the 
case of qualitative knowledge, probability theory, as we discuss in the following chapter, 
grants consistency to the elicited knowledge base. Note that the elicitation of a model's 
relevant variables are given by the variables dependencies. This dependency can also 
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be interpreted as cause and effect, thus providing a rich language to elicit the model's 
relations. 
The challenge is to elicit the knowledge base that informs the BN model, its topol-
ogy and its NPTs. The following chapter focuses on eliciting NPTs, it documents the 
elicitation problems and reviews current methods. 
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Chapter 4 
Modelling and Eliciting NPTs 
4.1 Introduction 
There are two approaches for modelling BNs, namely Data Based and Knowledge Based: 
• Data based approaches: This methodology makes use of algorithms to learn BNs 
from known (training) data [62,146,152]. The assumption is that there is a hidden 
pattern in the data that these algorithms can discover. There are different algo-
rithms available that search through the database for possible networks. They can 
be grouped into two main categories [88]: 
- Constraint-based search: These algorithms determine a network describing the 
data that satisfies a given constraint. For instance, in Pearl's Inductive Cau-
sation (IC) algorithm the constraint is that the model structure must follow a 
causal chain [178]; 
- Bayesian search: Constructs the graphs with the highest posterior probability 
given the data. This approach is guided by the actual correlation of the given 
data [38]. 
In any case, more often than not, models coming out of learning algorithms need 
to be fine-tuned by an expert. The addition of expert knowledge can result in a 
model reflects the nature of the data better than the outcome produced by searching 
algorithms alone [149]. 
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• Knowledge based approach (KBA): A model is seell as a cognitive map of an ex-
peres knowledge and experience. hl the context of BNs. \ve interpret these' cogni-
tive maps as cansal maps t hat express the judgment that certain causes will lead 
to particular eff(Tts [ISO]. As Russel and Norving [1 ~)7] comment 
If the knowledge-base is true in the real world then an.\· sentence 
derived from it b~r sound inference must be also true in the real 
world. 
The domains of interest for this thesis. i.e. high safety risk and operational risk 
in financial institutions, are characterised by the absence of data and the availability of 
expert knowledge. Hence, this thesis focuses on the KBA. 
Expert knowledge together with the semantic characteristics of BNs will enable us 
to model these domains accurately ,md effcctivel~·l . 
The need to elicit expert knowledge has hindered the development of BN models 
and it arguably remains a significant bottle-neck in the application of BNs. 
Indeed, the literature reports general guidelines on how to bring about the elicited ion 
process [17,34,144]. All of these agree, in general, that the elicitation process should be 
carried out in a number of broadly defined steps [76]: expert selection, definition of the 
scope of the problem, selection of the granularity of the description, identifiC<ltion of 
the relevant factors, structuring, iteration, encoding, verification, documentation. The 
differences between the various methods lie in the greater or lesser emphasis placed on 
some of the steps. 
Regarding BNs, however, we have not found a unifying elicitation methodology as 
such. In most cases, elicitation methods are tied up to the type of problem domain 
(e.g. medicine, financial risk), to the availability of experts and their expertise, the 
domain novelty and the type of information the experts must provide (network topology 
or estimates of probabilities). 
1 We are referring to BNs as a semantic approach as opposed to syntactic approaches like Rule 
base. The latter follows classical logic to rl.efine rules,i.e. if ... then, and the variables' scope, e.g. 
'ix, 3x. BN-style semantic approaches, on the contrary, employ conditional probabilit:y to rl.efine 
rules, i.e. B given A, and nse semantics to define the variables' scope, e.g. by representing a BN 
as a causal modeL 
See Krause and Clark [124] for a clear, albeit brief, rl.ifferentiation between the two approaches. 
and Pearl [178] for details on concepts such as intension and extension. 
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Other sourc(,s of variability involve t he form in which experts' HllSwprs are gin'n. 
('.g. llsing ci\Usality to explain modeFs behaviour, and of Course budget/time constrainb2 
[22.26.225]. 
This lack of an unifying methodology explains the variet)' of techniqlles available. 
In section c!.4 we review these techniques in the context of eliciting qualitative expert 
knowledge after having review in the next section the context in which these technique; 
are thought out. 
4.2 Subjective elicitation - Heuristics and Biases 
There is a long-standing discussion on the legitimacy of the subjective approach to build-
ing models based on uncertainty [27,109.189.200]. The main criticism [110] on the use 
of subjective probability is that, according to De Finetti [52] and Savage [200], for an es-
timation to be valid it only needs to be consistent with the expert's judgment. Bowen'!". 
as the work of Kahneman et a1.'s [5] showed, in the case of a systematic bias. 
... the judgment can be consistent with the expert's rational but not 
according to the probability of the event. Thus, for subjective probabilities 
to be considered adequate, or rational, internal consistency is not enough. 
The aim of Kahneman et a1.'s [5] work was to produce a "normative" model of how 
humans act when facing uncertainty. Their research showed that conditioned reasoning 
based on heuristic rules sometimes produces unexpected outcomes. As Kahneman et 
al. [5] comment: 
People rely on a limited number of heuristic principles which reduce the 
complex task of assessing probabilities and predicting values to simpler 
judgmental operations. In general they are quite useful but sometimes 
they lead to systematic errors. 
Such heuristic-induced errors are known as heuristic bias, In the following we briefly 
review some of the forms in which this may occur [5], as illustrated by the diagram in 
Figure 4.1. 
2For further reading on expert elicitation: Ayyub [17] provides a introduction to the subject. 
Meyer's book [144] is mainly based on the findings of the elicitations carried out by the USA 
pro·gram for Nuclear Waste [168]; it provides a good example of what is expected of knowledge 
elicitation and what its limitations are. 
Heuristics 






Insensitivity to prior probability of outcomes 
Misconceptions of chance 
Insensitivity to sample size 
The illusion of validity 
Insensitivity of predictability 
Misconceptions of regression 
Retrieve-ability of instances 




Conjuctive and Disjunctive 
Subjective probability assessment anchoring 
Figure 4.1: Sources of heuristic bias according to [5]. 
Representativeness bias refers to people evaluating the probability of an event based 
on how similar it is to a general class. For example, how likely I am consider a person to 
be a lecturer depends on my pre-conceptions of how lecturers should be. A vailability bias 
derives from the tendency to assess the probability of an event based on one's recollection 
of a similar event. For example, I assess the risk of heart attack based on how many people 
I can recall have had a heart attack. Adjustment and Anchoring occurs when people's 
initial estimates are not adjusted sufficiently to reflect the actual event, resulting in an 
overconfidence in their estimation which is not always backed by their knowledge. 
In summary, Kahneman et al. 's [5] research concludes that biases are an inherent 
part of human cognition. The fact that sometimes heuristic bias may lead to errors has 
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put into question the coherence and calibratio1l3 . 
As Ayton and Pascoe [16] argue: 
... if human decisions are plagued \\'ith unconscious biases. how might 
biases in the knowledge base be ayoided? 
For this reason A. O'Hagan [155] points out most research goes toward the use of 
... improper, so-called non-informatiye priors ... giuen ... the illusory ob-
jectivity of these priors ... however . .. the~' must never be used without 
first thinking whether genuine and informatiyp prior knowledge existsl. 
Let us review the grounds for O'Hagan's assertion. From the point of view of a BN 
we can say that, inasmuch as it follows the laws of probabilit~·. its coherence is granted 
as long as Cox's rules [140] are held. 
P. Krause and D. Clark [124] comment that one of the reaSOllS for using probabilit~· 
theory, and in particular Bayes reasoning, to develop expert systems, is to avoid the 
biases of other less rigorous approaches. 
We have two examples of this (note that these two approaches are not longer in use): 
• The Certainty Factors approach could not grant the coherence of the elicited values 
given its ad hoc approach to assigning numerical values to events. It must be 
said that this approach derived from the type of domain it modeled: medicine. 
Shortliffe [206] explained that medical experts agreed to provide their belief in a 
given conclusion, but that this belief in favour of the conclusion should not be 
constructed as evidence against it. In words of Harre5 
... to confirm something to ever so slight a degree is not to disconfirm it 
at all, since the favourable evidence for some hypothesis gives not support 
whatever to the contrary supposition in many cases. 
3Note that calibration refers to the expert's knowledge about the "true" nature of the event 
and/or to the accuracy of the elicitation method used to extract this knowledge. 
Elicitation is only concerned with the latter point. Indeed, it is against experts' opinion that 
the model is going to be tested and used. 
Nevertheless, there is an interesting discussion on this detachment between expert's knowledge 
and the actual nature of the event. For D.R.Cox [116] this detachment from the quality of 
expertise ... seems a bad idea likely to perpetuate the errors of the past while for Kadane et 
al. [116] thei detachment is what make possible models based on expert's opinions ... there is not 
future errors but actual knowledge. 
4 Italics added 
5Quoted in [206] 
4·2. Subjective elidtatiofl - Hellristics (Jnd Bill.';! S -16 
Shortlitfe [2{J(i) uses the example of diagnosing an infections disease due to sf rep-
tococci from its associated chain of symptoms. He C'xplains that \\'hile experts 
provided a 70% belief on the conclusion given the symptoms the.\· felt UliCClS\' to 
state the correspondent 30% against it as we would do if we were to follow proba-
bilitv theory: P(A) + P( .A) = 1. 
Note the expert is not irrational, as we would conclude if \H' were to follow prob-
abilistiC' reasoning; rather, as Buchanan and Shortlifi'e [2-4] would sa\'. he is only 
ref','cf'ing a level of belief. 
To support. this argument Shortlift'e followed the work of R, ('arnap [27] who illter-
prets degrees of confidence as degrees of confirmation. inasmuch as the probability 
of a statement is the degree of confirmation that the empirical e\'idence gin~s to 
the statement [91]; that is, for Shortliffe [206] the 
... term confirmation does not indicate that an hypothesis is proven but 
rather that an observations lends credence to it. 
'That is \\'h~' Shortliffe did not use the formalism of Probability Theory and based 
his ES MYCIN on the Confirmation Theory. For him the domain of ::\Iedicine did 
not have the level of knowledge assumed in probability theory: thus the creation of 
the Certainty Factor approach based on ad hoc rules made for the spC'('ific domain of 
Medicine6 . Note that this lack of a formal theory behind this approach is reflected 
in the inconsistency of some of its conclusions. 
• The project PROSPECTOR, used to find mineral deposits, is another example. 
Although this project is sometimes quoted as an example of a Bayesian model, this 
is not truly the case in reality. During the development of this project experts 
showed inconsistencies in the elicited value. For that reason the results of linear 
interpolation were used to assure the consistency of the elicited values [81]. 
In conclusion, regarding coherence, we can interpret probability theory as the nor-
mative standard of how people should make judgments facing uncertainty [16,60,170]. 
6See Giarratano [81] for an introduction to Certainty Factors and E. H. Shortlifff> [206] for a 
more detailed explanation. 
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This leaves us with the problem of how well experfs elicited assessments adjust to 
the ''true'' nature of tll<' event, i.e. how wcll calibrated they are. On this area. recent 
research has questioned the grounds for Kahneman et aI.·s [5] a.ssertiolls. 
The current debate is more about research on improving elicitation methods than 
about questioning the value of expert' S opinion. As G. \Yright and P. A~·tOll [76] discuss 
\Ye should remember though that an expert excels in his ability by kncl\\'-
ing "what to look for'~ and not in the ability to integrate information. It 
is in this aspect where an expert judgement can be improved on. 
For Hoffrage [75. 101] heuristic bias has more to do with a lack of methods to elicit 
the experts' opinion than a problem with the nature of human cognition. As Ayton [16] 
points out 
... the experimenter's assumption he is able to calculate what the subjec-
tive probabilities should be for all of the subjects was absolutely necessar~r 
if one was to judge judgment. However, it is also an indication of the ar-
tificiality of the task. 
The experimenter is treating subjective probabilities as objective ones. Gigerenzer 
[82] argues that if people provide similar answers it is because they are able to calculate 
them. However, in doing so the elicitation exercise is no longer subjective [125]. 
For Chapman [133] the current debate is more about 
'" the standards used to judge judgment rather than the judgments them-
selves. 
Under this respect, human bias is seen as the result of ill conceived tasks or of the 
use of a wrong normative model. Ayton and Fischer [15] raise an interesting point by 
questioning the heuristics of "representativeness". They compare the "gambler's fallacy" 
with the "hot-hand fallacy". Both are different interpretation of the same event: a gam-
bler betting following short or long term frequencies of the draws, respectively. Both 
interpretations are wrong if we think that draws are random events. Hence, they raise 
the question of how humans must interpret the result: do humans misunderstand the 
concept of randomness? If we do, as these two fallacies seem to show, how can we mea-
sure it against a statistical concept? Which in turn begs the question: do we know the 
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human reasoning process w('ll enough to ba...')e conclusions on experiments t hat may fail 
to capture that process? Arc we applying the right "nonnatiyc" model? 
Gigerenzer's research [82] has shown that biases such as "Availability" disappear 
when subjects are confronted with frequencies, hence concluding that some biases arc the 
result of how information is presented. Base-neglect [16,229] offers an example in point. 
Base-neglect happens when people ignore prior probabilities and base their judgments 
entirely on facts that may not be relevant to the problem at hand. Take for instance the 
fear of dying in a plane crash. There is indeed a great probability of not sluyiving a crash: 
however, it is very unlikel)' to have one in the first pla.ce. The fact that the experimenter 
expects the subject will think following Bayesian reasoning does not imply that they 
will; for instance, by changing the way the information is presented the subject ma)' 
not need prior probability [121]. Garthwaite et a1. [79] give another example regarding 
"Overconfidence bias" when eliciting probability estilllates for compound evellts, this bias 
is reduced when events are elicited separately rather than combined. 
There is also a discussion on whether single events can be assessed [16]: 
... no statement about confidence in a single event can violate any laws 
of probability ... hence if we cannot compare two judgments then ... who 
can say when an error has occurred ... 7 
This questions whether single probability assessments may be the product of lab 
experiments that cannot be reproduced in a real situation. G. Wright and P. Ayton [229] 
comment on the example of business entrepreneurs who are asked about the probability of 
success of their businesses. The experiment concludes that participants showed a great 
deal of "overconfidence". However this can be also explained as the difficulty for the 
participant to forecast without taking into account a number of variables: 
A business does not have a probability of going well or bankruptcy but 
is the parts that is compose with that should be assessed, this is what 
validates scenario planning. 
Along the same line, Krueger's [125] research concludes human biases derive from 
unrealistic expectations tested by methods that ignore fundamental notions of human 
7Italics added 
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cognition. On this liTH'. Fischoff [72] proyides a number of reasons for human biases. 
e.g. "subjects being unable to express what they know':: "unfair tasks, misllnderstanding 
the task they must perform" or "maybe expecting too much of the expert's knmdedgc", 
·'dehcienc.v from the experimenter to understand the respondenfs conceptual uniYersc':, 
among others. 
Bolger [22] points out that human bias, in many instances, lacks ecological 11(J/idit.l/, 
and when found does not necessarily mean a bad performance. For Hamm [93]. research 
on human biases and heuristics should be used to highlight the limitations of the subjects' 
knowledge and to develop methods to alleviate them [60]. 
Budescu and Karelitz [216] explain bias as a communication problem between expert 
and knowledge engineer. They distinguish three modes of communication: Numerical, 
Range and Verbal, ranging from the precise to the ambiguous. For them. problems during 
elicitation derive from miscommunication among modes, e.g. the knowledge engineer 
prefers the Numerical mode while the expert prefers the Verbal mode. This asymmetr~' 
between communication modes is the origin of the misunderstanding. 
Budescu and Karelitz accordingly devise a translation method that associat('s a fUllc-
tion to each mode. Their aim is to reduce the effects of variability among the participants 
and to provide the most accurate representation of the experts' opinion. 
For Ayton and Pascoe [16] these findings, in general, 
.. , justified exploring and developing methods for representing uncer-
tainty in expert knowledge. If human judgement and knowledge about 
uncertainty are more meaningful and more exploitable when elicited and 
modelled in the appropriate fashion ... 
In the case of BNs, we are able to test the experts' calibration; Lauritzen and Spiegel-
halter [129] comment that the experts' calibration is confirmed as more feedback comes 
along: 
... consistent "surprise" for a particular case would indicate an "outlier", 
while over a number of cases, build-up of 'surprise' in a particular part of 
the system may indicate either faults in the numerical assessments or the 
8The degree to which the laboratory tasks correspond to what the experts really do, and 
then'fore experimental finoings can be generalizeo to the real world. 
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:-;tructuring. 
All ('x;unph' in point is 11w w(,ather forec(1st ES ·'Hailfinder··. A .. '\lnrphy and R. 
""inkIer [18.87] show how the experts modelling weather forecast benefit from frequent 
feedback. The l\IUNIN project provides another example. This project was developed 
to a:-;:-;ist in the diagnosis of neum-muscular disorders [1240]. P Krause and D Clark [12-1] 
explaill how initial probability estimations are strengthened when the S~"stelll accumulates 
data. This is achieved b~' means of the method used to build the probabilit~· tables. 
explained in section 4.4:. 
"'hen data and/or feedback are not available the use of sensitivity analysis can help 
refine the model'::; output [10;3]. As van der Gaag and V. Coupe [218] comment 
The basic idea of performing a sensitivit.y analysis is to systematically 
vary the assessments for the network's conditional probabilities ... some 
... will show a considerable impact. while others will hardly reveal any 
infiuence9 . 
This goes to show that the development of a model is an iterative process where 
model knmvledge is fine-tuned with the help of sensitivity analysis and/or as new data 
comes along. 
Also BNs interpreted as causal models entail a deeper knowledge about the domain, 
with the ability to explain its internal relationships and to assist the experts' judgment 
by providing the relevant variables to consider. 
Developing a unifying methodology would reduce the bottleneck of eliciting BN 
models by creating and maintaining real problem domains using a standard approach 
that can be readily validated. Ontologies may be the answer to this question. 
4.3 Ontologies 
The aim of using ontologies to develop BN models is in part to answer the need of a 
unifying approach to building models and validating their outcome. The benefit for BNs 
is that information can be maintained, discussed, augmented, re-used and documented. 
For V. Alexiev [9] 
9Italics added 
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Ontologies typically define concepts and their relationship, together with 
constraints on those objects and relations. 
An Ontology allows the experts to translate their "mental models" into explicit and 
re-usable models that would be general and at the same time independent of the problem 
domain [203]. 
The aim is to provide a shared and documented understanding of a domain that 
can be communicated between people [68]. To achieve this generality we need a leyel 
of abstraction, i.e. meta-information, that describes the domain aw(\~' from <:m~' specific 
detail [48]. 
To validate these abstract descriptions we need to develop an objective standard. As 
Gruber [86] comments 
Formal Ontologies are viewed as designed artifacts, formulated for specific 
purposes and evaluated against objective design criteria. 
The design criteria proposed by Gruber [86] include10 : 
• Clarity: definitions should be objective, in the sense that they should be indepen-
dent of the social or computational context. Whenever possible they should be 
captured using logical axioms. 
• Coherence: any rational user should be able to infer the same conclusions according 
to the definitions stated. 
• Extendability: an ontology should be general enough (by limiting the number of 
assertions) so that further specialised ontologies can be derived from it monoton-
ically. In this sense building a model could be seen as putting together different 
ontologies. We can identify two approaches [9): 
merging data models to create a single ontology or 
mapping existing models. In this case, the ontologies remain unaltered but for 
the addition of a number of links between them. 
lOThese criteria act as guidelines. We can find other approaches that, based on the same 
criteria, expand or reduce the definition of ontology depending on the domain. See [4] for an 
example of building an ontology on the domain of Biology 
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• ~Iinimal encoding bias: t h(' conceptualisation of knowledge shollld be indppendent 
011 the tool (e.g. elicitation method) used to capture it. That is. \\"(' should not be 
partial to the lllost practical or familiar method, but rather choose the one that 
~hould provide the sa11l(' results when encoded in different tools (e.g. using different 
elicitation methods). 
For Gruber [86] the extent to which these criteria can be applied depends on the 
knowledge available and on the domaill in which the ontology is going to be used. For 
instance, in the engineering domain [230]. characterised by an axiomatic knowledge, the 
reslllting ontologies will better fit these criteria. 
However. in domains characterized by a greater ~ll1certainty we cannot always follow 
this criteria. In a BN coherence is granted by the use of probabilit~· theory, but We' 
cannot say the same thing about the nodes' definition or topology. For instance, we nlC1~' 
need to add some constraints in order to define concepts, e.g. in BNs the assumption of 
variable (in)dependence may not be shared by other experts. Thus we can no longer claim 
ontology extendability since other people may not share the same constraints. This falls 
short of the level of generality required to extend the ontology as we add more assertions 
about the model. 
Regarding encoding bias, Helsper and van der Gaag [98] discuss the use of probability 
theory to encode a domain's knowledge: 
... since a probabilistic network in essence is a model of a joint probability 
distribution, multi-valued domain concepts must be modelled as statistical 
variables, which are single-valued by definition. 
Costa and Laskey [39] propose a probabilistic ontology to represent uncertain do-
mains. The idea behind it is that although experts may have imperfect knowledge that 
falls short of the definition of a concept, they may still have some knowledge about it; 
the extent of that knowledge can be represented in probabilistic terms. For Costa and 
Laskey the knowledge about a domain application must include: types of entities in the 
domain, their properties and relationships, processes and events, statistical regularities 
and uncertainty regarding the domain among others. 
They discuss the use of a new probabilistic ontological language, namely PR-O\VL
ll
, 
llThe OWL language is the de facto standard used to develop web-ontologies. O\YL is based 
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hased on l\lulti-Entity BN (l\!EBN) hn,t order Bay('sian logic. :'IEBN [-lej represents the 
world as made of entities that hayc properties and relationships. These entities" attribut(.s 
and relationships are represented as a collection of fragments (':\IFrags) organized into 
Theories (l\ITheory). Each fragnlent specifies a conditional probability distribution gin'n 
its parent fragment. An l\ITheOl'~o will represent the joint probability distribution that 
results from the combination of all t he fragments. 
For an example of this approach see the project "Detection Threat Behayior" [171]. 
In it, an lVIEBN structure is used to control the access of people to sellsitiYe information. 
Information is available to all the users, but only the ones with pri\Oileges would be able to 
access it. Access is controlled using additional l\IFrags to refine the node's functionality. 
See also Helsper and van del' Gaag [97] for a didactic example on building a BN 
ontology. Their ontology focuses on the topology of the model. 
These ontologies are developed using the tool created by the Standford University: 
"Protege'·12. The University of Manchester and Amsterdam also developed the Ontology 
Inference Layer: "OIL',13. 
4.4 Probability Elicitation methods 
Garthwaite et al [172] define the elicitation of NPTs as 
... the process of formulating a person's knowledge and beliefs about one 
or more uncertain quantities into a (joint) probability distribution for those 
quantities. 
Those quantities are elicited within the context of the node's conditional dependency. 
As we explained in Chapter 3, a node is independent of the rest of the network given its 
parents. Therefore, the number of parameters of a child node depends on the number of 
its parents and on the number of states they both have. For instance, for a node \yith five 
parents, assuming parent and child nodes are binary variables, we need to elicit 25+1 = 64 
probability values, i.e. the number of values is an exponential function on the number of 
parents. For this reason we need techniques that make handling such a large amount of 
on the XML language; without going into details it will suffice to say that this type of language 
provides meta-information about a concept. 
12http:j jprotege.stanford.eduj 
13http:j jwww.ontoknowledge.orgjoilj 
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information possible. 
This section reviews known methods to ell'cI't tIle eXpel"ts' . opmion. The len>] of 
complexity varies; some methods are better suited to certain domains than others. e.g. 
Noisy-OR in l\Iedicine; in general they address the problem of bias from different per-
spectives and their accuracy and the time taken to elicit may vary. These methods are: 
• Interviews and Questionnaires. 
• Verbal/Numerical scales. 
• Probability wheels. 
• Betting. 
• Graphical tools: Bar graph, Probability wheel. 
• Statistical distributions. 
4.4.1 Interviews and Questionnaires 
This method is of particular relevance for the present thesis. An example of its use can 
be found in Chapter 6, where we model the contribution of socio-technical factors to 
mid-air aircraft collision. 
Researchers at the Safety Research Unit (SRU), in the School of Psychology of the 
University of Liverpool, lead by Prof. Ian Donald produced a questionna.ire to find out 
employees' perception of management involvement in the risk management process [138]. 
This questionnaire is divided into 12 factors. For each of these factors a number of 
questions are used to defined a. firm's risk perception. In Table 4.1, we observe how 
questions are grouped based on the factor they are more correlated with. In this case, 
factor one, "Personal evaluation of safety system". The last column of Table 4.1 shows 
the correlation between factor one and the answer to each of these questions. 
As the NATS project's results have shown, questionnaires are a valuable tool to reach 
a wider audience, in this case over 7211 respondants, using the same set of questions to 
act as a normalising factor. 
Questionnaires highlight the problems with direct elicitation methods: experts are 
more exposed to cognitive bias such as over-confidence, anchoring and adjustment. Gigeren-
zer [82] argues that direct assessments will not produce calibrated assessments " ... not 
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Q. NWIl. QuC'stion Correlation 
Q12 I f(,cl sali!:di('d wit h the safct~· informatioll I get .G--1--1 
Q13 I am happ~' with the existing safety precautions for particll- .567 
lady hazardous work 
Q14 I fepl s<ltisfied with the ;dtplltion given to safety in an~' train- . sse; 
ing I have had 
Q10 I am h;lpp~' \\"it h the safety f'quipment specified for m~' joh .S-19 
Q9 Generally I am happy with the safety in my asset area .--18:3 
Q22 I know the results of safety inspections to do with my job .--122 
Q15 Th(' people I work with arc satisfied with the attention given .--120 
to safety in any training 
Q8 The people I ""York with are satisfied with the inform()tion .388 
they get abont safe working 
Table 4.1: Questions Correlated to Factor One: Personal evaluation of safety Systelll. 
This is 01\(' out of 12 factors that have shown to define employees' perception of manage-
ment involvement in the risk management process. 
eL'en afJeri JIg Fre'nch champagne" [82]. It is, thus, not surprising to see why the usc of 
elicitation methods such as Delphi are highly criticised [17]. Questionnaires are also time 
consuming from the point of view of persons who administer the questions to the subjects 
who fill them [219]. In the case of Prof. Ian Donald's team it took several years to collect 
and to process the information. These amounts of time and the corresponding budget 
are not always available to develop a model. 
4.4.2 Verbal - Numerical 
Techniques like verbal scales try to address the problem of direct elicitation [92,107,193, 
202]. The use of linguistic probabilities is based on the idea that humans feel more at 
ease providing probability estimations using verbal expressions, e.g. "Probable", than 
using numbers, e.g. "0.85" [217,219,225]. Renooij [193] recommends to couple verbal 
expressions with numerical values, in this case, verbal expressions are later evaluated to 
a numerical value. 
However, the interpretation of verbal uncertainty may be influenced by cognitive 
biases [1]; there is also the difficulty of mapping numerical values to verbal expressions 
open to the different expert's interpretation [66], without mentioning the time it may 
take to elicit a completeNPT through this method. 
However, it is also advisable to use techniques familiar to the expert (e.g. verbal 
scales) when the values to be elicited or the experts do not satisfy certain conditions. 
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Bolger [22] mentions t he following: 
• availabilit~· of repeated en'nts of tIlt' same t~'pe: 
• unamhiguous OCClllTl'll(T of events: 
• usable feedback and 
• experience using probabilities. 
As an example we can refer to our NATS project explained in Chapter 5. In it. \\T 
used thi::; technique to obtain the expert',,, confidence about his assessment. The main 
reasons for using this approach was the scarcity of aircraft "near-misses", i.e. data, and 
the lack of statistical knowledge of the experts. We also share the view of Ngwenyama 
and Bryson [115] when they comment 
... the use of conditional probability can help reduce the inherent problems 
of verbal-numerical probability elicitation by providing the expert with 
more information when assessing the probability ... 
We provided a look up table where the experts could map their confidence using a 
verbal/numerical scale. The variance elicited was calculated and the results discussed 
with the experts, who could see the impact of their estimation on the model. Providing 
this quick "feedback" enabled us to discuss any possible misunderstanding or ambiguity 
in the values elicited; any disagreement between the elicited estimations and future data 
on near-misses will end up confirming or modi£ying these values. 
4.4.3 Probability Wheel 
A probability wheel, see Figure 4.2, has two sections of different colours. The size of the 
shadowed area is adjusted by the expert until the probability of the pointer stopping on 
the shadowed area agrees with the expert's estimation. 
The idea is that when the pointer is spun the probability that it will land within the 
shadow area is equal to the probability assigned by the expert to some specified event. 
4.4.4 Betting 
The basic idea is that the expert is presented with the choice of two lotteries, schematized 
in Figure 4.3. He/she can either enter a lottery, where the pay-off is 10 if the expert 
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Figure 4.2: Probability wheel. 
guesses the "correct'" probability of a particular event. or (lcc<'pt Cl fix('d iUllollnt of money 
that is offered instead. The idea is that the ;Ullonnt of money v;lries with "x" (see 
Figure 4.~3) until the expert is indifferent about either bet. 
P flO 
1 - P f1 
____ ~fx? 
Figure 4.3: Betting method. 
A similar approach is used in the field of finance where experts are paid with bonuses 
III relation to their forecasting. This practice has been criticised as experts may feel 
tempted to be over-confident in their estimations given the prospect of personal gains, 
as recent financial scandals have shown [67,194]. 
Regarding graphical tools, Druzdzel et a1. 's [88] research showed they are useful 
in elicitating experts' beliefs. They devised a game of cat and two mouse to evaluate 
how people learn probability values. The goal of this game is for the cat to catch the 
mouse. There are certain "conditions" on this game that the player must learn by trial 
and error. There are two main variables, one is the player's move (which is known to 
the player) and the other is the state of the game which is uncertain to him. If the 
player wants to catch the mouse he will have to learn, condition, his movement to that 
of the mouse. Participants were asked to produce probability estimations following three 
different methods: directly asking for numerical values, a probability wheel and a scaled 
probability bar. 
Out of these methods, the scale bar was the most efficient in terms of accuracy 
and time spent recording the probability values. Whitcomb et a1. [226] evaluated similar 
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elicitation lllcthods: l11111leric;-d probabilities, pIe diagrams, and odds. Both IT:-'(',IITh 
groups concluded t han these methods are seen as reliable. The same C,\11 be said of (It her 
methods like Lotteries. Betting, Certainty equivalent gambles [46]. Resl'archer:-. :-'l'pms 
to be unanimous on this point, that the use of the above tools is helpful to obtaiJl the 
experts: estimations. 
The main drawback of these techniques is the time taken for each probabilit~· elicited 1-1. 
In the case of Druzdzel et aL [88] research, the average time per elicited \'cdue was 
around 30 min. making these techniques non viable for building large NPTs. A d(':-.irable 
feature of these techniques is that they do not require a knowledge of Statistics. which is 
often the case of the people who maintain and use the tool [71,73,136, 139.15L 187]. 
4.4.5 Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Methods 
Druzdzel and van del' Gaag [61] explain a method that uses both quantitative and qual-
itative knowledge to build NPTs. The underlying idea is that all knowledge about the 
domain is valuable and can be used to constrain the model's outcome. All the available 
knowledge is therefore incorporated in the model in the form of a system of (in)equalities. 
These equations act as constraints within which lays the "true" or, in Demspter and 
Shafer's terms, the most "plausible" joint probability distribution. 
4.4.6 Statistical Methods 
Two statistical approaches can be used to build NPTs: Parametric and Non-parametric . 
• Parametric approaches involve the use of distributions of known shape (for example 
Gaussian curves) to fit experts' knowledge (or the domain data). In general, as J. 
Gill [83] explains 
.. , parametric functions define what the data should look like conditioned 
on unknown variable values. 
14Time here is interpreted in the context of eliciting large probability tables. From a different 
perspecti~e, it 'WOUld be difficult to assess a method in terms of time consumed given that the 
time taken will ultimately depend on how difficult the expert perceives the task to be [77J. 
The reader can use the tool called "Elicitor" to appreciate the point of this argument [126J. 
This tool uses graphical cues to elicit probability values: http://silmaril.math.sci.qut.edu.au/ '" 
whateley / download.html 
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These unknown variables an' the "parameters" from which this category of ap-
proaches takes its name (in the casc of a Gaussian, for instance. these would be its 
lllcan and standard deviation). 
• Non-parametric approaches invoh'c the use of distributions that h8\'e their shape 
determined directly by the data [36.130] (for instance, as a frequency histogram) . 
These methods force fewer assumptions onto the data, but normally require more 
information for a reliable estimatioll to be obtained, They also result in more 
memory-intensive algorithms, because the shape of the distributions needs to be 
stored - this is particularly onerous in the case of high-dimensional data [196]. 
In this Thesis, we will focus on the parametric approaches. The main reasons for 
our choice are as follows: 
• The availability of data 1Il the domains of rare events in the safeh' critical and 
finance industries is more an exception than the norm. 
• The complexity of modelling these domains leads to complex relationships (e.g. the 
causes connected to a financial fraud are multiple) which translate into large NPTs, 
making the use of non-parametric approaches impractical 
4.4.6.1 Eliciting Distributions' Intervals 
R. Winkler [127] studied the use of Binomial distributions to elicit probability values. 
He focused on four different techniques to eliciting the probability value p of a Binomial 
distribution: 
1. Cumulative Distribution (CDF) - The distribution is divided into quantiles and 
experts provide probability estimations for those. A Beta distribution is also used 
to represent expert's estimation of p; the Beta distribution is chosen from a table 
showing different shapes. This method is also called quantile method or credible 
interval method. 
2. Hypothetical Future Samples - The expert begins with an assessment that it is later 
modified according to a change in the sample size. 
3. Equivalent Prior Sample Information - Expressing prior judgments in the form of 
an equivalent prior sample. 
4·4· Probability E!icitlltioll II/ethod." GO 
4. Probability Density Function (PDF) - This technique is similar to the CDF. Both 
techniques require values for given intervals. only in this cast' it is the probability of 
the interval rather than the quantile. The estimation provided is relatin> to anuther 
interval. Experts draw a PDF according to their opinion: both assess probabilities 
for given quantiles. 
Out of these methods the CDF and PDF provided good results eliciting probability 
values, with the PDF being the most successful of the two. The use of a CDF proved 
more challenging for the participants. who found it difficult to understand its concept. 
In summary, the use of quantiles and drawing the distribution were seen as successful 
approaches; although R. Winkler also acknowledge that the \"alidity of t hes(' findillgs is 
limited to the use of the Bernuolli distribution in his research. 
Garthwaite et a1. [175] recommended two methods to elicit intervals in a PDF: "fixed 
intervals" and "variable intervals". The former amounts to pmtitiolling the area into fixed 
intervals, e.g. 5 intervals of equal width, and eliciting values for each interval while the 
latter there is not a prior partition of the area. The initial interval is given by the 
elicited Median and subsequent interval's assessment are relative to it [172]. HO\v(~\Tr, 
this research does not comment on how to choose the width and number of the intervals in 
order to produce the best results, which is something to consider given that the selection 
of intervals has an impact on the reliability of the results obtained [2]. 
Regarding the selection of intervals, O'Hagan [2] compares dividing the area into 
different intervals size to study how this affects the probability estimates. One approach 
is to divide the area into three intervals of approximately equal width, i.e: [0-33], [33-66] 
and [66-100]. Another approach is to divide the area into to intervals of equal width. 
[0-50], [50-100]. He concludes that neither approach in particular shows better results. 
However he also adds that these results demonstrate the lack of research on this area. , 
Although eliciting intervals avoids the need to obtain directly the distribution's pa-
rameters and is more approachable for the non-statistician, it must be said that cognitive 
bias, like for example "over-confidence", is still present [127]. 
A dear example of the presence of overconfidence and anchoring biases occurs when 
eliciting the distribution's tails [141). Anchoring bias results from choosing one interval, 
e.g. assess the Median, and make relative estimation based on that Median; if the first 
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inten"al is incorrectly chosen then further estimations increase the initial error. 
Tails. as w(' explain in Chapter 7, capture rare events: all~' misjudgment (e.g. o\"cr-
confidpllcc) un the tail can have em important repercussion on the forecast. For this 
reason, it would desirable to elicit the tails as part of a distribution and not indepenclentl~" 
as an interval. In Chapter 7 we discuss this latter point in more detail. 
4.4.6.2 Eliciting Distributions' Parameters 
Parametric techniques call build large probability tables eliciting only a few scenarios 
while maintailling the quality of the information elicited. As Druzclzel [60] commeuts 
... subjects consider no more than a few scenarios, a tiny fraction of the 
possible scenarios in a complex problem ... The probability of c1ll~" sce-
nario within a model often can be seen as drawn from a highly Ske\\Td 
log-normal distribution ... What it practically means is that despite un-
certainty, there is at any point usually a few very likely states of the model 
... These states explain for all practical purposes almost all nncertaillty. 
In this section, we review the following list of distributions: 
• Beta distribution 
• Triangular distribution 
• Pert distribution 
• Binomial distribution 
• Conjugate distributions 
• Normal distribution 
• Multivariate Normal distribution 
Other techniques specific to BNs are: 
• Divorcing 
• Noisy-OR gates 
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Beta distrib1J,tio'TI. Thi~ t.'"pc of distribution is often llsed gIven tht' difff'l'('nt type of 
shapes it can prOChlC()5. HO\\"('V(T. it is difficult to anticipate its shC:l}H' gin'll it s hn)er-
parameters a. f3. These h~rper-parameters are sometimes elicited CIS the probability of 
success (a) and t he probabilit~· of failure (f3) of an event. However. this interpretation 
does not always match the intended shape of the distribution. For this reason. a table 
with different Beta shalH'S is often used to give the expert a choice of shapes [1~7]. scc 
Figure 4.4. 
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Figure 4.4: Beta distributions 
Triangular distribution. As an approximation to the Beta distribution we can use a 
Triangular distributions, which simplifies the elicitation of the expert's knowledge. This 
type of compactly supported distribution is characterised by three parameters: the lower 
and upper bounds of the support and the mode, i.e. the point for which the probability 
is most likely [222] (see Figure 4.5). 
This distribution does not require advanced statistical knowledge and is easy to 
elicit, as only three points are needed to specify the distribution. However, it constitutes 
a rather coarse approximation to the Beta distribution, with a tendency to overestimate 
the tails. 
A better approximation is provided by the Pert distribution described below. 
15Note that the Beta family can also represent a uniform distribution. Uniform distributions 
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Figure 4.5: Triangular distribution. Minimum = 0, l\/Iaximum = 10, ~lost Likel~' = 5. 
Pert distribution. Developed by NASA to assess time involved in developing a tool [222]. 
the Pert distribution uses a three point estimate like the Triangular distribution but 
follows a smooth shape of the Beta type. 
The aim is to combine the flexibility of the Beta's sl1<lpe ana the ease of elicitation 
of the Triangular distribution parameters. Figure 4.6 shows two examples of a Pert 
distribution. Here, we observe how the most likely outcome makes the distribution skew 
to either side. 
Finally, we note that the Pert distribution has, like the Beta and the Triangular 
ones, a finite support, meaning that the probability is strictly zero out:-;ide a finite set. 
This assumes a knowledge that cannot always be granted when dealing with uncertainty: 
setting the boundaries of the support means that it is inconceivable that the event can 
happen beyond those bounds, thus showing a clear case of over-confidence bias (unless 
the finite interval is dictated by the nature of the problem). In the case of the Pert 
distribution, as opposed to the Triangular, the extremes of the support are not elicited 
explicitly, which somewhat alleviates the effects of the bias. 
PERT distribution 








PERT d,stnbllbon" MLflumum =- 0 Likely = 2 Ma:o,mum = 10 -
°OL----~02----~0.'----~0~.6--~~0.8~--~ 
Expectedv.tlue 
Figure 4.6: Pert distributions 
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Binomial distributions. P. Krause and C. Clark [124] give an example on how the Bi-
nomial distribution is applied to reduce uncertainty. In t he MUNIN project referred to 
earlier on page 50, they used a Normal distribution to build NPTs the mean of which i 
the expect ed value, while the deviation is given by the average of n diagnosis, each of 
which is distributed as a binomial with probability p : 
( 4. 1) 
As we observe in equation 4.1 as n increases the deviat ion decreases , thus narrowing 
the central peak of the distribution; in other words, as n increases so will our knowledge 
about the estimation being confirmed (or otherwise , if the distribution spreads then the 
est imation must be rnodified ). 
P. Krause and C. Clark [124] comment 
. .. once the system is in use, case data will become available. If the 
true state of a patient , say, is eventually ascertained , this can be used to 
critique the state predicted by the system. 
We can see an example of this function in the OpRisk model, explained in Chapter 
7, to capture the relation between the number of potent ial fin ancial loss at business 
line level and the probability of success in reducing/avoiding them given by the control 
quality (e.g. quality of t he internal auditing) of t he business line, see Figure 4.7. In this 
case, the control's quality, i.e. t he probability p of reducing the number of losses, is a 
function given by the Report Quality, the Internal and External level of auditing and the 
Organisational Culture that promotes risk reporting16 . 
KRls for trading and Sales 
Function : 
Binomial (n,p) 
n = frequency of losses 
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F igure 4.7: Binomial distribution for "Key Risk Indicators for Trading and Sales". 
More complex parametric functions require statistical knowledge to provide the dis-
16See C. Alexander [7) for details on the use of this function modplling fina.ncial risk 
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tribution mumellts. In 1he case of Conjugate distributions, the knowJ<.dg(> ,l\l<! clifticllltif'~ 
of eliciting different h~'p<T-par(\ll}('t(TS for diH'erc>nt t~'I)('s of distributiOlls ,-11"(' reduced at 
the cost of assuming a prior knowledge. 
Conjugate JJrior Sometimes it is more convenient to assume that th(' expert's kllowl-
edge call lw captured using a specified faIllil~' of distributions. this is \\"h~' this choice of 
distributions is also called convenience prior [185]. 
Given a certain class of likelyhood functions, its conjugate prior is a class of prior 
distributions snch that the posterior will have the same form as the prior. That is to sm'. 
both prior and posterior belong to the same distribution family [228]. 
The most commonly used pair of conjugate distributions is the Beta-Binomial - the 
likelihood being a Binomial distribution while the prior, and consequentl~' the pos1erior, 
are Beta distributions. 
The elicitation task is reduced to choosing appropriate hyper-parameter values to 
capture the main features of the expert's opinion [79]. 
In the case of a Beta-Binomial, the experts are asked for the number of successes 
given a particular scenario and also for reasonable bounds on the uncertainty [172]. 
This prior is represented using a Beta distribution. If our prior hypothesis is con-
firmed by the data via the likelihood function we can conclude this relation is robust, 
i.e. our prior has little impact on the conditioned probability, see Figure 4.2 a). On the 
contrary, if prior and likelihood have widely differing shapes, this signals a problem with 
the elicited information, for instance due as we commented in section 4.2 to cognitive 
biases. In any case, this highlights a weakness of the estimation process that needs to be 
addressed, see Figure 4.2b). Figure 4.2c) shows as D'Agostini [49] comments, a problem 
with the domain being too uncertain to base any assertion: in this case, the supports of 
the likelihood and of the prior do not overlap. This does not necessarily imply that the 
assessment is wrong (as indeed it could well reflect the nature of the problem), but that 
it does need to be confirmed. 
S. Russell and P. Norvig [197] provide a didactic example on the use of the Normal 
distribution in a BN model. Their example models the relationship between the harvest, 
its subsidy (or lack of) and the resulting cost of the product. The subsidy is represented 
by a boolean variable while the harvest is represented by a continuous variable. 
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a) Prior confirms likeli-
hood. 




c) Prior and likelihood 
contradict each other. 
Table 4.2: Prior probability - likelyhood function 
The parameters of the cost distribution are a function of the harvest; for this thc~­
use a Gaussian distribution whose mean J.1 varies linearly with the YCllue of the parent 
harvest h and whose standard deviation (J is fixed. 
In conclusion, two distributions are needed to model p(clh, --.subsidy) and p(clh.subsidy): 
(4.2) 
where s indicates the presence of the subsidy, its value being either true or false. 
So, for s = true we need to provide the parameters {a/, bt , (J/ }, and the same for s = 
false(adapted from [197]). 
The interesting points we want to draw from this example are: 
1. The child node becomes a function of its parent nodes: cost as a function of harvest's 
size and subsidy. 
2. The use of a linear function to model the nature of this dependence: the mean of 
the distribution of the child node, the cost, becomes a linear function of the harvest: 
3. The uncertainty of the cost is captured using the standard deviation (Js. 
From these features of Russell and Norvig's example we can derive the following 
considerations: 
1. There is no need to elicit the child node's NPT (invariably the largest table) ex-
plicitly as this becomes a function of its parents, thus making a causal explanation 
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easier as we'll. Being the distribution Normal we only need the mean and \'ariance 
to produce a NPT in a short amount of time [60], 
2. The assumption of lilwi-1rity is pertinent as long as the variables remain monotOll-
ically related, and there are no abrupt changes or discontinuit), in their functional 
dependellce: in this case, a simple linear model will provide good results [22], Sen'e 
as an example G, \Yright and P. Ayton~s [76] comments on a study on Hodgkin's 
disease in which the doctors coded the patients' biopsies and made an overall rating 
of severity: 
These overall ratings were very poor predictors of survival time. But 
the variables provided by the doctors were used in a standard linear 
regression analysis. These made excellent predictions. 
In fact, even if the underlying relationship is not linear, making this approximation 
(unless the nonlinear dependence is crucial to the problem at hand and cannot be 
ignored) produces better results than using more complex approaches17 . 
3, The assumption of variable independence in the linear model is also consistent with 
BN assumption of independence. 
Notice that the parameters a,b and (J' in Russel and Norvig's example are estimated 
from the data and that (J' is fixed. 
In the ranked node approach we assume the absence of data and instead we use 
experts' knowledge. The values a,b are elicited Following this approach This can be done 
by assuming that Y is normally distributed around the value provided by the regression 
model, with a given standard deviation <J: 
P(Y = y) = Normal (Yl J.1 , <J) (4.3) 
where J.1 = f3xx+ f3zz, This is a valid assumption as long as the noise on the estimate 
17There is an interesting philosophical discussion regarding complexity vs simplicity, which 
supports the case for simple models [146J (in the author's view, many of the arguments could 
be extended from the topology of the model to elicitation methods). In support to this thesis, 
we quote Darwin's Theory of Evolution: a model must be general enough to adapt to changes 
on the domain, thus, simpler models have good chances to fit future demands. Another relevant 
principle is Ockham's razor: all other things being equal, choose the simplest explanation. :"lore 
complex explanations are often a sign that a problem is not well understood. 
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of Y can be interprett'd as t he sum of ind('pendent find identically distributed e.rput 
uncertain assessments. 
It is worth noting that v.:hen the distribution to be elicited is approximatel~' sym-
metric experts' estimates have shown a high degree of el('curacy [79]: this suggests that 
the experts are better at providing prob;-lbilities when these are in the shape of a Normal 
distribution [172], 
On the other hand, if the resulting distribution is not symmetric experts' estimates 
are poorer. However, as Gart liwaite's [175] research has shown, there seldom is enough 
difference froIll the point of view of accuracy tu justif~' assuming an aS~'lmnetric distri-
bution for the experf opinion, 
In the case of eliciting the standard deviation, research shows that the experts gin' 
poor estimations [175]. For this reason we need alternatiY<::' ways to obtain this quantity: 
• using a verbal/numerical table (see section 4.4.2): 
• indirectly by analysing the factors that contribute to that variance; 
• using statistical distributions (e.g. see section 4.4.6.2); 
In the indirect approach the standard deviation is a function of the parent nodes, 
these represent the systematic errors and random errors that can derived from the elic-
itation exercise [3], e.g. variance = systematic errors + random errors. In this way the 
standard deviation can be dynamically adjusted depending on the novelty of the do-
main, the experts' knowledge of the subject and possible bias, among others. Figure 4.8 
illustrates this idea. 
Multivariate Normal Another particular case, studied by Garthwaite et a1. [14] and 
Kadane et a1. [183], is the use of a NIultivariate Normal distribution to represent more 
complex relationships involving more than one variable. (In Chapter 8 section 8.3 we 
show Multivariate method consistent with the node approach.) 
However, our view is that, if at all possible, one should re-cast the relationship in 
a way that avoids the multivariate dependence, in order to make it more amenable to 
elicitation. 
We agree with O'Hagan [156] when he comments 
4·5. EN techniqll(,s to 'trlllf'(' flu size of the XPT ()!J 
Predicted y - TN(EM ' Variance) 
Figure 4.8: ]\!ean and variance as a function respectively of the data aud of the explicitly 
defined SOUl'Ces of uncertainty . 
... Even with two variables, these are more complex things for the C'xpert 
to think about, and with three or more variables it will be very difficult for 
the expert to assess suitable values for joint or conditional probabilities 
It is generally possible to re-interpret the model in such a way that node's relationship 
becomes univariate. As argued by Kadane and Wolfson [117], 
If complex probability is required decompose the problem into eliciting 
simpler probabilities and combine then using probability laws, using in-
fiuence diagrams they can appreciate more the value of their input ... 
The next section explains how to decompose a problem domain using a technique 
called divorcing. 
4.5 BN techniques to reduce the size of the NPT 
There are essentially two specific approaches to reducing the size of the NPT: 
1. Changing the graphical structure of the BN (namely, divorcing) or 
2. noisy-OR gates. 
4.5.1 Divorcing 
The first approach builds on the principle of divorcing parents by introducing intermedi-
ate variables, thus reducing the size of the node probability Table [111]. This approach 
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can also be used as a tool to facilitate and improve expert elicitation. As we commcllkd 
earlier in section 4.4.6. experts are poor at estimating the cum pound eH'(,ct of t\\·o or 
more variables [156]. Garthwaite et al. 's [79] research shows that experts tend to un-
derestilll;d e the eft°eet of single variables showing overconfidence when estimating their 
combined effect: under tbis respect divorcing can be seen as a modelling tool. 
(a) Node X with four parents pa(X) = 
{A,B,C,D}. Assuming they are all binary 
variables, we have 24+1 = 32 probability 
values to elicit for the node X . 
(b) Same network as in Figure (C\) but this 
time we have divoTced the parent nodes 
taking them one at a time. In this way. 
we only have 22+1 = 8 probability values 
to elicit per intermediar~r variable Xi when' 
i = 1,2,3. Thus, the total values elicited 
are 8 x 3 = 24 values. 
Figure 4.9: Divorcing is a techniques to reduce the size of an NPT by introducing inter-
mediate variables. 
Figure 4.9 shows an example of divorcing. Note that the way the parents nodes 
are grouped in Figure 4.9(b) is irrelevant to the final computation 18. That is, we might 
have chosen a different order: {B, D}, {A} and {C}; as long as the order respects the 
(in)dependency among nodes. 
In any case, the way in which the nodes are grouped should facilitate their elicitation. 
The intermediary variables X I ,X2 and X3 appear only for computational purposes, and 
have no other (causal) meaning attached to them. In terms of elicitation, they represent 
the compound effect of their parents. 
18There may be some disparity between results but this is due to the computational algorithm 
used 
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4.5.2 Noisy-OR Gates 
The second approach, called noisy-OR, W(-IS introduced b\ Pearl in [178]. Thi~ approach 
models the case where the relationship behn'cll parent and child is uncertain or as Pearl 
would say, the causal relationship between parent and child mav be inhibited. 
oJ 
\Ve will introduce this technique b~" means of an example in a medical context (,\"here 
this approach has mainly been applied]!)), l)('foH' giving its mathematical definitioll. 
Let us assume that we want to discover the cause of a patient's fever. Suppose that 
there are only three possible causes, i.e. cold. jiv. and malaria. Hmwyc'r. \\.C' can think 
of a patient who has a cold but who does not exhibit a fever. in which case the causal 
relationship would be inhibited. Of course. the conditions that inhibit cold as a cause 
are different from those that inhibit flu. and so forth. Also. vv'e assume that if the patient 
shows a fever due to a cold then the inhibitors associated with cold must be inactive. 
and that the same applies to the other causes. \'"it h these assumptions we onl)· need to 
elicit three probability values to build the noisy-OR table 4.3. namely 
P( ----.feverjcold, ---,flu, ----.malaria) = 0.6 
P( ----.feverl----.cold,flu, ---,malaria) = 0.2 
P( ----.feverl----.cold, ---,flu, malaria) = 0.1 
(the numerical values are those used in Table 4.3 below). 
I Cold I Flu I Malaria I P(fever) I P( ----.fever) 
f f f 0 1 
f f t 0.9 0.1 
f t f 0.8 0.2 
f t t 0.98 0.2*0.1=0.02 
t f f 0.4 0.6 
t f t 0.94 0.1 *0.6=0.06 
t t f 0.88 0.6*0.2-0.12 
t t t 0.988 0.6*0.2*0.1=0.012 
Table 4.3: Example of noisy-OR, from [197] 
Pearl [178] defines noisy OR as follows. Let U = {V1,V2, .. Vn } be the n parents of 
node X and h ,h, . .In be the associated inhibitors of these parents nodes, respectively. Let 
qk stand for the probability that the k-th inhibitor is active. If Vi is the only parent that 
19See for instance Agnieszka [169] for an example of the use of Noisy OR-gates in the diagnosis 
of liver disorders. 
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is in the "trlll;' state, X will be .. true" if and only if the inhibitor associated with L'i ( i.e. 
li ) remains inactive. That is, 
p(X = truel Ui = true, Uk = false'llk =I- i) = I - qi 
As we have seen in our example, the NOI'sy-Or' oper·~-,.tl·orl k t . dIna es \\'0 aSSlllnptlOns 
[178]: 
Figure 4.10: Logic diagram showing the concept of a noisy-OR gate, Adapted from [178] 
l. Accountability: An event E (e.g. having a fever) is presumed false if all the condi-
tions listed as causes (e.g. malaria, fiu, cold) of E are false. This of course implies 
that all the causes must be listed2o . 
2. Independence: the inhibition of each parent is independent of the inhibition of the 
other parents (e.g. the inhibitor of cold is completely unrelated to that of malaria). 
Therefore, 
p(X = falselU) = IT qi 
iju;=t 
and 
p(X = truelU) = 1 - IT qi 
ilu;=t 
where {iIU; = t} indexes the subset of parents that are true. 
For instance in table 4.3 we observe that Fever is false if and only if all of its parents , 
in the "true" state are inhibited. 
20 An interesting extension of this concept is the leaky Noisy-OR. This is for the case in which 
the effect r:an still materiali7:e even if none of the parents are actiw. The leaky node stands for 
the other causes not captured in the model. 
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Bl'c(Hls(' of the independence assumption, the probability of this happellillg is the 
prodnct of the probabilities of each parent being inhibited: 
for exalllple~ p(Fever = falselCold = false, Flu = true,Malaria = true) = 0.2 * 0.1. 
Using noisy-OR we onl~' need to define n probability values (where n stands for 
!lumber of parl'!lts)~ instead of the 217+1 values that would be needed otherwise. Figure 
4.10 illustr(\tes this concept using a logic graph. 
Notice that in the case of noisy-OR variables must be Boolean, i.e. the calIses must 
be present or absellt. A generalisation called noisy-AND can be used whell causes are 
not onl~' present or absent but they can also be present with different degrees of illtC'llsity, 
e.g. low. medium. high [55]. 
\Ve can <,pph' this techniquE' in the field of risk and safety nssessment whem'\'('r the 
assumption about the inhibitors acting independently is reasonable, e.g. an air-traffic 
controller:s advice to avoid a mid-air collision and pilot:s skills to perform the requin'd 
manoeuvre. In this case, both inhibitors are independent. An altogether different scenario 
would be an airplane radar system and the radio equipment failing due to a power failure. 
In this case, both events have a common inhibitor, thus the noisy-OR model cannot be 
applied. 
4.6 Discussion 
In this section. we briefly discuss the above elicitation and modelling techniques in the 
light of the following key points: 
• the expert's judgment is a genuine source of information and should be taken into 
account in the absence of data or in order to complement the data; 
• the expert's time is scarce and costly; 
• the expert's knowledge of the domain is limited21 ; 
• the users more often than not have little statistical knowledge; 
• a simple approach makes the user understand and follow a model's forecast in an 
informed way, as opposed to seeing it as an Oracle [60]; 
210'Hagan [155J questions whether eliciting more summaries from e~p~rt~ woul~ ~e.sult in a 
more accurate, true distribution. In his opinion the experts' accuracy IS hmited; ehcltmg more 
summaries over a variety of distributions would not improve the results. 
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• designing a BN is all itcrativ(' process through which we add. remove or modify parts 
of the topoIOb'Y' amI/or the probability estimations i:1S the modelling progresses. 
\Vc have discussed earlier that subjective judgment is a genuine source of information. 
potentially as valid as an objective judgment and even more so when the latter is absent: 
trying to 11S(' other approaches like Objective Bayesian ill an attempt to grant validity to 
the model is what O'Hagan called a heresy [155]. 
In the case of BNs. probabilit,v theory grants consistency to the elicited values. 
Calibration is ascertained as feedback and data become 3\'ailable, and with the help of 
techniques such as sensitivity analysis. 
Also, expert elicitation is facilitated by the concept of conditiona1 dependenc~·. that 
indicates which are the relevant nodes to elicit and supports the interpretation of a BN 
as a causal network. 
It will be interesting to see how the development of ontologies will affect the disCllS-
sion on subjective elicitation. We can see the use of ontologies in the context of defining 
network semantics and consolidating model findings. During our project with the air-
traffic experts, explained in Chapter 6, we ran several times into misunderstandings 
about node definitions; i.e. expressions that are semantically identical but syntactically 
different or syntactically similar but semanticall~' different. For instance, there was a 
misunderstanding caused by the use of the word "pilot" in one of the model's nodes. 
For us this term represented the pilot's performance, while to the air traffic controllers 
"pilot" meant the performance of the plane's crew; consequently, probability estimations 
had to be changed. Using ontologies we can avoid this type of problems by explicitly 
defining each node's meaning; definition that is shared and accepted by the experts. Such 
definitions can greatly reduce the ambiguity on what is being said. 
However, as Gruber [85] pointed out, the level of abstraction in a definition (and 
hence its level of ambiguity) is given, to an extent, by the domain it captures. If in the 
domain of engineering concepts are formulated as mathematical expressions learnt by the 
engineering community, can we say the same about the concepts related to financial risk? 
Regarding probability elicitation methods, we cannot see the viability of graphical 
tools such as the probability wheel or histograms to build large NPTs, mainly due to 
the time required for eliciting the probability values in this way. Such tools can be used 
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advallt(\~('()usIY in the context of elicitino SI)ec'I'fi(' I-)rl()I'S e g 11 c.' f d' 
, / '. '-" " . " 1 ase 0 Isagrcemcll t 
between two experts on a distributioll that needs detailed attention. a sittwtion that 
suggests that the underlying relationship could be bi-modal. 
As part of this thesis, we implemented (\ Bezier Curve and a Histogram as eliciting 
tools, see Appendix A, This type of curve was already used by the RADAR group dur-
ing the Serene project [37]. Unfortunately. the author canllot report 011 how useful. or 
otherwise, both tools are given the lack of opportunities we had to test them. 
Verbal scales deserve a special mention. \Ve can find authors that recommelld their 
use. while others criticise their shortcomings. On one hand we have the ('else of eliciting 
single values using an intuitive method, but on the other hand we h<1\,(' the ambiguity 
of the semantics, the potential bias of how an expert can interpret a scale. the lack of 
consistency between scales, and the ad hoc mapping of probabilit~·. Nen-'It heless. \\'(' find 
researchers that still use them: Bolger [22] recommends their use in particular cases. 
Budescu [216] recognises them as a valid tool that experts can choose to communic;lte 
their opinions, van der Gaag et al. [217] finds them a useful tool in the domain of medicine 
and to elicit many probabilities [219]. Renooij and Witteman [193] report on !JO\\' the 
use of a numerical scale coupled with a linguistic scale could improve expert assessments. 
From the RADAR group's experience, we view this tool as a viable option to elicit 
probabilities which are later confirmed and/or refined as data is accumulated. 
Parametric distributions can produce NPTs in a short amount of time. It is often 
the case that there is more than one potential distribution family to capture a NPT. 
The type of distribution used, e.g. Beta, Binomial, Normal is left to the expert/analyst's 
choice and this is determined by whichever can provide the best fit. The selection is driven 
by the expert's knowledge in Statistics, whether the elicitated estimations are observable 
quantities [117] or repeteable events [22], and by the care to avoid possible bias that 
can result from overly complex distributions (for example, in the Multivariate Normal 
distribution the compound effect of different variables is affected by over-confidence, 
underestimating the contribution of each individual variable [79]). The choice is of course 
constrained also by practical considerations, such as the time and budget available. 
Given that the distribution chosen is conditioned on such mundane factors such as 
amount of time available, costs, and limited expertise among others, to what extent does 
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the ]}lude] bellefit from dedicating more time (and resources) to the elicitCltioll of lllOlT 
demanding statisticCll distributions? On this issue. Garthwaite's [79] research concluded. 
as we have seerL that in the case of eliciting skewed distributions the benefits obL)inecl 
did not outw('ight the adclitional effort required by modelling such distributions. 
Henrion et a1. 's [99] research answers this question from a different perspcctin' b~' 
analysing to what extent the sources of imprecision in the quantificatioll of (',H·h node's 
relationship have an impact on diagnosis networks: 
The additioll of massive amounts of random noise to the link, leak, and 
prior probabilities produced only modest decrements in diagnostic per-
formallcc ... It is more important to identif~' findings. and diseases 
and their relationship, than to quantify the relations with high level of 
precISIon. 
These filldings arc also corroborated by the work of Chan and Dmwiche [29]. It is 
also true that these conclusions depend on the type of domain and node relationship [155]: 
some relations can prove more robust than others. 
It is therefore for these reasons that we advocated a general, flexible approach that 
can accommoclate different types of relationships, rather than a bespoke distribution 
whose development would be lengthy and costly. We support a simple approach that 
would captures the experts' opinions, and not their knowledge in Statistics. 
Although such a general approach may be seen as coarse, it originated from the 
extensive experience of the RADAR group in the development of real world BNs [71,73, 
136,139,151,187]. 
The next chapter explains this approach in detail. 
II 
Chapter 5 
Building Node Probability Tables 
5.1 Introduction 
This Chapter benefits from the \-vork and experience of the group RADAR, lead by N. 
Fenton and M. Neil, has producing solutions to a number of real-world problems such as 
• safety of embedded systems in the railway industry [187], 
• military vehicle reliability [139] and 
• software defect prediction in consumer electronics products [71,73,136,151]. 
These applications involved building large-scale BN models. As a result of the diffi-
culties that we encountered in BN model building, we were well aware of the limitations 
of relying on purely "hand crafted" approaches, like elicitating NPTs using a table of 
different Beta distributions, in which each variable and each NPT had to be elicited 
exhaustively with domain experts; especially for nodes with many states which are con-
venient during elicitation as Andreassen et aLl [12] points out 
.. nodes with multiple states has given a conceptual simplicity that makes 
knowledge acquisition and verification easier. 
This Chapter focuses on only one especially important part of this problem: how 
large NPTs can be built for a commonly occurring class of nodes called "ranked" nodes 
1 Note that in the case of the l\IUNIN project nodes have up to nine states [12]. 
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(which represent qualitative variables that are mapped to intervals in a cOlltimlO\l~ di~-
tribution). 
We begin III section 5.2 by outlining the problem. In section 5.2.2. we formalize 
the notion of ranked nodes, along with the conditions under which they OCCllr m< )~t 
commonl~r in ENs. Section 5.3 explains the previous step to using a Normal distribution 
to express expert's uncertainty. Using what we call the odds function me' were able to 
calculate the deviations of the expert"s estimates. In sections .5"! and 5.5, we describe the 
class of causal weighting functions required to generate the NPTs for these ranked nod('~. 
Our method is based on the representation of NPTs by means of parametric probabilit~· 
functions, where the child node's probability is defined a::: a weighted function of the 
parent node values. The weighted rank node functions specified herein (which turn ont 
to be sufficient for most applications) are: 
• Mean Average, 
• Minimum, 
• Maximum 
In section 5.6, we describe the other instance where ranked nodes commonly occur, 
namely, as indicator nodes. 
The discussion on this Chapter is postponed to Chapter 8, after introducing the two 
examples used to demonstrate the validity of this approach. 
5.2 The problem and background 
5.2.1 Ranked nodes 
Consider the EN fragment shown in Figure 5.1. Such fragments are very typical of those 
that frequently occur in the real world models already cited. 
They are characterized by the fact that node values are typically measurable only 
on a subjective scale like {very low, low, medium, high, very high}, and only extremely 
limited statistical data (if any) is available to inform the probabilistic relationship for Y, 
given Xl and X2. However, there are significant expert subjective judgements that can 
be used. 
X1: Qu&11ty ofTuting Staff 
5.2. The problem (Inri backlJTDund ,0 
X2: Quality of T .stlng 
p,oc",,~. 
Figure 5.1: A typical BN fragment 
Assmnillg th(~t {'clch of the llodes has fivE' states the NPT for the node Y has 125 
states. This is not an impossible number to elicit exhaustively. but from extensi\'e expe-
rIence, we know that all kinds of inconsistencies and arise when experts attempt to do 
so. If the number of states increases, and/or the node Y has additional parents. then ex-
haustive elicitation becomes infeasible, especially as real-world models invariably inn)ln' 
dozens of fragments like these. 
Hence, the problem and challenge is to produce an appropriate NPT for the node Y 
that makes the most of limited expert elicitation unless we adopt Wellman [224] approach 
and avoid the problem of eliciting NPTs altogether. This type of network uses qualitative 
influences that is, assigning signs {+, - , ?, O} to the node's links instead of assigning 
probability estimations. 
5.2.2 The nature of Ranked nodes 
Ranked nodes represent discrete variables whose states are expressed on an ordinal scale 
that can be mapped onto a bounded numerical scale that is continuous and monotonically 
ordered. We can assume that all ranked nodes are defined on an underlying unit interval 
[0-1] scale. l<or a given number of intervals defined and labeled, on this scale, we simply 
discretized accordingly, see Figure 5.2. 
As far as the user is concerned, the underlying numeric scale is invisible, the dis-
played scale is still the labelled one rather than the numeric one, but the latter is used 
for the purposes of computation and generating the NPT. Note that BN software tools 
like Hugin [13] do not provide this type of functionality. For this reason we needed to 
implement a computer program to make the BN construction and editing task much 
simpler than is otherwise possible. In particular, provided that they appear in the appro-















Figure 5.2: Ranked node. The probability range [0-1] is divided illto five intervals and 
labeled as Big Improvement: Improves. No e./fec t , Sl'ight 'Worsens, Wo rsens each interval 
representing 20% of the distribution. Thus "Big Improvement" is associated with the 
interval [0 - 0.2), "Improves" is associated with the interval [0.2 - 0.4) and so forth. 
associated NPTs is drastically simplified. 
From the experience of our previous applications , experts typically wanted to com-
plete an NPT by using a simple averaging scheme to compute the maximum or minimum 
value as a guide to defining the "centraJ tendency" of the child node based on a set of 
causal parent node values. For instance, during the NATS model (see Chapter 6 section 
6.7 page 111) we adopted an approach based on sampling values to construct the NPT 
for a node like Y which resulted in expert elicitation assertions like the following: 
• When XI and X2 are both "very high", the distribution of Y is heavily skewed toward 
"very high". 
• When XI and X2 are both "very low", the distribution of Y is heavily skewed toward 
"very low". 
• When XI is "very low", and X2 is "very high", the distribution of Y is centered below 
"medium". 
• When XI is "very high", and X2 is "very low", the distribution of Y is centered above 
"medium". 
Since we are assuming that each node has an underlying numerical scale in the 
interval [0, 1], such assertions suggest intuitively that Y is some kind of a weighted 
average function. In fact, experts found it easier to understand and express relationships 
in such terms. Many so-called "self-assessment" or "scorecard" [21] systems are based 
around little more than the weighted averages of attribute hierarchies. 
5,3. Odds .fl1ndion ,'"'I 
The challeng(' is to provide the appropriate BN implemelltation th<lt capture:-; the 
('xplicit simplicity of the weighted average wlll'le also pl'eSel'\Tl'Ilg tIl' "t 't' . 
" < , . (' III U1 lY(' propertIe:-; 
that the resulting distributions have to satisfy. For example. simply makillg Y the "('x-
act" weighted average of its parents does not work, since the onl," uncertaillt~· ill the 
distribution of Y. given its parents, is the result of discretization inaccurac~' rather than 
deliberate modelling. For this reason we needed a function to capture the uncertainh' of 
this relationship. The next section explains our first attempt to explicitly model unccr-
taillt~., 
5.3 Odds function 
The odds fUllction is defined in equation 5,1: 
(5.1 ) 
where Y is a ranked node and 1[Ej stands for the expected value for Y and Yi for 
the labeled states of Y, for instance Yvery [ow, Yiow, Ymedium, Yhigh, Yver\' high and corresponding 
ordinal values {I, 2, 3, 4, 5} respectively. The term odds stands for the expert's confidence 
in his assessment. 
From equation 5.1 we observe that expert's uncertainty is inversely proportional to 
the odds raised to the power of the "distance" from the expected value YIEj and the rest 
of possible states yt. As expected, as we move away from the expected value 1[Ej the 
probability decreases. 
To obtain the odds value we provide a look up table where the expert can map his 
confidence using a verbal/numerical scale as in Table 5.1. A lower odds value produces 
a peaky distribution shape meaning a stronger confidence in the estimate while a high 
value would have the opposite effect; a wider spread distribution. 
For instance, using the BN fragment on Figure 5.l. Let us assume that the expert 
is "confident" that when the staff and testing quality are both "very low" the test effec-
tiveness is also "very low". In our case, this "confidence" translates as odds = 2. Using 
equation 5.1 we obtain Y = 211~Jj = 1 for Y being "very low", see Table 5.2. The last step 
is to normalise the values obtain on this table, see the right most column of Table 5.2, 
This process was easy to compute and to elicit. However, after extensive testing, N. 
5·4· Afodelling Ranked Couses [isill.rJ (1 Doubly Tr'uncoted .Vormal Distribution 
CUllfid<'IlU' odds 
Almost Certain 1.1 
very confident 1.5 
con fi <I( '1l t 2 
likeh- 2.5 
not sure 3 
uncertain 4 
Table 5.1: Odds look up table. 
y Xl and X2 = "very low" Normalise 
very low 1 0.5 
low 0.5 o ')C': .-:) 
medium 0.25 0.13 
high 0.125 0.064 
very high 0.03 0.015 
Table 5.2: Estimates for child node using Odds function 
Fenton realised that the symmetrical property of this function did not hold in the case 
of inter-causal reasoning. 
For example, suppose we have observed Y and Xl and wish to explain away the 
value of X2 as follows: If Y is "very high", and Xl is "very low", then we would be almost 
certain that X2 is "very high". If Y is "very high", and XI is "average", then we would be 
confident that X2 is "very high" but not as confident as in the above case. However, the 
odds function failed to satisfy this property. 
A straightforward solution that fulfills this property was the use of the Normal 
distribution. The challenge here, however, was to implement this function in a computer 
program that was the reason of using the odds function in the first place because its 
simplicity to implement. We were able to make such an implementation (see Appendix); 
now part of the Agena Risk tool [134]. The Normal distribution was later dropped in 
favour of a bounded Normal distribution which is explained in the next section. 
5.4 Modelling Ranked Causes Using a Doubly Truncated 
Normal Distribution 
Formally, the ranked node's causal structure is characterized by a joint probability dis-
tribution with a set of causes X containing i = 1,2, .. ,n ranked nodes X as parents of Y 
5·4· Modelling Ra.nked Ca.'uses Using (J Doubly Trun(:{Jtr:d Nonrw! Distr-i1iution 
11 
p(X, Y) = p(YIX) np(Xi) 
i= I 
In general. the node Y is considered to be a conseq71ence of two or more cmlse nodes. 
where each of the cause nodes is &'3sumed to be independent when calculating the ~PT. 
The BN in Figure 5.1 is a very simple example. 
We can draw an analogy with linear regression, where Y = Xl {3 + X2{3 + E. if \H' 
consider the child node Y the result of a linear relationship bet\\'ecll the parent nodes. 
with E approximating a Normal distribution of mean ° and variance (J} (\\Titten N(O. (J,2), 
and where the contribution to the variance of Y is (J\~). 
The regression analogy is apt, since we are attempting to "target" the area of C'l'll-
tral tendency in Y, given difFerent values of X, and then are adding a fixed amount of 
uncertainty around this. The only issue that we need to resolve is the contribution of 
each ca.,use to the effect, and a clear way to do this is to usc the correlation between the 
cause and the effect as the appropriate measure. 
Rather than the Normal distribution commonly assumed in linear regressIOn for 
ranked causal nodes, we use the doubly truncated Normal distribution (denoted TNormal 
hereafter) as defined, for example, in [42], where all nodes are truncated in the [0,1] region. 
Unlike the regular Normal distribution (which ranges from -00 to +00), the TNor-
mal has finite end points. vVe denote the TNorrnal by TNormal(J.1.(52,O, 1) where J.1 is 
the mean, and (52 is the variance. 
In the TNormal, we start with a regular Normal distribution but "ignore" the prob-
ability mass to the left and right of the finite end points and then normalize the resulting 
distribution over the finite range [0, 1]. This enables us to model a variety of shapes, 
including a uniform distribution, achieved when the variance (52 ---+ 00, and highly skewed 
distributions, achieved when (52 ---+ 0. 
We use a simple weighted sum model to measure the contribution of each .Xi to 
explaining Y as a "credibility weight" ~ (it can also be elicited from an expert in this 
way) expressed as real values ~ > 0. The higher the credibility index, the greater the 
correlation between X and Y . Thus, in our method, the equivalent to the error variance 
(59 in the linear regression model is simply the inverse of the sum of the weights: 





fo r I Wi > ° 
i= l 
i= l 
Given that Y lies within [0 , 1], we must normali ze the regression equation E(Y) = 
n n 
I X iWi by dividing by I Wi. Thus, 
~ l ~ l 
17 
' XW· L I I 
p(YIX) = TNormal _i=_l __ 
n ' -17--
IWi I Wi 
(5.2) 
i= l i= l 
Suppose, for example, that n = 3 and that the allocation of weights Wi for each X i's 
contribution to explaining Y is in the ratio 2:3:5 , with a resulting variance (}9 = 0.1. 
Then , the joint distribution generated will be 




Very Low Mlfdium, High Ve e)' 
·low High 
Figure 5.3: WMEAN function for Y , given X I ,X2 and X3. 
The resulting distribution and BN model are shown in Figure 5.4. The resulting 
distribution for p(Y) will not produce summary statistics exactly matching the function 
because we are using coarse discretization in arriving at the result. 
Given this , the mean values will tend to differ within the interval range specifi ed . 
Specifically, for five ranks defined on [0 - 1] , the mean value may be out by up to 0.1. 
Also, the variance values observed will be considerably higher because of the coarse 
discretization. However, neither of these are major problems, since the aim is to produce 
a good fit to the expert's distribution rather than a good approximation to a TNormal 
distribution. 
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5.5 Modelling Ranked Causes Using Weighted Min and l\Iax 
Sometimes t he relationship between parent and child nod . . h . es IS one were one parent :-; 
input (:overrides" the impact of the other parent(s). We are going to explain this point 
using an ('xample taken from our project with NATS explained in Chapter 6. 
In Figure SA we observe that the child node "TCAS & Pilofs perfonnancC"'( y) 
depends on "Pilot\ skill" (XI) and '"TCAS d' .. (X2) I h a VISe" . ntis case. \\"C' elicited the 
following information: 
Figure 5A: The node '"TeAS and Pilot's performance" depends on two causes: '"TCAS 
advise" and "Pilofs SkilL 
• When XI and X2 are both "very high", the distribution of Y IS heavil.y skewed 
toward "very high". 
• When Xl and X2 are both "very low", the distribution of Y is heavily skewed toward 
"very low)). 
• When Xl is "very low", and X2 is "very high", the distribution of Y is centered 
toward "low". 
• When Xl is "very high", and X2 is "very low", the distribution of Y is skewed toward 
"low". 
Figure 5.5 illustrates the result of eliciting, with the aid of graphs, a particular set 
of sampled scenarios for the child node. On scenario "A" we observe that when TeAS 
advised is considered to be "Very High" (understood in this case as accurate) and Pilots 
Skills are "Very High" (understood as excellent skills) Performance is expected also to be 
"Very High". 
To make the analysis of this drawings easier we are going to use the table 5.3. There. 
we observe that whenever TeAS or Pilot's skill are expected to be both "Very Low" child 
5./). ltlodellinq Ranked CO/lses {'<;ing We?']I,' tv I '1/' d ~I ' ~'. ." ,r 1 If! (III :1 OI xG 
P(Performance I TCAS Advice, Pilot's skills) 
TCAS Ad. Pilot Sk. 
VH VH t Q 
VL L M H VH 
A 
VL VH ~~ 
VL L M H VH 
B 
VH VL tC\ 
VL L M H VH > 
C 
M M t~ 
VL L M H VH 
o 
VL VL 1\ E > 
VL L M H VH 
Figure 5.5: Expert's drawings of a sampled set of scenarios. 
TCAS advice " VH II VH " VL " VL 
Pilot's skill II VH II VL II VH II VL 
Performance 
VH VH - - -
VL - VL VL VL 
Table 5.3: Relationship table between TCAS, Pilot and Performance 
node Performance is also expected to be "Very Low", that is, the expected estimation is 
skewed toward whichever parent has the lowest state. 
In this case, the experts seem to be more concern with the situation where one of 
the parent nodes has a high probability of not performing well (regardless how well the 
other parent performs), e.g. TCAS gives wrong advise or pilot's skills being poor. 
We are aware that this may result in a too conservative estimate but given the nature 
of the domain, mid-air-collision, a cautionary approach is justifiable. 
So, a weighted sum for the child node will not produce a NPT to satisfy these elicited 
requirements. Formally, child distribution's mean is something like the minimum of the 
parent values, but with weighting in favour of Xl. Comparing scenario "E" and "e" on 
Figure 5.5 we can see that "Pilot's skill" has more weight on the resulting distribution 
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hape. This mak s sense if one thinks that it is ultimately pilof.. re v n ibili ty to Hy the 
plane and to follow any advice. The necessary function. which we call t he VV ighted lin 
function (WlVIIN) , has the following general form 
WMIN M 1 Ni= 1.2 ... 11 
11 
~Xi+ I X} 
i=J } 
W;+ (n-l ) (5.3) 
where the weight Wi > 0 and n are t he number of parent nodes. with a sui table 
variance (Jf t hat qua.ntifies our uncertain ty about the result . thus giving 
p(Y IX) = TNormal [WMIN(X ), (J2,O, I] (5.4) 
The WMIN function can be viewed as a generalized version of the normal NIIN 
function . In fact , if all of the weights Wi are large, then WNIIN is close to NIIN. At the 
other extreme, if all the weights Wi = 1, t hen WMIN is simply the average of the Xis. 
lVIixing the magnitude of the weights gives a result between a MIN and an A VERA GE. 
In the above example, taking WI = 3 and W2 = 1 (with a variance (J~ = 0.0 1) yields the 
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Figure 5.6: WMIN function for Y . "TeAS advise" = "very low", with WI = 3. ' Pilot s 
Skill" = "very high", with W2 = 1 











5.6. Ranked Indicator ' 
Figure 5.7: WlVIIN function for Y. "TCAS advise" = "very high", with WI = 3 and "Pilofs 
Skill" = "very low", with W2 = I 





where the weight Wi > 0 and n are the number of parent nodes . 
(5.5) 
In each case, experts need only to supply the parameters to generate the NPT. We 
found that this set of functions has been sufficient to generate almost all of the ranked 
node NPTs elicited in practice. The efficiency savings are considerable: if there are 
m ranked cause nodes, each with n states, then the expert needs to only supply m+ 1 
parameter values as compared to requiring (m + I y values for full elicitation. 
It should be noted that ranked nodes can be further partitioned by declaring addi-
tional labelled, Boolean, or numeric parents that can be used to condition the type of 
weighted expressions that one might wish on the child node. 
5.6 Ranked Indicators 
We have included this section because, as we explain in Chapter 6, we use this type of 
relationship to represent the contribution of the organisational culture in company's risk. 
We interpreted culture as something that is not directly observable; we can only 
perceive its manifestations. That is , looking at the performance of a given company 
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1.('. whether or not it is "successfuL we can determine \\'hetllCr it has a "good" or 
"bad" culture [190]. Thi~ culture is reflected 011 hctors like ,'u -. f \\T k' P t' .. - - - ( . ~ nsa eor mg rac Ices 
"vVorkforce Support" that can be observed and thus measured using. for instance. sUl'Ve~' 
responses~ performance in jobs and employment turnover. These manifestations represent 
the indicators of the present culture, see Figure 5.8, In this Figure we can see ranked incli-
cators modelling the relationship between "Culture" and factors such as "Unsafe "'orking 
Practices", "\Yorkforce Support", "Participative Communication". 







involvelllelll in the 5i1fety 
5}"1tem 
Figure 5.8: Culture sub-net 
Indicator nodes operate in a similar way to "filter" nodes in a Kalman filter. Here, 
we can think of the indicators as providing noisy or imperfect observations and the 
parent node as the true (but possibly unobservable or not economically measurable) 
value awaiting estimation [142], In a Kalman filter, we wish to condition our estimate 
for the "true" value on the data on hand from each of our "indicator" nodes, assummg 
that each indicator is Normally distributed, 
Formally, the joint distribution for a set X containing i = 1,2, ", n ranked indicators 
Xi of a single causal parent node Y is 
n 
p(X, Y) = p(Y) IIp(XiIY) (5,6) 
i=! 
We model the NPT for each indicator node by using the doubly truncated TNormal 
distribution: 
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p(XIY) = TNorrnal(y,a.2,O, 1) 
This assumes that the nodes Y and X are on the same scale. The expert simply 
has to specify the variance parameter crl whose inverse acts as a "credibility index':: the 
higher the credibility index, the greater the correlation between the indicator and the 
parent cause node. 
Indicator nodes are correlated with each other following concept of d-separation 
explained in Chapter 3. This correlation is desirable, given that indicators reflect tlw 
true state of the underlying unknown cause. Only when the cause itself is instantiated 
with hard evidence are the indicators uncorrelated. However, given that the causal nodes 
are usually unobservable (this is, after all, why we use an indicator), indicator nodes are 
generally not independent in practice. 
Another perspective on the use of indicator nodes is that each can be treated either 
as a different sub-attribute of the parent node or as a different measure of that sub-
attribute from a different source, for instance, when there are multiple experts, each with 





Modelling Safety of an Air-Traffic Control System 
6.1 Preface 
This project is a joint effort between the Risk Assessment and Decision Analysis Research 
(RADAR) group in the Department of Computer Science. Queen ::\Imy. University of 
London and the Safety Research Unit (SRU), in the Department of Psychology, Liverpool 
Universityl. 
In a sequence of five interviews of three to four hours each, over a period of one 
year, we discussed the model structure, identified and defined the relevant nodes and 
their relationships. Present from NATS during these sessions were: the safety director, 
a manager from the Short-term Collision Advise team, two human factors engineers and 
one air traffic controller (ATC). \Vhile the director had some knowledge about BNs, the 
others had background knowledge in Risk analysis but not in BNs. 
During these informal interviews they explained the flow of processes they follow in 
their daily jobs, identifying the tasks they perform and the tools they use. The group 
leader, ]\;1. Neil, decided earlier in the project to follow an unstructured approach to the 
elicitation of the model. The idea was to reach a compromise where different views can 
be accommodated thus providing a framework to take action to improve air-traffic safety, 
if needed. 
We explained to all parties the concept of BN, conditional probability, and the 
IThe SRU has built cultural metrics against which companies can compare their organisational 
cultural settings. 
6.1. Pn fan 9:3 
pot<'lltial pitfalls during the elicitation process and, most importantly. that there is Bot a 
sillgular model, as there is not a. single solution. but a model that hest fits tlwir kno,,"]('d,,(, .... 
at a giW'll time. That is, the outcome of a BN model provides an approxim;ltion t() 
current knowledge; approximation that given the characteristics of BN (spl' Chapter -1) 
will become closer adjusted to the true nature of the event as feedback and data is 
accumulated. 
The elicitation of the probabilities took three more sessions over the same period of 
time; in two of them the NATS experts drew probabilit,v distributions using the ranked 
nodes approach, and in the last session we compared the moders results against experts' 
expectations. \Ve had to fine-tuned some of the outputs because the)" did not match 
the expected values. This was done for each components of the model. Results \H'lT 
later compared against Safety Significant £\'ents (SSEs) data and presented to the safety 
director. 
The modelling of organisational culture was based on the data collected by our 
partners in this project the SRU, led by Prof. 1. Donnald and his team: S. Johnson 
and Q. Xie. We organised four sessions of four hours each, two in Liverpool and t\\"o in 
London, where we discussed the network structure. During these sessions we agreed on 
the definition of culture and its representation in the model. 
In the following sections we explain, within the Soft System l\Iethodology (88,:\1) 
framework, the development of this project. This methodology as P. Checkland and J. 
Poulter [31] comment: 
... was developed using an alternative model of research, ... ,namely 
"action research". The idea of action research is that the researcher will 
state the framework on which the research is taken place with the purpose 
of being reproduced, (and thus validated) obtaining similar results (not 
identical given the human component of the research). The SSJ\I being 
one of these frames of work. 
This methodology is needed because as Checkland [30] argues: 
... social reality is no refined entity 'out there', waiting to be investi-
gated. Rather it is to be seen as continuously socially constructed and 
re-constructed by individuals and groups ... 
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For that reason P. Checklalld and .J. Scholes [:32] comment that 
... the aim of SS1\1 is to take seriously the subjectivit~" which is the crucial 
characteristic of human affairs and to treat this sUbjectivity. if not exactly 
s("i(,lltificall~·. at least in ;1 way characterised by intellectual rigor. 
This is wh\" this lllethodology is typically used in problem domains that contain a 
large social component. In this project. this social component translates into the stucly 
of the contribution of organisational culture in the avoidance of mid-air collisions. 
This contribution, as Checkland [31] would argue. is not a problem as such (i.e. as 
sornething that needs fixing) but a problem situation. in the sense that it involw's more 
than one issues as we will see in this Chapter. 
It can also be seen as an opportunity for improvement. These improvements are 
beneficial if we consider the opening of new runways and a consequent increase in air-
traffic volume. In this cOlltext. w(' can think of the BN model as a model to question the 
problem situation and to validate the need to take action, if need be. 
Following this methodology, this Chapter is structured as follows: in section 6.2 we 
discuss the problem situation and in section 6.3 we set the framework of this project. 
Within this frame we have analysed the activities that are relevant to this problem. In 
section 6.4 these activities are structured and defined using a CATWOE analysis. One 
of these activities, Culture, is of particular interest to this thesis. For this reason section 
6.5 is dedicated to explain its role on this model. All these definitions, also called root 
definitions using SSl'vr terminology, provide the bases to build the conceptual model; this 
is done in section 6.6. Section 6.7 explains how the probability tables were built using 
the ranked node approach. 
6.2 The Problem Situation 
Often, the focus of incident investigations m air traffic management is on the human 
failings of pilots and ATCs. Examples include confusion when reading instruments and 
failure to recognise or take note of warnings [23]. Human performance, as we discussed in 
Chapter 2, is influenced by a wide variety of "performance shaping factors", e.g. training, 
unexpected behaviour of technical systems [205]. These latent conditions or "upstream" 
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factors provide the underlying structure, i.e. tIl' f 
~ Ie Clam 0 conditiolls. \\'here hreakdowlls 
or active mishaps occur [190], 
The study and measurement of this chain of CH'nts alkm's us to take action in order 
to improve the safety record of an organisation. 
The aim of the NATS Human Resources (HR) team was to im'cstigate this chain of 
cvents. Note that \\"l' have analysed the air-traffic control processes \\'ithin the perspective. 
or in SS.M terminology Wordlview, of the HR team. The focus of this pruject is to 
observe the effect of human factors in the management chain. From this perspective. 
we have analysed what the HR team and the RADAR team considered~ in the \\"ords of 
Checkland [31], feasible and desirable. 
(Changes? are systematically desirable if these 'relevant s~'stems' me 
in fact perceived to be truly relevant ... (they are considered feasible)3 
... only if they are perceived as meaningful within that culture ... 
For this reason, this model focuses on the activities that are meaningful and relevant 
to HR. Thus, when we say that a Planner or a Tactical ATC have de-conflict('d a pot('lltial 
incident, e.g. loss of separation between two aircrafts, we are referring to the event cease 
to be a risk threat. The details of how they deconflict this potential risk are not relcvant 
to this model. The same applies if an ATC considers that two airplanes are fl~'ing too close 
and recommends evasive maneuver. The type of maneuver performed b,Y' the pilot is not 
relevant to this model, again, we are only concerned with whether this event was resolved 
or is still a potential threat. This model does not capture that level of granularity. We 
are mainly interested in events that contain a human component that can be singled out 
from the rest of the network, for instance, all the tasks that have to do with routing an 
aircraft through an airspace corridor can be explained, in human factor terms, as the 
capabilities of the ATC. 
To the question, how close does this model's predictions match their expected out-
come, we can say that this model was built following the SSE data. The aim was to match 
the frequency of events that go through each barrier4 . The BN model is approximately 
2Text within brackets added 
3Text within brackets added 
4Note: All participants of this project signed a non-discloser agreement by whi~~ we a.re not 
allowed to faithfully reproduce data or previolls air-traffic risk models, e.g the BrItIsh :\If\\'ays 
model. 
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20% - 30% close to their initial estimations. The concept of "barrier" defense will become 
clearer as we progress through the Chapter. 
Thp next section identifies the relevant activitips in HIP traffic mallilgenll'nt chain. 
6.3 Description of the Problem Situation 
The focus of this project is to put into practice, in a real-world model. the ranked-node 
approach and, in doing so, to observe the effect of the human factors on the management 
chain and ultimately, by improving this to reduce the risk of mid-air aircraft collision. 
This ilir-traffic control system BN model was developed from a series of workshops 
with representatives from NATS. the UK's Air Traffic 1\lanagement authorit~ .. 
The outline of this model is the effort of Martin Neil (Group leader). Roger Shaw 
and Bob :Malcom (facilitators) and Jose Galan (Technical leader). 
Jose Galan, apart from contributing to the development of this model as part of 
the RADAR team, was personally responsible for building and validating tl1f' probabilit\ 
tables and for modeling the cultural elements. The probability tables were built and 
validated using a computer program Jose Galan implemented for this occasion, sCC' Ap-
pendix A. This project was a test bed for the development of the ranked node approach, 
explained in the previous Chapter. With the help of this computer program, we were 
able to find, through trial and error, a general approach, i.e. ranked node, that made 
possible the construction of this model. 
The interpretation and design of the impact of Culture in the organisation's safety 
proved to be challenging. First, it was the novelty of this approach, i.e. a) we are able to 
measure culture, b) we can define \vhat makes a bad or good safety culture and c) this 
definition enables managers to take action to improve company's safety record. Second, 
the design had to be intuitive enough for the participants to understand and reason the 
outcomes. Third, it had to accommodate the data provided by our partners on this 
research; the Safety Research Unit (SRU) at Liverpool University. 
Note that the development of the Culture network (i.e. human factors having an 
effect on a firm's safety) is going to be the main thread through out this Chapter. The 
reason being to show Jose Galan's contribution on this project and, in doing so, to explain 
his other contributions. 
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Tilt, \vorkshops with t}l(' expnts a1 N ATS highlighted the following areas of discll~-
SlOll: 
• In air traffic mc\ll;\~('ll1ent tlwre is a chain of activities fI'om d' f' , " . , . '" eSIgn 0 mrspc-w(' 
("llpstrealll"). through flight planning, through the ATCs and their interactions 
with pilots, to the reactions of pilots C·downstream"). 
• These are the activities performed by the ATCs [135]: 
The design of the airspace. 
Procedures for controlling the access to, and the use of, the airspace. 
The usc of 11 ighl)' skilled and trained air traffic controllers. 
The use of collision warning systems, such as the Short Term Conflict Alert sys-
tem5 (S'TCA) and the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance SystpIll6 (TCAS). 
The skills of the pilots themselves. 
• Each of these activities are intended to minimise the difficulty of operations further 
downstream in such a way so as to minimise the risk of collision. 
• All these activities (i.e. designing, planning and routing aircrafts) are surrounded 
by the unpredictable weather, aircraft performance and pilot action, any of which 
might affect the speed or direction of aircraft and therefore upset the plans of 
the ATCs. Equally, though, such factors might help recovery from a threatening 
situation. 
• There are different types of airspace; from sectors over remote countryside that 
experience very light traffic (e.g. Scotland) to very busy sectors around major 
cities (e.g. London). 
• There are different types of sectors; some concerned entirely with flights through 
the sector and some only with takeoffs and landings. 
5STCA is an automated air traffic control safety net, which alerts controllers of potential 
conflicts. 
6TCAS is the equipment aboard an aircraft that gives audible and visual warnings when there 
is a threat of collision with another aircraft. 
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• Diff(-']"('nt tf'C1ms have differpllt cultllI"es. Different teams, also. typical1~· have dif-
hTl'llt tccllllic;d :-;~·:-;t('lIlS a1ld may ('V('1l hav(' C'volv('d different (possibly informal) 
operating procedllrl's. 
• The organis<ltjoll of the teams is structured differentl~' in different parb of the 
airspa.ce. In some areas there is the separation between Planner ATC (PATe) and 
T;lctical (TATC') (The role of these hvo different johs are explained in the next 
section). 
Within this framework, both RADAR and NATS decided that, in the first illstclllC(,. 
a "sector group" should be studied (in this case Swansea), in which teams, usually working 
in shifts. control traffic through a small number of related sectors. Such sector groups 
might comprise 5 pairs of PATC and TATC, each pair being responsible (usuall~') for one 
sector. 
The input of the weather was interpreted as factor that influence all other activities, 
or in other words, as a contextual probability evenly distributed among the other activities 
(see section 3.6 in 35). For that reason, it was removed from the discussion on the model. 
The output of the model should be a set of expected frequencies of various kinds of 
breaches of the layers of defense also called "barriers", and that the model should be able 
to show the extent to vdlich cultural (and other) factors affect those frequencies. This 
approach is convenient since SSE data is gathered monthly on potential problems which 
arise through breaches of the various barriers. 
6.4 Root Definitions 
The starting point to build our model was a previous conceptual model made by British 
Airways (Figure 6.2 depicts a similar model) and the available SSE data. SSE data is 
linked to the loss of separation. This data is defined relative to the bands: 
• Band 1: Separation <= 66% of prescribed value or, if no prescribed value. then 
<= 2 nautical miles and 600 feet of vertical separation . 
• Band 2: Separation> 66% of prescribed value or, if no prescribed value, > 2 
nautical miles and 600 feet of vertical separation. 
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Figure 6.1: Loss of separation data derived from the barriers breaches. 
The underlying assumption is that at any given time it is expected that a number of 
aircrafts will breach one of these bands, Figure 6.1 illustrcitcs this point. The SSE datil 

















Figure 6.2: The "Barrier Moder· of Air Traffic Control. 
7 Classification of SSE data: 
• SSEP (prior to Tactical intervention): SSE Potentials occurred for any Band 2 incident. 
• SSE4: An SSE4 is registered if a Band 1 event occurred and was effectively resolved by a 
controller who was providing the service when the event was initiated, and no system or 
procedure failure affected the resolution. Tvm sub categories are defined, tllp first if the 
controller was aware in advance that the event would occur and the second if he became 
belatedly aware. 
• SSE3: In this case the Band 1 event is detected and resolved by ATC but either it was 
not solved by the controller providing the service, or the event was detected by another 
controller, STeA, or the pilot, or it was not resolved in a timely or pffpctive manner, or a 
system or procedure failure affected the resolution. 
• SSE2: In this case, once again Band 1, the pilot resolved the event, or it was not resolved 
by the aircraft safety net or it was resolved by the aircraft safety net. 
• SSEl: Finally, the Band 1 event was not resolved by timely pilot action or there was a high 
risk that any action taken was ineffective. Matters are resolved by providence. 
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In Figure 6.2 we observe the workflow of activities performed by ATCs at different 
,. -
barriers, also termed as "defence in depth". All aircrafts are managed. initially. by flow 
managers. These aircrafts are then subject to sector planning controllers that route 
them through the airspace. If needed, the tactical air traffic management will handle 
any potential safety risk. Ultimately, the risk of collision depends on pilot's skills and on 
what the air-traffic community calls "providence" (or luck). 
To help us define these activities we are going to perform a CATWOE8 analysis. 
This analysis can be performed at different levels of abstractions: 
CATWOE analysis at Project level: 
• Customer. Society in general and CAA and NATS in particular. Ultimately, the 
HR department at NATS in that they, directly, benefit on the understanding of 
the role organisational culture in the NATS's safety record and on measuring its 
impact. At the model level, the Customer is the ATC who benefits from the task(s) 
performed previously down the chain. 
• Actor. CAA and NATS acting as the guarantors of the air-traffic safety. At the 
model level, the actors are the ATCs (or Pilot), considering that they daily tasks 
consists on the air-traffic management to ensure safety. 
• Transformation. Given a volume of air-traffic, with potential risks, as input; the 
ATCs are responsible to design, planned, route and, if need be, de-conflict potential 
safety risks thus producing a safe airspace as output. 
• Owners. In a wider context, NATS and ultimately the CAA. In a more specific 
context, we can consider the ATCs and Pilots as the owners, inasmuch as they are 
responsible to avoid a potential incident going further down the chain. 
8This analysis consists on defining these activities by studying its constituent or emergent 
properties. 
• Customer, who benefits from the activity; 
.• Actor who performs the activity; 
• Transformation, the conversion the activity undergoes; 
• W orldview or the perspective the activity is perceived under; 
• Owner who can start or stop the activity and the 
• Environment that constraints the activity performed. 
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• Wordlvi('ws. This Worldview is that of the participants during the elicitation of 
tlH'mock1. \V<, cannot talk about different \Vor]chil'ws hd\\'('('ll ATe's and the HR 
team given that during the this process there were not major diffpH'llces in \W\\.s 
that could not be discussed and agreed upon. 
• EllvironnH'nt. This can be subject to different illkrpretations: the fact that :\TATS 
was privatised can be seen as a constraint. equally the fact th;-It participants in this 
project lacked statistical knowledge. For this model. the cllyironment is regarded 
as the air-traffic rcgul<ltion that each activit~· must fulfill. c.g. aircrafts should be 
as far as possible, and as economically as possible kept apart. 
Thp following CAT\VOE analysis concern the different BN modules that make the 
model. We are going to center our attention on who is the Customer, the Actor and 
\vhat gets Transformed. \Ve understand t hat the dl'finitions of Owners, vVordlvi('ws and 
Environment can be shared. \iVe need these definitions, called TOot definitions in SSI\l 
terminology, as the basic building blocks to produce the EN model. 
The starting point of the chain of activities is the design of the airspace. Conflicts me 
made more or less likely as a result of the airspace design. This design is taken as given 
in this model, as the "presenting situation". After this, we have the Flow Management. 
CATWOE analysis for Flow lVIanagement: 
• Customer. PATe. 
• Actor. Flow lVIanagement. 'Typically there will be one or two flow managers for 
each sector group. They have the task of assigning flight-paths to aircraft. They 
mayor may not be aware of the risks arising from the combination of routes they 
assign, but air traffic control organisations have little influence over the way flight 
planning is done, other than through attempts to constrain traffic through flow 
management. 
• Transformation. Given a volume of air-traffic, the aim of flow management is to 
maintain this volume through the various air traffic control sectors within manage-
able levels (known as "target sector flows'} Aircrafts should be as far as possible, 
and as economically as possible kept apart. 
CAT\VOE analysis for PATC: 
• Customer. TATC. 
• Actor. The PATC. Their activities are the routing of an aircraft through a sector. 
• Transformation. It separates the airspace into sectors and locates Hight corridors 
through sectors. lVlaintain aircrafts apart and minimise the risks when aircraft 
diverge from their planned route - such as at route crossing points bet\Wl'1l two 
aircrafts. 
CATWOE analysis for TATC. First barrier: 
• Customer. Pilots and/or TATC in recovery mode. 
• Actor. The TATC has the job of maintaining the separation of aircraft. often 
through direct interaction with pilots. Also the air-crew may take a greater or 
lesser part in choosing appropriate avoiding action. 
• Transformation. The management of the aircraft through a gIven route. The 
TATC would manage the moment-by-moment sector movements and would de-
conflict potential conflicts using planned procedures. For instance, if two aircrafts 
may be heading toward a situation where they are too close9 , though not necessarily 
dangerously close, then there is said to be a "potential conHicf·. Either the TATC or 
the air-crew may "deconflict" such a situation by re-routing the aircrafts. Potential 
conflicts are recorded on the SSE data. 
CATWOE analysis for TATC in Recovery mode. Second barrier: 
• Customer. Pilots . 
• Actor. The TACT people might perform different functions at different times. For 
instance, an important distinction is drawn between the TATCs working in "no 
panic': mode - anticipating and avoiding potential conflicts well in advance - and 
TATCs operating in "recovery" mode, where there has been a "loss of separation" 
that must be rectified quickly. If there has been a loss of separation then the TATC 
gelose to 2 nautical miles of horizontal distance between aircrafts or at least 600 ft of vertical 
separation 
illt('rVenes to recover the situation through direct interaction with pilots. ThC'~' may 
b(' assisted b~' the STCA. Also, of course. the air-crew may take a greater or lesser 
part in choosing an appropriate avoiding action. 
• Transformation. The TATC'. generally following standard operating procedures. 
advises the pilot on an appropriate avoiding action. The TATC ma~' be helped in 
this task by a warning from the STCA which automatically detects impending lo:-;s 
of separation. If this loss of separation is not resolved, it is recorded in the SSE 
data. 
C AT\YOE analysis for Pilots. Third and last barrier: 
• Customer. All. This is the last barrier of defence. The immediate beneficiaries are 
the passengers inasmuch as their lives depend on it. 
• Actor. Pilots. They may be assisted by the TCAS. 
• Transformation. If both aircrafts are In a conflicting situation and have TeAS 
installed and operating correctly, then these systems should automatically negotiate 
compatible recommendations for avoiding actions which they present to the pilots. 
If TCAS is not operating, or if despite TCAS recommendations they find themselves 
in a collision course, pilots might still with skill and judgement avoid a collision. 
But if they fail to do so, an accident can happen. This is recorded in the SSE data. 
CATWOE analysis for SSE: 
• Customer. SSE data. 
• Actor. ATCs and Pilots. 
• Transformation. Depending on the performance of each of the ATC functions and 
Pilot's skills, a proportion of a volume of traffic might be expected to "breach" some 
of the barriers. The amount of breaches at different barriers are recorded as SSE 
data. 
CATWOE analysis for Culture: 
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• Actor. HR department inasmuch as the," 
are responsible to prO\'ide an internal 
culture in which ATCs work. 
• CustOBlC'L The ATCs. 
• Transformation. The clllture of the organisation is transfonned Tlle a . . t' . .. . ~~ump IOn 
of this project is that an improved internal culture would translate in a reduction 
of air-traffic accidents/incidents CilllSecl by human factors. 
Now, the question is how to examine the culture of an organisation m order to 
determine whether action needs to be taken to improve it. The next section addresses 
this point. 
6.5 Culture 
Modelling "cultun;' in air traffic management deserves special attention. partly because 
a fundamental motivation to signal the author's contribution to t his model, and part I)" 
because it proved to be particularly problematic. 
The starting point is the work of the SRU led by Prof. Ian Donald. The SRU 
research has shown the importance of employees' perception of management involvement 
in the risk management process. The SRU has produced a Safety Attitude Questionnaire 
(SAQ) whose answers correlate (to varying degrees) with the actual safety records of a 
number of organisations. The SAQ dataset was collected from 73 companies across the 
world during the period of 1992-1999, and includes companies from the oiL chemical and 
power generation industries. The majority of the respondents were from the UK and also 
from China (Mainland and Hong Kong), Greece, the Netherlands, Portugal, Australia, 
Middle East, and New Zealand. The total sample size is 7211 respondents lO . 
The SAQ data was broken down into probability tables suitable for inclusion in the 
BN. To achieve this, it was necessary to rate the individual companies in relation to their 
safety performance and to provide safety culture data for each of these companies. In an 
effort to reduce data not related to safety culture in the existing dataset, a number of 
companies were excluded. The criterion for exclusion was companies with a sample size 
of less than forty, and companies not based in the UK. Additionally, companies which had 
lOInformation provided by SRU team members Q. Xie and S. Johnson 
r('peatpd safet~· culture data (i.e. safet~· culture surn'~'s completed more than ()llce) \\"('n~ 
r('~trictpd to inclusion on the basis of their first sllrn'y Oldy. Thl' final :-;(llllp\f' t jl!'H'fore 
included 23 UK companies, with over 4500 responclentsll. 
Factor 12 Factors correlating to the compan~"s safet~· culture C'urrelc) t ion 
number 
1 Personal eyaluation of the safety S\'stem 0.90 
2 Safd~' representative's perceived (knmdedge of and) involn'- 0.88 l 
ment in the safety system I I 
I 
3 Personal safe working practice 0.8/ 
1 "'orkforce's perceived evaluation and involvement in sC1feb· 0.86 
meetings 
5 ~lanagement 's perceived involvement in the safet~· system 0.86 
6 Unsafe working practices O./D 
7 Safety representative·s perceived evaluation of the safct~· sys- 0.86 
tem 
8 \Vorkforce·s (perceived safet~· encouragement and) support o .8() 
9 Co-worker's perceived involvement and evaluation of the ()./~ 
safety s~'stem 
10 :Management's perceived evaluation of the safety system 0./0 
11 Participative communication () .10 
12 Personal involvement in the safety system 0.70 
Table 6.1: Factor Structure of the SAQ. These factors are strong indicators of how ·'good·' 
or "bad" the safety culture of an organisation is. 
There were over 60 questions in the SAQ, that have been grouped into 12 ··factors··. 
see Table 6.5. See Appendix B on page 177 for the complete set of questions. From these 
60 questions, approximately 20 have been identified as correlating significant \y with the 
company's culture, and for that reason they can be used as strong indicators of how 
"good" or "bad" a company's safety culture is. For instance, in Table 6.5 we can see the 
questions related to the first factor: Personal evaluation of the safety system. 
Consistent to J. Reason's [190] argument, see Chapter 2, we interpreted culture 
as something that is not directly observable. We can only perceive its manifestations. 
Looking at the performance of a given company, i.e. whether or not it is "successfuP' (e.g. 
lower rates of accidents, lower turnover), we can determine whether it has a "good·· or 
"bad" culture. In this sense, the causal link between culture and its manifestations forms 
a loop where the actions reinforce the idea of culture and culture is responsible for those 
actions. These physical manifestations can be observed and thus measured, e.g. survl'~' 
11 Information provided by SRU team members Q. Xie and S. Johnson 
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Qucstions to determine the factor 1: Personal evaluation of sClfety system 
I feel sat isfied with the safety information I oet . C> 
I alll happy with the existing safety precautions for particularl~' haz-
ardous work 
I feel scltisfied with tIll' Clttention given to safety in any training I haye 
had 
I am happy with the sClfpty eqllipnwllt specified for my job 
Generally I alll happy with the safd,Y in my asset area 
I know the results of safety inspections to do with my job 
The pcople I work with an' s;llisficd with the attention given to safet~· 
in any training they have had 
'The people I \york \\"ith are satisfied with the information they get about 
safe working 
If changes are made to the procedures for my job I know about them 
I feel I could tell my boss if I had worries about safety 
Table 6.2: Questions Correlated to employees' perception of management invoh'ement in 
the risk management process. 
responses, performance in jobs. 
Figure 6.3 is the result of this interpretation. The node labeled "Culture" represents 
"cultural assessment': , a probabilistic assessment of a given culture (the "causc"), and 
the nodes, called indicator nodes (see Chapter 5 section 5.6 on page 88 ), represent 
the "factors': (the grouped responses to survey questions) that correlate best with safety 
incident records. The information provided by these indicators classify the culture that an 
organisation exhibits. Note that this interpretation of culture reflects the ideas discussed 
in Chapter 2. 
",,,_.aI. I 
worWng practict / 
Figure 6.3: Final sub-net for cultural assessment 
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Also, note that t 11(' factors are now reduced to 7 \\", -'" - -
. - l \\(Ie concern that 12 mchcators 
nodes would worsen the results rather than to improye theITI \\'-tl 1') f t "' 
- 1 1 _ ac01 S \\-(I~ more 
difficult to obt.ain the results expected lw om' colle'1 o'Iws '1t SRU TI SRU 
' .( 0 • c, - le team sllgg()sted 
initially that a solution with f(,wer factors \\"'1S po,-,cl-ble so f "tl' ' 1 ' 
• ( • .hJ •• UI leI ana ~':-;l:-; \H're run 
forcing data into 7 to 11 factors. \Ve opted to reduced the number of indicaturs t (I 7 
which was the best compromise between the SAQ d'lt'1 and tl'le' l' t· d' I . ( c . mc Ica.01 no es so utlOn, 
Table 6.3 is a typical example of the data obtained from SAQ. Table 6.-1 illustrcltl's 
how these data was translated into probability tables. 
Culture bin Factor 7 Factors affecting organis<ltion \ 
Value culture 
1 3 4 5 6 8 11 
1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 
2 0 4 0 1 3 3 3 
3 0 10 4 1 19 2 4 
Very Weak 4 10 11 11 8 IS 8 25 
5 23 14 17 23 1 23 6 
6 6 1 5 5 1 4 0 
7 1 0 2 0 0 1 0 
Total 40 41 40 39 40 41 39 
Missing 1 1 2 1 2 
System to- 41 41 41 41 41 
tal 
Table 6.3: SAQ Data for Culture classify as "Very Weak". The Factor Value column 
range from Strongly Disagree (1) to Strongly Agree (7). 
Culture Factor 1 
1 1 2 I 3 14151 6 I 7 







Table 6.4: Conditional probability for factor one given a poor organisational culture. 
Note that the zero values where changed to 1-8 when introduced in the NPTs given that 
a zero in probability means that a particular scenario is inconceivable. These values are 
later normalised. 
Figure 6.4 is an illustration of the Culture network showing a graphic view of the 
probability tables. 
SRU also suggested to consider just two "levels" of culture that of the "unit" (typically 
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Figure 6.4: Graphic view of the Culture network NPTs using the Agena Ri k tool. 
6 .6 Conceptual Model 
At this stage we put together all the previous root definitions to build the BN model. 
This model is made of different modules: 
• The "Culture" or Socio-Technical module. Each socio-technical function might have 
its own local culture, and each collection of socio-technical functions (as in a sector 
group) would have its own culture and there would be local cultures associated with 
each level of the organisation. 
For this reason, this pattern will be replicated whenever an activity has a human 
component which can be considered as independent , in this case the PATC and the 
TATC (including when acting in recovery mode) . 
The factors affecting the TATCs' capability may well be different for different 
modes. An ATC's performance in recovery mode, for example, is likely to be condi-
tioned by specific training for such circumstances. It is also affected by the perfor-
mance of particular technical aids, such as the presence and operation of any STCA 
system. So, in the network the patterns for socio-technical functions were repeat d 
for both "normal" and "recovery" modes of operation of the TATC treating th m 
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as separate functions. Figure 6.5 shows a schema of this interpretation. 
T raffic 
Dem and 








P ilot & 
T eAS 
ColliSion 
Figure 6.5: Schema representing the role of NATS s culture in the B model. 
Culture is , then , regarded as a factor not just in parallel with "people skill .. and 
"v. orkst.ation capR hili ty", bu t. afff'cting those factors as well , through such things as 
the importance attached to training, and the design , maintenance and operation of 
technical support systems. In Figure 6.6 illustrates this interpretation. 
"P eople Skills" ddlI1cS the staff education , tra.ining and expenenc ote 
that this definition does not represent simply competence, which is gen rally 
regarded as independent of a given situation, but in this network r present 
the diligence of application of that competence as conditioned by the local 
culture. 
"Workstation Capability" refers to the performance and the usability of the 
systems, as well as the correctness and dependability of their functional design. 
Figure 6.6: Note that the Culture pattern is replicated whenever an activity has a human 
component which can be considered as independent , in this case the PATC and the TATC 
(and in recovery mode). 
An additional node: "Cultural Dependency", was introduced in order to allow ex-
perimentation with the degree of cultural autonomy of the operational units. Often 
pockets of "unsafe" culture exist within safety conscious organisations' and occa-
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sionally "~afe" pockets of behaviour exi~t 'tl' 
WI . 1m organisation~ \\'ith a poor safety 
culture. See Figure 6.7. 
Figure 6.7: Cultural Dependenc~r adjust the impact of the prior NATS ~af('t~· culture 
• Pilot's module. It also was decided to make explicit the combined effect of the pilot 
(including the aircraft performance and other air-crew members) which affects the 
performance not of the TATe capabilities. but of the TATe function in which the 
ATe works with the pilot. 
In addition, the role of the Pilot responding to TeAS warnings is now more clear. 
TeAS does not itself control the aircraft: its warnings are mediated by the pilot 
and the aircraft. 
Figure 6.8: Pilot's performance. They are the product of their skill's and TeAS advice. 
In Figure 6.8 we can see how the pilot's behaviour is the common cause to the 
TATe's performance and recovery capability together with the TeAS advice. This 
means that the pilot's skills have a bigger weight in the outcome of an accident, so 
much so, that it only needs the pilot to fail to have an accident . 
• SSE data module. The role of the SSE data is to fine-tune the outcomes the model 
will become clearer during validation in section 6.8. Depending on the performance 
of each of the ATe functions, a proportion of that volume of traffic might be 
expected to "breach" some of the barriers. We can model this module using a 
Markov-chain transition model [111]. That is, the outcome of a process depends 
on the previous one, thus making a chain a successive events in time [132]. See top 
row of nodes in Figure 6.9. 
-----<luaI SSE.< (E~nt'" \ after TIDicill 
'y 
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Figure 6.9: SSEs tIt' ne wor \: represen mg expected barrier breaches. 
For instance. a proportion of the volume of aircraft movements handled b~' the 
TATe's in normal operational mode will not be satisfactorily "dc(()lIfiin eel" alld 
become potential losses of separation which must be handled b~' the TATe's in 
"recon)r\" mode". Ultimately there is only luck (helped b~" the \"olume of airsp<lce 
out there) and then just bad luck and collision. 
The network ill Figure 6.10 shows the final version of tIl(' BN model. 
Note that Flow l\Ianagement is not present in the model. \Yhile ultimatel~' it ma~' be 
desirable to consider how changes to flow management procC'sses might improve "down-
stream" performance, NATS decided for the present to focus on the performance of PATe 
and TATe processes affected by the organisation culture. 
So, the outputs of the Flow Management processes have been replaced the input 
nodes "airspa.ce characteristics" and "traffic complexity" \vhose output is the "pres('nting 
problem" for the "PATe Performance" node. This node aggregates the effecb of volum(' 
of traffic, complexity of traffic mix, complexity of airspace, such as crossing paths. com-
plexity of flight plans, and the performance of flow managers in trying to keep t he traffic 
presented to PATe's to acceptable levels. See Figure 6.11. 
6.7 Populating Node Probability Tables 
The prior probability for nodes such as "Traffic Volume", "Traffic .Mix", "STCA" or 
"TeAS" were obtained from the NATS experts. 
A more difficult task was to built the NPTs for the conditioned nodes. For each 
conditioned node, experts were asked to express their beliefs about particular scenarios 
associated with that node by drawing probability distributions. These curves are esti-
mates of the conditional probability density function for the "output" of a node given 
its "inputs". Given a selection of scenarios, we are able to generate a function for the 
child node. After having elicited a full set of graphs, the node probability tables were 
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Figure 6.10: Fined network arising from the case study. The final network is made of a, 
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Figure 6.11: Planner 
constructed semi-automatically using the ranked node approach described in Chapter 5. 
P(Performance I TCAS Advice. Pilot's skills) 
TCAS Ad. Pilot Sk. I (j VH VH 
VL L M H VH 
A 
VL VH ~~ B 
VLLMHVH 
VH VL V\ ~ 
VL L M H VH 
C 
M M t L:\ 
VL L M H VH 
o 
VL VL 1\ ;:. E 
VL L M H VH 
(a) The node "TeAS and Pilot's perfor- (b) Expert's drawings of a set of scenarios. 
mance" is considered to be a consequence 
of two causes: "TeAS advise" and "Pilot's 
Skill". 
Figure 6.12: Elicitation example 
Figure 6.12 shows the example of a node that represents the pilots' responses to 
TeAS advise. Those responses depend on two factors - the extent to which TeAS 
provides useful support, and the performance of the pilot in responding to a TeAS alert. 
For each of the input factors, five states were considered: "Very Low", "Low", " 
Medium", "High" and "Very High". 
Instead of eliciting all 125 combinations of these factors, needed for the Performance 
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node, we considered just four extreme situations along with a fifth, medium. case. 'Ill(' 
eXIH'rts' probability graphs for these five scenarios are shown in Figure 6.12(b). 
The experts explain these estimates as follows: In the case of TeAS supportiveness 
and Pilot performance both being "Very High" we would expect the resultant Performance 
to be also very high. A highly skilled pilot may, for instance, add a lateral turn to 
whatever advice is given by TeAS. Both the "skewness" and the sharp peak of the 
distribution indicate a high degree of certainty for this estimate. In the case of TeA.S 
supportiveness being "Very Low" and Pilot performance being "Very High" we haw> a 
more spread distribution along "Very Low" and "Low" right up to "High", indicating 
a less certain outcome. On occasions, for instance, TeAS may give a nuisance alert 
and mislead a pilot. Pilots are generally trained to follow TeAS advice. However, the 
more skilled they are the more likely they are to have good situational awareness. with 
knowledge of other aircraft in the vicinity from radio, etc, and will be more likely to 
respond correctly to the actual situation, rather than blindly following the erroneous 
advice. 
6.8 Validation 
For the purposes of validation SSM recommends to compare the conceptual model with 
the perceived reality [32]. This methodology describes four ways of doing the comparison: 
• informal discussion; 
• formal questioning; 
• scenario writing based on "operating the models"; 
• and trying to model the real world in the same structure as the conceptual models. 
During the development of this model we have exercised all these types of compar-
ison. We use scenario analysis as one of the main techniques to build the conceptual 
model. This model was made following the structure of the real world process. To val-
idate the outcome we are using SSE historical data as one of the recommended options 
in SSM. 
The SSE data is used to corroborate the model's incident estimates, whenever avail-
able and to indicate how often breaches took place. Incident data is currently collected , 
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by NATS and is linked to loss of separation , see Figure 6.l. 
The SSE data helped us nne-tuned t.h e models· NPTs by comparing the elicit d 
probability est imates with the loss separation data. 
The NPTs for the Culture sub-net , see Figure 6.3 , and for its link to the ' Unit Safet 
Culture' ~ node, were agreed with the SRU and were validated later by NATS through the 
following scenarios. 
Note that the purpose of these validation tests is not to compute exact values but to 
check that the output values appear relatively correct compared with actual experience 
or the available data. Through scenario analysis, we can observe the relative importanc 
of various factors and their interaction . The following are examples of scenarios we run: 
• Default scenario , that is, the model prior to enter any observation. With these 
settings the network predicts the likelihood of a single accident as 1.4E-07 see 
right corner of Figure 6.13. This translates into approximately 0.01 events per year 
on average or as 67.28 years between events on average. 
Suong ".d Ilftrqu~U: lud"n~nur O<t:n runhoc , 
Unit Safety Culture has five states rang-
ing from strong to destructive. The initial 
node probability table indicates that this 
variable is as likely to be between adequate 
(30%) and destructive (18%) . 
HI~~ .... "'oHsl_C.,.J)ffiIflt If:~.r.ar ~ 
SIUfk.d ·1 
The pilot aircraft node has five states 
ranging from highly skilled to poor. We 
observe that around 24% are highly 
skilled, 47% professional and so on. 
TCAS ranges from Highly supportive to 
Misleading. With a mean of 46% of being 
Supportive. 
1.'£- 1 •. 
1.1 2'" Lt 
Collisions. Probability of an mid-air colli-
sion is 0.00000014 on a 15min interval. 
Figure 6.13: Default settings 
• Scenario 1. This scenario is derived from the default scenario but with the nod 
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modelling the sector unit culture set to good . When this evidenc i propagat d 
it can be seen that the mean number of collisions per year is 0.01 \\ ith a mean of 
67.28 years between collisions. The probability of a collision is reduced to 1.65E-0 
per year and the probability of the identified SSE events is as shown in table 6.5. 
• Scenario 2 models the following node settings: 
"Traffi c Volume" = :30% above target sector fl ow, 
"tra,ffic Characteristics'; = complex, 
- "ATC Planner" = bellow average and 
- "Unit culture" = good. 
This scenario yields, for example, a mean number of collisions per year of 0.04 with 
a mean number of years between collisions of 24.98, see table 6.5. 
• Scenario 3 models the situation where: 
"Pilot/crew mix" = below par , (by pilot/crew mix is meant that the capabil-
ities of the pilots, their command of English , their attentiveness to the radio 
communications, their effectiveness in responding to ATC clearances/requests 
(how fast do they respond and perform necessary manoeuvres, do they ques-
tion the need for avoiding action etc.) 
"TCAS" = highly supportive 
"Unit culture" = strong 
In this scenario the mean number of collisions per year is 0.03 with a mean number 
of years between collisions of 35.02, see table 6.5. 
Table 6.5 shows a summary of the above scenarios but this time including the SSEs 
probability estimates. 
. 
SSEl & 2 SSEl Collisions 
1. P(event) 1.99E-5 5.75E-06 1.65E-07 1.65E-08 
Culture Strong Mean events per year 17.84 5.16 0.15 0.01 
Mean years between events 6.73 67.2 
2. 
:{. 
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, 
P ( (,\·f'nt) 4.2:m-'i l.(nE-O'i 4.4.')E-07 
ATC' Challenged l\Iean ('\"('n t s per ~·l'ar .38.00 17.:):) 0.40 
lVlean ~·ears bet\\·cC'Il events ') C _ .. J 
P( event) 2.16E-5 9.32E-06 :U8E-07 
Pilots degraded 
l\Iean events per year 19.40 8.87 0.29 
and l\'litigations 
l\Iean .H'ars between events 3.50 
Table 6.5: Table with the data predictions obtained from 







Table 6,6 shows a summary of the scenarios used to validate the model's results. 
along with the expert's comments on their prediction. 
From the validation exercise, it can be seen that the barrier safety process is remark-
ably resilient to poor performance of particular parts of the process. This is just what 
one would expect from a "defense in depth". 
It might seem that some stages of the process are not very important. For instance, 
under normal operation, TCAS appears to offer little benefit. However, the important 
contribution of systems such as STCA and TCAS becomes clear when earlier "barri-
ers" are breached, Again, there is a parallel with redundancy in other reliable systems, 











We set: Airspace complexity to "Very low" and Planner Ca-
pability to "Highly effective" 
Planner ATC Performance: Very low, ATC P erformance: 
Very low and Culture (assessment): good 
Planner ATC P erformance: Very low, TCAS : high ly sup-
portive Culture (assessment) : good and ATC Performance: 
Very low 
ATC P erformance: Very low, Planner ATC P erforma.nce: 
Very low, TCAS: misleading and Culture: good 
Planner ATC Performa nce: Very low, ATC Performance: 
Very low, STCA: misleading and Culture: good 
Planner ATC Performance: Very low, ATC P erformance: 
Very low, STCA: highly supportive and Culture (assess-
ment): good 
Cu lture (assessment): good , STCA: mis leading, T CAS: 
highly supportive and Pilot: highly skilled 
Culture (assessment): good, ST CA: highly support ive, 
TCAS: highly supportive and Pilot : highly skilled 
Culture (assessment) : good, T CAS: mislea.d ing, Pilot: 
highly skilled 
C ulture (a.ssessment): good, T CAS: highly supportive and 












Attention to upstream factors a.ppea,rs 1,0 have s ignificant impact on 
do"vnstrea,m performance 
See next scenar io 
The poor performa nce of planners and ATe a lmost hide t he effect of 
TCAS. In th is scenario, T CAS contribution represe nts a 10%reduct ion 
in coll is ions. (This reduction is !lot Lhat. s ignifi call t a nd it was t.o be 
expected given that t he prior for TCAS i~ between support ive a nd 
hi ghly supportive.) 
Now the importance of T CAS ca.n be seen in (\. poo r environment , t he 
sit. uG).t ion is ten tinJ cs worse withouL effect ive T e AS . 
STCA ha.-; a pr ior a.ro und support ive a.nd highly supp ortiVE', so seLt ing 
this node to mis lea,din g repre~ent~ a.n in crease on collisions t.(\ 5 yea.rs . 
Compn.ring wit h sCf'nRrio 4: good S'l'CA Rpp f'R rS to offp. J' o f ha lving (\f 
the incident rate. 
Conso lidates t he i mpressioJ1 gai ncr! ill sce nario [j 
Compare wit h next sce nar io 
STCA a ppears to be ".lmost irreluvanL wllC'n (!V(' J'.vt hinp; C'lse is wO J' kin g 
well. 
Compare wit h next scenari o 
These lasL Lwo scena rios fil wp ll with t he beli efs LII<lt n. ski ll ed pi lot ('all 
sti ll rescue a poor s it llat ion , while it poor rilot is (\.1 risk (' v('n wi1. h [!.,oo <i 
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Modelling Operational Risk 
7.1 Introduction 
In recent years the financial industry has recognised the importance of operational risk 
(OpRisk) in shaping the risk profile of financial institutions. This is not only a result of 
the large losses we mentioned in Chapter 2 but it is also due to new developments such 
as the use of more highly automated technology, large-scale acquisitions and mergers, 
deregulation and globalisation of financial services, growth of e-commerce, emergellce 
of banks acting as large-volume service providers and the growing use of outsourcing 
arrangements [106]. 
Proof of this concern are the results from the survey conducted in 1997 by the British 
Bankers Association and Coopers & Lybrand. This survey underlined the importance of 
OpRisk for the majority of banks; 71% reported an increased concern about it. This is 
due to the fact that 24% of those banks each experienced losses of more that $1.6 million 
in the previous three years [11]. 
For these reasons, the Basel Committee has drafted a system of regulation addressing 
the issue of OpRisk and its assessment [164]. This Committee is part of the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS). The BIS is an international organisation, which fosters 
international monetary and financial cooperation and serves as a central bank for banks. 
The focus of BIS is the research and cooperation in international banking regulation. 
The key to this regulatory process is the modelling of a business's OpRisk, in terms 
7.2. Dffindion of o]Jf !Ofiol/a! Ri,l 120 
of a \'ariety of loss event typc's. in order to arrive at an appropriate regulatory capital 
charge. The capital chaTge is the amount of capital banks must put aside as a provision 
against an~' possible future losses due to breakdowns. The most important typc's of 
OpRisk losses. as the Ba~;('l Committee [162] signals, 
.. involve breakdowns in internal controls and corporate governance. Such 
breakdm","ns can lead to financial losses through error. fraud. or failure to 
perform in a timely manner or cause the interests of the bank to be com-
promised in some other way, for example, by its dealers. lending officers 
or other staff exceeding their authority or conducting business in an un-
ethical or risky manner. Other aspects of operational risk include major 
failure of information technology systems or events such as ,I major fires 
or others disasters. 
In the following sections we are going to discuss the framework set by Basel to control 
OpRisk's breakdowns. In section 7.2, we give the Basel Committ.ee's definition of OpRisk 
and study its implications. In section 7.3, we study the regulatory framework. This 
includes a summary of the regulatory strategies to address OpRisk and an explamltion 
of the Basel proposed methods to calculate the capital charge. In section 7.4, we give 
a brief introduction of the methods put forward by the financial institutions within the 
Committee's regulatory framework. Section 7.5 is dedicated to explain the BN approach 
to model OpRisk. In this section, we decomposed the OpRisk BN model into smaller 
modules and explain their semantics and probability tables. 
7.2 Definition of Operational Risk 
In 1998, the Basel Committee [161] came up with different definitions of OpRisk given 
the different interpretations that financial institutions gave to this risk. For some, it 
was defined as the risk not categorised as credit or market risk, others as the risk of loss 
arising from various types of human and technical errors, among other similar definitions. 
This initial disagreement in defining the scope of OpRisk highlighted the particular and 
complex nature of it. The final definition, by the Committee [164] in 2001, is the result of 
a compromise, wide enough to accommodate these different views. The Basel Committee 
defines OpRisk as 
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TIl(' risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal process. people. 
and s~'stem or external events. 
This definition signals as ul1lses of OpRisks: 
• People. The risk of losses caused intentionally or unintentionally by the employees. 
It also includes the losses associated with alleged violations of employment law. 
• Process. This category reflects losses that have been incurred because of a deficien('~' 
in an existing procedure, or of the lack of a procedure being in place. Losses in this 
category derive from mistakes (i.e. errors) or from not following existing procedllres 
(i.e. compliance or control breakdown). There may be many reasons why the losses 
occur. like insufficient staff to process the transactions, or because inappropriate 
access to systems, however, what differentiates the losses in the Process category 
from those in People, is that the former are not intentionaL 
• System. This category reflects the risks and losses that are caused by systems/technology. 
All risks and losses in this category happened by mistake, and are not intentionaL 
If an intentional event occurs, it should be placed in the People category (if by 
employee) or on the External one (if by a third party) . 
• ExternaL This category is the risk and losses that occur due to business interruption 
resulting from natural or man-made forces. Risks and losses that are a direct result 
of a third party action should be grouped in this category. 
Table 7.2 on page 122 shows this classificat.ion and the risk event types they can 
give rise to. It is worth noticing that in a survey conducted by the Risk Management 
Association (RMA) in 2002 on the sources of OpRisk, the financial institutions consulted 
pointed out "Process" and "People" categories as the major causes of concern, see Figure 
7.1. These results stress the need to implant management practices within the firm to 
address these potential sources of breakdowns. 
7.3 Operational Risk Assessment Framework 
The Committee focuses on two areas: (a) the need to establish a strong internal control 
culture, that takes the responsibility to put into practice regulator's advice, and (b) the 
Accounting error 
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Employment law Miss-selling/ suitability Strategic risks Political 
Health and safety Product complexity System capacity Regulatory 
Industrial action Project risk System capacity Supplier risk 
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Figure 7.1: Results from a 2002 survey conducted by RMA the sources of OpRisk 
need for a quantitative and qualitative method to measure this OpRisk. This amounts 
to the study of: 
1. Corporate governance. Section 7.3.1 gives a brief summary of the regulation and 
recommendations given to improve the control and assessment of OpRisk. 
2. Quantitative and qualitative methods. In section 7.3.2 we study the methods de-
veloped within the framework set by the Committee 
7.3.1 Corporate Governance - Regulatory Strategies for Improvement 
The Basel Committee recommendations echo the concerns and advice that reports such 
as Cadbury [25] , Greenbury Code [195], Turnbull [214] and the Combined Code [54] 
stated in preceding years. 'I' he main difference is that the Basel recommendations focus 
on banks OpRisk (and Credit risk) and regulate its compliance by means of a capital 
charge. 
All these reports highlight the influence of management practices in shaping the com-
pany's risk profiles . They all agreed and emphasised on the importance of the company's 
directors commitment in the risk avoidance strategy. 
The Cadbury report [25] , published in December 92, focuses on the role of directors , 
emphasising the need to implement rigorous reporting and control measures. It al 0 
requests the full commitment of the board to risk management, rather than treating it 
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a,.,) something t hat is covered by an insurance polin'. The GI,eeI1 l-)111'\' I'eco d t' . " I '. " lllmen a 1011:-. 
[195] (Code of Best Practice) are ba .. sed on the fundamental principles of accountability. 
transparellcy, and linkage of rewards to performance. 
The Combined Code [54] (Principles of Good Governance and Code of Best Practice) 
is a set of principles, which embraced the Cadbury and Greenbury reports. This is just 
a summary of the above reports. i.e. board duties, director's control (performance-pay 
ratio, disclosure of information, remuneration, bonuses, pension. termination of contract 
payment), financial and internal reporting. 
The Turnbull report [143] in 1998 comments on issues such as the type of risks that 
need to be controlled, keeping the control system up to date and t he responsibilities of the 
board. On this last point, the guidelines are emphatic about the board's responsibilit~, 
to regularly review the control system [214]: 
• To implement the policies adopted by the board: 
• To assess reports from management regularly throughout the year; 
• To make sure that the control system is working properly, that the system responds 
adequately to any faults and weaknesses that have been reported and that the 
corrective actions have taken place; 
• Reviews should cover all controls, including financial, operational and compliance 
controls and risk management; 
These above reports consider the environment, where the internal control is exerted, 
crucial to its success. They consistently agree that the board of directors is the keystone 
to the implementation of a strong culture of internal controls. This is very much reflected 
in the Basel Committee's [106] comments: 
The board and senior management should promote an organisational cul-
ture which establishes through both actions and words the expectations of 
integrity for all employees in conducting the business of the bank. ... despite 
these differences, clear strategies and oversight by the board of directors 
and senior management, a strong operational risk culture and and inter-
nal control culture, effective internal reporting, contingency planning are 
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crucial elements to an effective operational risk m;m3g('11H'llt framework 
for banks of any size and scope. 
The Committee provides considerable detail on how to achieye this internal culture of 
control. It does this from different perspectives: from the management point of yie\\' [lOG]. 
providing guidelines to improve internal controls [160~-162l or establishing a framework 
for the OpRisk assessment [164,166]. 
In summary, all the reports agree that the internal control s~'stem must be integrated 
within the company's normal management processes and not just as an annual exercis(' 
of compliance with the regulators [214]. In essence, OpRisk is about good managemellt. 
which is not only good for OpRisk stand point, but it is also good for the compan~" as a 
whole. 
7.3.2 Quantitative and qualitative methods - Basel proposed methods 
In broad terms, we can classify the OpRisk methods into two groups: 
• Top down approaches: These methods estimate an overall capital charge for the 
firm as a whole. 
• Bottom up approaches: The capital charge is based on the measurement of the 
potential risks within the business units of the firm. This assessment prO\"ides more 
detail on the causes of potential losses. 
Within the top-down approach, Basel proposes two different approaches: Basic and 
Standard and establishes the basis for a third one, Advanced measurement, where banks 
are allowed to produce their own models following either a top down or a bottom up 
approach. The Committee's approaches measure OpRisk capital charges in a continuum 
of increasing sophistication and risk sensibility, (see Figure 7.2). In this figure we observe 
that the capital charge is related to the managerial "quality". In essence, the firms that 
demonstrate compliance with the Basel's requirements on managerial internal control 
practices will have to put less capital aside [160]. 
The details of the three approaches are: 
1. Basic indicator approach (BA). This method is only concerned with the overall 
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Figun· 7.'2: OpRisk available methods. The techniques framed with a dotted line corre-
spond to the Advance :0.Icasurement Approach. 
control OpRisks. 
The charge is calculated by multiplying the level of exposure indicator (EI) for the 
whole institution (provisionally the gross income (GI)) times a fixed perCl'llt(l,~(' a. 
set by the Committee. Following the quantitative impact stlld~r in 2003 (QIS3) 
[167], Basel has set a. at 15%. The GI reflects the business volume and thus it can 
llsed as an OpRisk EI. According to the provisional definition [33] GI = net illterest 
income + net non-interest income. 
The capital charge is, therefore, calculated as follows: Capital charge = a. * GJ. 
2. Standardised approach (SA). The SA looks at the potential risks arising from the 
firm at business unit level. In doing so, the firm can identify and thus prevent 
the losses. Although SA provides more detail than BA it is still not sensitive to 
management strategies to control risk. The reason is that SA calculations are not 
based on internal or external loss data but on the risk coefficients set by Basel. 
In this approach we still use GI as a proxy for OpRisk exposure. The difference 
with BA is that in the SA the bank's activities are divided into 8 business lines 
(BLs) and 7 loss event types (ETs) associated with each BL. The Committee [106] 
has identified these ETs as having the potential OpRisk to result in substantial 
losses, (table 7.3 in page 128 shows the definition and gives examples of the ETs). 
The result is a matrix of 8 BLs times 7 ETs as the one shown in table 7.3. 
The total capital charge is the addition of the charges of each BL. 
Capital charge = L f3i * Gli where i=BL, and GI is taken as EI. 
i 
The percentage, f3, charged depends on the BL's risk level. The percentage will 
vary from a 12% of the GI for the least risky BLs like retail banking to 18% for the 
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Internal External Employment Clients. 
Fraud Fraud Products ~nd 
Damage to Business Execution, Total Across 
Practices and Physical Disruption Delivery, and Event Types 
Workplace Business Assets 
Safety Services 
and System Process 
Failures Management 
Corporate Finance 4 3 16 15 8 1 33 
o 0'''10 0.01 % 0.06% 0.05% 0.03% 000% 0 12% 
Trading and Sales 16 6 37 11 2 10 39 1.114 
006% 0.02% 0.14% 0.41 % 0.04% 0 .14% 4.07% 
Retail Banking 593 ( .798 579 1,2 (3 B37 570 6.807 
2.17% 28 49'''10 2.12% 4 .65% 3 .06'''10 2 .08% 2487% 
Commercial Banking 93 1.180 55 66 285 474 1,463 
0.34%, 4.31 % 0.20% 0.24% 1.04% 1.73% 5.35% 
Payment and 22 9 61 9 57 40 64 , 52 
Settlement 0.08% 3.51 % 0.D3% 0.2 1% 0.15% 0 .23% 2. (5% 
Agency and Custody 6 7 12 69 17 11 356 
Services 0.02% 0.03% 0.04% 0.25% 0.06% 0 .04% 1.30% 
Asset Mana:Jement 4 4 21 35 6 360 
0.01 % 0.01% 0.08% 0.13% 0.02% 1.32% 
Retail Brokerage 7 2 12 122 28 291 809 
0.03% 0.01% 0.04% 0.45% 0.1 0% 1 .06% 2.22% 
Total Across 745 9.961 741 1 .749 1,225 1,456 11.494 
Business Lines 2 .72% 36.39"/0 2.71 % 6.39"/0 4.48% 5 .32% 41 .99% 
Table 7.3: Number of Individual Loss Events per BL and ET. 30 Banks Reporting Data. 
Taken from [105] 
Corporate finance = 18% 
Trading and sales f32 = 18% 
Retail banking f33 = 12% 
Commercial banking f34 = 15% 
P ayment and settlement f3s = 18% 
Agency and custody services f36 = 15% 
Asset management f37 = 12% 
Retail brokage f38 = 12% 



















most risky ones for example trading. For other lines such as commercial banking a 
figure of 15% is used [166]. These coefficients are shown in table 7.4. 
3. Advance measurement approach (AMA). The methods in this approach follow a 
bottom up approach (apart from the Scorecard approach that can also follow a top 
down approach). The AMA approach allows banks to develop methods to assess 
their own OpRisks. Financial institutions must be able to demonstrate that the 
risk measure used for regulatory capital purposes, reflects a holding period of one 
year and a confidence level of 99.9%, see figure 7.4. Leaving only a 0.01% chance 
of suffering catastrophic losses. The incentive for banks following the AMA is to 
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Figure 7.3: Event types that BLs can give rise to. Taken from [105] 
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reduce their capital charge percentage to a " . f 9(1r [ , mlllmlUm 0 r 118J. Although thi~ 
is not the primary aim of the Committee. £ th 1 ' or . em t 1e goa.! of the institutioll:-; 
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Figure 7.4: OpRiskVaR. The mean of the distributions represent the expected losses 
while the tail represent the unexpected ones. The losses that go beyond the 99.9% are 
called catastrophic. Note that similar Figures are shown in a number of books related to 
this subject, see [8,33,43]. Jose Galan has created this Figure using GNUPLOT graphics 
tool. This Figure was also used in [153] 
The AMA methods must include certain key features such as internal and external 
data, scenario analysis and factors reflecting the management environment and 
internal controls [166]. In this context, the Basel Committee [106] has recognised 
as possible tools for identifying and assessing OpRisk: 
• Self-Assessment: using, for instance, a Scorecard approach a bank can assess 
its operations and activities against potential risk vulnerabilities by ranking 
the different types of OpRisk exposures. This subjective measurement is not 
only able to complement internal and/or external data but it also captures the 
quality of the internal controls. 
• Risk Indicators (RI): These are statistical measures that can provide an insight 
into a bank's risk position. Such indicators may include the number of "failed 
trades", "staff turnover rates" and "frequency and/or severity of errors and 
omissions". RIs can be seen as a combination of subjective and objective 
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information. They are subjc'ctive because each institution lllay choose differpnt 
Rh, givC'll ('(l.eh of tl}(,lll conduct their busill(,ss in diff<,)'" t ., t· h . 
~". ,.11 \YC\~ s. 0 gauge ten' 
risk levels. They are objective in the sense that these indicators. often. provide 
statistical metrics, e.g. number of failed trades [8]. 
• Measurement: this refers to the use of i\ banks internal and/or extemal his-
torical loss data to compute the charge. The resulting charge is C<:1lculated 
aggregating the frequency and the severity distributions. 
• Risk l\Iapping: In this process we identify the factors that are relevClllt to 
potential losses and how they interact following causal reasoning. Thp quan-
tification of these factors can be done either using historical data. expert's 
judgement or both. 
Table 7.6 on page 131 gives a summary of the above techniques 
7.4 Advance Measurement approaches 
In this section we explain the different techniques developed, thus far, within the Ar--IA 
framework by the financial institutions. It is worth pointing out that new techniques 
are coming up constantly which reflects the complexity and novelty of the task. Ac-
cordingly, the Basel Committee is making progressive changes to the regulatory draft 
to accommodate financial institutions' feedback. For this reason rather than explaining 
each technique in great detail we are going to give an overview of the trends they fol-
low, i.e. whether they are based on data and/or on expert opinion. Authors such as 
Alexander [8], Cruz [43]. Hoffman [100], Chorafas [33] provide a more detail account of 
the AMA techniques. Figure 7.7 classifies the current techniques depending on the source 
of information used, i.e. subjective or objective or both. 
7.4.1 Data approaches 
1. Value-at-Risk. VaR is defined as the maX1,mum loss over a target horizon such 
that there is a low: pre-specified probability that the actual loss will be larger [114]. 
We are referring to the market and credit risk techniques used to calculate the 
portfolio volatility. These techniques were, and still are in some cases, the starting 
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Subjective (Expert's judgement) 
- Self-Assessment: e.g. Question-
naires , check lists , Scorecards 
- Scenario Analysis: "What if scenar-
ios'; 
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Objective (Historical data) 
Measurement: 
- Value-at-Risk 
- Loss Data Approach . (e.g. Actuar-
ial models, Extreme Value Theory) 
- Internal measurement approach 
(IMA) 
Risk Indicators , e.g. Key Performance and Key Risk indicators 
- Risk Mapping, e.g. Bayesian networks 
Table 7.7: AMA methods. Classification based on the source of information . 
using VaR methods to calculate unexpected values. Although the Basel Com mitt 
recognised that this tool is not the appropriate one it is also acknowledged the lack 
of a better alternative [ll8]. There are a number of reasons for not using VaR 
methods: 
• OpRisk is essentially different from market and credit risk. As the Basel 
Committee [106] recognises 
. .it is clear that operational risk differs from other banking 
risk in that it is typically not directly taken in return for an 
expected reward ... At the same time, failure to properly manage 
operational risk can result in misstatement of an institution's 
risk profile and expose the institution to significant losses. 
• VaR methods require data that is available for the market and credit risk but 
in the case of OpRisk this may not always be true. 
• VaR methods calculate the portfolio volatility over a period of time that can 
vary from 10 days holding period to a month, in contrast to the 1 year period 
required by the OpRisk. 
• VaR does not say anything about the origin of the losses. It just indicates 
the probability of a value occurring. It treats the losses as inherently volatile. 
Thus, it does not motivate the management to take a pro-active action to 
avoid risks. 
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• TIl(' default cOllfidencf' value for VaR llwth(jds is <J:/7c while for OpRisk it is 
99.9%. On this point, Jorion [114] comments that VaR methods would not be 
able to 1ll<'(lSllfC fisk at sllch a high If'\'t'l of confidence. 
• VaR methods are more concerned with the sl'verity of the losses than \\'ith the 
frequency of those which from the point of vic\\" of managing risk is not ideal 
situation [43]. 
In the remainder on this thesis we are going to refer to OpRiskVar for the \'alue-
at-risk for the OpRisk to differentiate it from the VaR in the market and credit 
risk. 
2. Internal :Measurement Approach (Il\IA). Following this c\pproach. banks must clas-
sify their business units in BLs then measnl"e. based on their internal and external 
loss data (LE), the probability of loss event (PE) and the loss given that event 
(LGE). The expected loss per BL is given by the product of PE, LE and the EI of 
that line per ET across the BL [163]. Therefore, the expected losses on a BL is 
j=7 
Expected lossBL; = I Elj *PEj *LGEj where j=ET and i=BL 
j=1 
The total capital charge is the summation of the expected loss per BL times the 
BL's gamma factor y across the BLs (the y factor is the risk coefficient associated 
to an ET in a BL). The unexpected losses is obtained multiplying the expected 
losses by the gamma factor [164]. Which means that in this approach unexpected 
losses are causally related to the expected ones. 
i=8j=7 
Capital charge = I I Yi,j(Eli,j *PEi,j *LGEi,j) where i=BL 
i=lj=! 
It is worth noting that the Committee requires the addition of individual risks (i.e. 
ETs per BL) unless the bank can demonstrate that the ETs are correlated [184]. 
The gamma coefficients Yi,J are established by the Basel Committee (based on the 
report data gathered from a number of financial institutions). These parameters 
are subject to regular validation based on subsequent loss experience or other tech-
mques. 
Chorafas [33] points out that the main difference between Il'vIA and SA is that the 
former provides a more detailed account of the business risks, that is, it can take 
twenty or more business channels and a dozen or more OpRisk ET, thus providing 
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a more flexible and detailed approach to meaSllr,j B1' .' 1··, . H ,~ \ ~S ()~~e~, owen'r. t his also 
brings the complexity of calculating the gammas y b~' BLs per each ET. 
3. Loss Data Approach (LDA). This approach is an application of actlHlrial meth-
ods that combine a frequency distribution describing the occurrence of operational 
losses and its associated severity distribution. Actuarial models use loss data to 
build the frequency and the severity distributions of the losses. The frequency dis-
tribution describes the number of losses over a fixed period of time and the se\'erity 
distribution describes the size of the loss once it occurs [43]. Figure I,S illustrates 
this point. The total losses are the result of the frequency of the losses times their 
[!h] 
severity. 
Frequency distribution Severity distribution 
P(x P(x 
x 
N. of failures Loss severity 







This approach deals with unexpected and expected losses separately. It aims to 
assess unexpected losses directly rather than assuming a causal relationship between 
them, as the IMA approach does [164]. Thus, the capital charge is based only 
on the unexpected losses. However, we argue that the reason for this separation 
is more practical than theoretical. The expected losses are generally provisioned 
by the financial institutions through insurances. For this reason, the Committee 
has agreed to lift the charges coming from the expected losses and focus only on 
the unexpected ones, provided that the institution can demonstrate that it has 
established a strong internal controls that cater for the expected losses [8]. If the 
Committee does not separate both risks the financial institutions may end up paying 
twice for the same risk. 
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One of the methods used to calculate unexpected losses directly is Extreme Value 
theory (EVT). We are are going to give a brief summary of this theory. Our aim is to 
put the EVT in the context of OpRisk and not to provide a detailed description of this 
theoryl. The use of EVT in estimating financial extreme exposure is relatively new. This 
theory has been rnainly used in the field of engineering (in particular reliability theory) 
and to forecast extn.>me meteorological conditions such as floods and tornadoes. 
EVT focusses on the extreme values of the distribution, i.e. the tail of the distt"i-
bution representing large losses, and ignores the rest of the values of the distribution, 
i.e. the mean. EVT forecasts unexpected losses by extrapolating extreme past events 
to future events [43]. The unexpected losses refers in this context to greatest historical 
losses experienced by the financial institution. The forecasting is done by fitting para-
metric distributions to these extreme observations (which, by definition, are a small set 
of observations) and obtaining the parameter estimates that produce the best fit. There 
are a number of distributions available to calculate extreme values according the their 
level of kurtosis, e.g. from Wei bull and Gumbel to Pareto distributions to name but a 
few [33,147]. There are two approaches to calculate EVT [43] . 
• Generalised Extreme Value distributions (GEV). GEV is a combination of the fol-




• Generalised Pareto distribution (GPD). These distributions are built on the losses 
that exceed a threshold, e.g. Peaks-over-threshold (POT) distribution. Expected 
and unexpected losses are separated given a threshold. The setting of this threshold 
is arbitrary and thus particular to each bank [119]. 
The GEV distributions are defined by three parameters F(x;~,J1,(J). Where J1 and 
(J are the location and scale parameters, respectively. The parameter ~ defines the tail 
of the distribution [43], for ~ < 0 we have a light-tail distribution like Weibull, for ~ = 0 
1 For further reading on the subject we recommend Castillo et al. [63) and Christoffersen [35); 
both provide examples. 
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a medium-tail distribution like Gumbel and for ~ > 0 a heavy-tail one like Frechet. That 
is, the ~ index is proportional to the level of kurtosis. Equation 7.1 shows the cdfs for the 
GEV. Cruz [43] explains two different methods to estimate the distribution parameters: 
probability weighted moments and maximum likelihood. 
F(x;~,J1,(J) 
exp { - [1- ;(x:)!]) for~ #0 
exp { -exp [(J1~X)] } for ~ = 0 
(7.1) 
Figure 7.6 shows an example of the EVT using a Gumbel distribution. Here we 
suppose that a financial institution forecasts a maximum possible loss of around 10.000 
for the current year. This prediction is, however, uncertain and therefore subject to 
variation. The institution wants to find out with 99.9% confidence the probability of 
suffering major losses. In this case, mode= 10.000 and scale between 1 and 2, we give 
this range to capture the uncertainty in the forecast. The confidence at p=99.9% can be 
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Figure 7.6: GEV - PDF and CDF Gumbel distributions 
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G(p) = mode-scale. log (tOg G) ) (7.2) 
However, the llse of EVrJ' in the field of OpRisk hllS been criticised. For instance. 
Chorafas [33] questions its applicability given the EVT assumptions. i.e. the loss distri-
bution must be smooth without discontinuities or spikes. 
The techniques reviewed, thus far. all rely on data. However. as we discuss in the 
next section, this brings a number of problems. 
7.4.2 Limitations with data approaches 
The Basel committee has acknowledged the need to complement historical data with 
qualitative information. Although the Committee does not explicitly state it. expert 
opinions must be taken into account to model OpRisk if the Committee "vant::; financial 
institutions to produce reasonable models by 2007, which is when the OpRisk regulation 
becomes into action. Implicitly, the proposal of tools such as Scorecards or RIs to assess 
OpRisk, recognise this need. In our view, there are a number of reasons why purely 
historical data approaches are not viable: 
• Sparse data. It is only recently that financial institutions have started gather-
ing OpRisk loss data. However, this data must extend beyond 5 years to be a 
statistically significant. Given the time, the data may represent varying levels of 
operational effectiveness and risk/threat level. Thus, it would be difficult to cap-
ture potential losses from one single distribution with a small number of "known" 
parameters [153]. 
• Changing environment. Losses experienced are simply a sample of possible events. 
They may not be representative of changing operational processes. As the underling 
operational process degrades or improves the value of such historical data, loses its 
predictive value. 
• Under-reporting. We must also look at the context where the data, when available, 
is extracted. In the domain of OpRisk, a crucial part of building databases is the 
employees' willingness to report the required information. However, as we know 
from the discussion in chapter 2, employees are reluctant to give up such information 
7.4 .. Advance .Measuremrnt approach(.'i L3~ 
for fear of retribution. For example. consider what Kalhoff et al [IV";] says regarding 
the bnilding of n common international database of I·epol·ted fi . 1 I 
IlanCla OSSl'S: 
... the results from the latest Loss Data Collection Exercise (LDCE) 
conducted b~- Bank for International Settlements confirms this im-
pression (the lack of reported frauds) '" the losses derived from the 
category "Internal Fraud" has only a 3.3% of the total loss events in 
the LDCE. 
This seems somehow unexpected if we think that the main aim of building such a 
database is to reduce "Internal Fraud" which, unreported, is a major concern for 
the bank's board (as the Baring's Bank bankruptcy showed us). 
It is worth noting that the Chicago based insurance company, Aon, calculated the 
mean size of bank's fraud to be around $3.5 million while the Basel's quantitatin' 
study (QIS3) [167] concluded that 98% of losses through fraud were for sums less 
than 1$ million [45]. According to the data compiled by Aon [45], 
... fraud is a far greater operational risk than banks have been pre-
pared to admit (in public). 
• Difficult\" In building large databases. The building of large databases poses a 
problem. On one side, to share the data banks must collect it using the same 
standards to identify and classify the events. On the other, banks should be free to 
select whichever method they think appropriate to assess their risks, and this may 
entail a different approach to identify and classify risks [33]. 
• External data. The Committee recognise the use of external data from consor-
tiums such as Op Vantage 2 , British Bankers Association3 or the Operational Risk-
data eXchange Association4 run by ABM-Amro, BNP Paribas, JP Morgan Chase, 
Canadian Imperail Bank among others. Their purpose is to create and share an 
OpRisk database between its members [8,33]. However, we argue that using exter-
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commellted 011 earli('l' and may be more because very often the pron'nanc(> of this 
data is unknowll, DiH'erellt bilTlks may have diffen'nt proccdll],('S to gather data or 
difff'rent manilgerial approadlf's to risk managemenL e.g. banks :-;etting differpnt 
thresholds on what they consider a reportable "near-miss". That is. this threshold 
depends on the severity of the incident which in turn depends on the bank's size. 
thus, raising doubts about the scalability of the data. 
• Assumption of independence. The condition for the validit~· of data collected b\· 
different external financial institutions is that the set of obsen'(ltiolls among insti-
tutions must be independent. However. this assumption is questionable. as data 
collected during 2001 and 2002 by the LDCE, after the September 11 terrorist 
attack, shows [147] . 
• Classification of risk, 'The loss data can produce an unrealistic prediction given 
that banks may be double-counting the same incident, e.g. Credit risk can be 
categorised as OpRisk or a risk from one BL can be assigned to another. As the 
survey conducted b~' PricewaterhouseCooper [186] in 2003 points out, 
.. 69% of banks stated concern about the quality of the data regard-
ing the overlapping with other risks, i.e. credit and market risks. 
Thus, Stone [210], vice-president of risk management at Zions Bank corporation in 
U.S., comments: 
Many businesses are reluctant to base their capital allocations or 
risk improvement efforts exclusively on loss data, as confidence in 
the data is questionable. 
The British Bankers Association echoes these concerns when it believe that [33] 
.. that past operational risk loss data does not enable prediction of 
future losses. 
For these reasons many banks are reluctant to invest (around 40% of banks con-
sulted [90]) on databases that haven't got a proven record, given that databases 
are based on a balance between costs and returns. 
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• From the point of view of management Turnbull [113] comments 
.. (building) cumbersome risk databases can be a distraction from the 
primary goal of getting each person in the organisation to be aware 
of, and manage risks related to the tasks that person performs. 
As the study on bank's assessments on OpRisk, in 2001, conducted by the consul-
tory firm TCAS in London [90] c()ncludee, 
Banks are realising that it's not about populating a database or 
about implementing a Monte Carlo simulation and getting an an-
swer. It's about process analysis and identifying drivers ... 
These limitations with loss data approaches mean that traditional statistical met hode, 
are unlikely to provide useful predictions of operational losses. Therefore, in our ,·jc\\". \w 
need an approach that combines qualitative and quantitative methods. That is, OpRj:-;k 
models will have to rely on a variety of input data: subjective (e.g. self-assessment 
and scenario analysis), objective (e.g. loss data) or both (e.g. risk indicators, cansal 
networks). 
The Fitch survey [159], in 2004, of over 50 major world banks corroborates this 
view. It signals that the world's largest financial institutions are adopting a combination 
of processes to identify risks: 65% are using risk and control self-assessments, more than 
32.5% use key risk indicators as the main tool to identify OpRisk. Some 37.5% use risk 
mapping and 10% scorecards as additional tools. 
7.4.3 Subjective approaches 
7.4.3.1 Self-Assessment - Scorecards 
Following this approach, each business unit or the firm as a whole (i.e. bottom-up or top-
down approaches), identifies the nature and size of OpRisk using a "Scorecard" approach 
[106,164] . 
Simons [207] gives us an example of how to carry out a top down Scorecard assess-
ment. In an article, in the Harvard business review, titled "How risky is your company?'", 
he applies the Scorecard system in the context of a "risk calculator". The basic idea is 
that by identifying the "key pressure points" and giving a score to those points, say. from 
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1 for low risk to 5 for high risk. managers can w()!'k Ol.lt 1 t le total risk exposun' of the 
compall~'. He signals a number of risk indicators: 
l. FcLSt-growing business. e.g. aggressive company's stl'ate<.r\' to gaO 'k t h 
o. 111 mal e s are may 
lead employees to by-pass company's policies to get greater revenues. 
2. Rate of expansion in operations, e.g. company infra-structure not following the 
p,lC'e of growth. 
3. A high level of inexperience among st.aff, e.g. recruitment policies can be ignored 
\\·hen companies need staff quickly to cope with growth. 
4. Company's culture. e.g. internal competition. Do I share information that can 
benefit ot hers? 
5. Information flow in the compally. e.g. do fa.ilures get reported? 
6. Information management, e.g. more sophisticated products brings new risks 
As Simons, points out, there is no specific score that firms have to reach. Each firm 
has its own way to carry out business, i.e. controls and risks are assessed in the context 
of meeting specific business objectives. 'Nhat the Scorecard does is to make managers 
aware of the risk involved in the business activity or process by highlighting the strengths 
and weaknesses of existing controls. 
Using Scorecards in the context of a "bottom-up" approach would consists for in-
stance of filling the matrix 7.3 in page 127. In this process, employees and managers who 
are responsible for a particular business function present their views about processes, 
controls and risks quantifying those with a score [50,119,123]. 
The fact that Scorecards do not need to gather data to assess company's risks, 
makes it possible to capture environments that can change rapidly, for instance, gIven 
new management, new products or new technology. Following an only data approach 
would need years to gather enough information. It also is able to capture organisational 
factors such as management culture, and system support. 
vVith this approach Basel intends to reflect the improvements in risk management 
and to bring a forward-looking element into the capital charge calculations. Basel re-
quires a strong quantitative basis for the Scorecards. In this respect it is similar to the 
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relies less exclusively on historical loss data in determining capital charge. In essence. 
the lack of data must be balanced with strong internal controls that can delllOllstrate the 
validity of the measures taken to avert losses. 
7.4.3.2 Scenario Analysis 
Employees are asked to estimate future possible losses by conditioning them to a partic-
ular scenario. Performing this analysis helps us understand the interaction among the 
variables in the modeL Based on these estimations, financial institutions can put capital 
aside to cater for the risks arising from those scenarios. 
We gave some examples of this approach in chapter 6 during the validation process 
of the NATS model, section 6.S. Then, we performed "what if' scenarios ;mel "stress 
testing" to obtain the probahilit:y of an air-traffic incidents under specific conditions. 
During the stress-testing we condition the variables in the model to situations t h;1t could 
cause extraordinary losses [114]. 
7.4.4 Combining Subjective and Objective approaches 
7.4.4.1 Risk Indicators 
Vinella [221] makes a distinction between risk indicators (RIs): (a) Key Performance 
Indicators (KPI) which assess the risk of achieving a firm specified level of performance 
and (b) Key Risk Indicators (KRI) which assess the risk involved in achieving such 
performance. The idea is that in order to achieve the targeted performance the company 
must identify and assess the potential losses. In the context of OpRisk, we can think of 
KPI and KRI as the factors that better explain the operational losses [220]. As King [119] 
comments 
.. the performance measure is used to develop associated risk measures .. 
the reasoning is that if performance measures reflect the cause-and-effect 
relation between the business activities and the earnings of the firm, then 
a measure of volatility for the performance will reflect the cause-and-effect 
relation between business activities and risk of earnings. 
Certain KRI such as audit scores, staff turnover, trade volumes, error rates, income 
volatility and so forth are used to measure the risk changes over time. These indicators 
are asslUned to correlate with a change in OpRisk The' £, tl . , . Ie Ole. le,) me uspd to gauge the 
company's risk level. The mapping of potential allows tIle ba k t . I . -. I ' no ann \:-,P t le causes 
as \\.pl1 ,IS to link the consequent financial losses [?01] TI', . - tl " k 
,~ . 11S Wd~ 1e llS management 
process can take proactive steps to reduce losses. This mapping is similar to Faulty Tree 
Analysis. ('ommon in the field of engineerino and safet\' S-'\'sterrlS h· f I 
C). ( • • ~ w el e we oeus on t 1e 
different ways a process can faiL This mapping consists of 
• Find the potential breakdowns, 
• identifying in the organisation the breakdown originates and \-"hat parts are affcct('( I 
• and measuring the severity of the breakdown. 
The only requirements that the Basel Committee [201] set, regarding KRIs. is that 
they should be: 
1. Relevant to the frequency and severity of the losses. 
2. Non-redundant, if two KRIs are strongly correlated, only one should be considered. 
3. l\Ieasurable. Objectively quantify and verifiable. 
4. Easy to monitor. Ratio between benefit and cost. 
5. Auditable. 
One method used to measure the OpRisk using key indicators is statistical regression 
[221], another is using Scorecard as a tool to convert qualitative risk assessment into 
quantifiable risk indicators [100]. 
7.4.4.2 Causal mapping 
Following causal reasoning we identify potential risks associated with the processes and 
assess their respective severity. Using BN models we are able to map process workflow 
while identifying possible errors in the procedures or/and in their execution or/and in 
the associated controls. 
In chapter 5 we explained how we could use our ranked node approach to elicit 
probability values in a similar fashion as the Scorecards. We also showed how we could 
use linear regression coupled with a Truncated Normal to produce NPTs. \Vhen data is 
available, these estimations can be complemented with historical loss data. 
7.5. OpRisk J..Jodel l-l~l 
A BN model, therefore. captures all the Basel [IGG] requirements to qualify for an 
Al\IA. That is, (\ BN can use historical loss data, make use of KRIs to highlight process 
weakness and causal reasoning to understand their interaction and poterlt.}·al tl .. t . . , llea ~. 11~( 
Scorecards to quantif\" expert's opinion in changing environments where data is absent 
thus providing a forward-looking component in the capital charge calculations and is able 
to perform scenario analysis to corroborate its forecasts. The next section explains the 
OpRisk BN model we developed within the AidA framework. 
7.5 OpRisk Model 
The aim of this model is to provide a measure of OpRisk that takes account of qualita-
tive and quantitative factors and causal process relationships. The main assumption that 
our BN model takes is that unexpected losses are explained as a sequence of "l'Xpcct<,<j"' 
breaches. As explained in chapter 2, major unexpected losses are the result of the (\('-
cumulation of minor incidents. That is, the unexpected losses are proportionally related 
to the expected ones. Which means that both types of losses can be represented by the 
same statistical distribution. The mean of the distribution represents the expected losses 
while the unexpected ones are captured in the tail. 
Our model assess the capital charge at BL level, that is, we have divided the bank's 
business activities into BLs. The total loss is the addition of all the losses per BL. So 
in total there would be 8 models representing the 8 BLs. We have built the model for 
the Trading and Sales BL, thus providing a template for how to develop the other BLs 
models. The tenet is that a BL's model is made up of modules common to all BLs and of 
modules specific to each BL. For instance, the Trading and Sales BL has different KRIs 
than the Retail Banking one, e.g. shares dealings and credit card fraud, respectively. 
But it also has common elements such as socio-technical factors i.e. staff performance or 
company's culture, however different these common components impact the BL's losses. 
Hence, for each BL, we only need to model a specific module representing the KRIs of 
that line and change the NPTs of the common modules given that each BL has a different 
level of performance and risks. 
We also assume that the frequency and severity are correlated. It is reasonable to 
think that both would ultimately depend on the organisation's internal controls, The 
freCi1Wll(,~- of the potential losses ,He a reflectio1l of tIle 111'1' . ffi' . - . (nag('lIlelH e (]('Iln- and the 
same can 1)(' said about the severih-, With this hst assumI)t' . -. I ' I 
' ' c., 1011 \\(' 0 It am t le conceptual 
model in Figure 7.7. The OpRisk model is made up of tIle C 11 '- d 1 . . 10 oWlI1g 1110 11 C's: 
.... -- .. , , , , .. , 
,t Potential 
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• OpRisk , 
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Figure 7.7: Conceptual OpRisk model. Potential losses module is specific t() the BL TIl<' 
total losses is equal to the aggregation of the severity and frequency functions, 
• Potential OpRisk of BL. This module represents the losses for a specific BL, 
• Controls. Understood as the bank's controls to avoid potential losses, 
• Organisational factors, 'rhis represents the underlying firm:s structure where OpRisks 
occur and controls measures are exerted. 
• Total losses. This is the aggregation of the BL's forecast risks and their associated 
severity. 
The model in Figure 7.7 was further refined to include the BL's EI and the controls 
associated to the BL (e.g. manager supervision) which are different to the ones exerted 
at firm's level (e.g. auditing). The rationale of introducing the EI is that the number of 
events depends on the volume of business of the BL, Figure 7.8 shows the final OpRisk 
schematic model. In this figure we observe the following modules: 
• Exposure indicator. BUs GI. 
• Potential OpRisk of BL. Represents the losses for a specific BL and their associated 
controls. 




• e llltrob, FinaIlcial controI"s at firm's lew)l. 
• Total losses. Same as Cl bove . 
.. , , 






• Associated • , , 




7..7, OpHis/': JJorid l-lG 
Total 
Losses 
Figure 7.8: Final OpRisk scheme. Forecast risk(A) represents the result of the BL's 
potential losses given the BL's EI. Forecast risk(B) represents the probabilit," of th()se 
potential losses not being captured by firm's controls. 
The following subsections explain these modules in detail. 
7.5.1 Exposure Indicator 
This model takes the GI of the BL as the EI. The GI represents the volume of capital 
for that BL. This is what Basel [164] has defined as the net interest income + net non-
interest income. The potential number of OpRisk events is proportional to the GI of that 
BL. For example, a BL with a greater number of transactions is more at risk of delaying, 
mistyping or more likely to suffer fraud. 
7.5.2 Potential OpRisk and Controls of the BL. Key Risk Indicators. 
Using BN models we can map business risk indicators and show how they interact to 
create a potential risk. In this context, risk is interpreted in a wider sense: risk is 
understood as a threat of monetary losses and failing to achieve the potential profits. e.g. 
a business transaction can become a threat if it is delayed for too long or bring profi ts if 
it is dealt with efficiency. 
7.5. OpRisk Jlodrl 1-!i 
Potential losses emerge when KRIs acts in COllJ·UllC·t· ··th I . K Ion \\ I ot 1eI RIs to CTeatt:' ur 
increase the likelihood of an event, e.g. if there is no I ' . . . . , c eell segregatIOn of dutIes and the 
trading is not well supervised the likelihood of losses·' du t f· d' " eo lau lIlcreases. \Ye have 
modelled this interaction using "OR" and "AND" gates. see Figure 7.9. 
Re(ofl(iliillion 







Risk D (AND) 




KRls for Trading 
r----lO.I & Sal es Bl 
(AND) 
Figure 7.9: KRIs mapping. The nodes showing risks indicators interaction through "OR" 
and "AND" gates. 
In an "OR" gate node we are concerned with the smallest probability of a risk emerg-
ing while in an "AND" gate node we are only concerned with the highest probability value. 
Notice that the gate nodes in this model, labelled with an "AND" or "OR", capture the 
interaction of both parent nodes but they have not got any other causal meaning attached 
to them. 
Figure 7.10 shows an example of the "AND" gate. In this case, we want to model the 
interaction where either of the events, "Transaction type unauthorised" and "Gains higher 
than expected", has the highest probability value given that any of them can cause great 
losses for the firm. In this figure we see that we have evidence on the node "Transaction 
type unauthorised" being "Very High", see Figure 7.10(a). This evidence makes the shape 
of the distribution for the child node "Risk D" to move towards "High". Notice, however. 
that when we introduced new evidence on the node "Gains higher than expected" being 









Figure (a). The probability of a 
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Figure (b). The probability of a 
"Transaction type unauthorised'; is 
"Very High" and the evid nce on 
the "Gains above expected·; is "Very 
Low". 
Figure 7.10: Example of an "AND" gate nodE'. Compare figures (a) with (b). Despite 
adding the evidence on the node "Gains above expected" (see Figure (b)) the probability 
distribution for the child node does not change. 
We can expect the level of risk shown in the KRls to be related with the firm s 
management. Thus we have the link from the "Organisational factors" module in Figure 
7.9. The quality of the BL's control becomes a reflection of the organisational factors 
and the supervisory duties at BL level. This quality tells us the probability of potential 
events being capture in that BL. 
7.5.3 Organisational factors 
As the Basel Committee [164] points out, one of the main areas of concern in the risk 
management process is the establishment of a strong culture of control. To measure 
the strength of these controls we must look at factors such as the firm '5 culture, the 
employee's performance and the quality of the support systems. We have decomposed 
































Figure 7.11: Organisational Factors module 
This module captures the quality of the staff. This quality, among other things, depends 
on employees' capabilities. We defined those as a function of their level of "Education
ll 
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Figure 7,12: Sub-module People. The intermediary "Dummy" nodes to reduce the size 
of "People" node NPT, 
7.5.3.2 Culture 
This module is based on the assumption that culture is a hidden factor whose definition 
we ignore, that is, we cannot define directly what culture is. Thus, we need to look at 
the factors that "successful" companies exhibit, to define. in terms of performance, what 
makes a "good" or a "bad" culture, Only by looking at these shaping factors are we able 
to define culture, The factors shown in Figure 7.13 were drawn from our discussion on 
the role of the organisational culture in chapter 2, these are: 
• Employees perceived commitment by the management towards risk strategies, 
• Written policies and procedures, 
• Employees' motivation, 
• Staff turnover (this refers to company's employees in general not only "Key person-
nel".). 
• Communication channels . 
Organisational 
(ultur~ 
Figure 7.13: Sub-module Culture 
7. 5. OpR i k il Iad l 1. 1 
Looking at the evidence available on these factors we can infer the culture that better 
explains these factors ' evidence. For instance, if we observe that the "Communication 
channels" between employees and managers are "High'), the "Sta.ff Turnover" is "Medium" , 
the "Employees Motivation" is "Medium)), the written "Policies and Procedures" are 'High" 
and the "Employees managers commitment" is "Medium') we would expect a culture, 
thus described, to be mainly towards "Medium", see Figure 7.14. Which means that the 
factors "Policies and Procedures" and "Communication channels" are not relevant enough 
to qualify the culture of a company. 
0.0 
c - EO :!I: :r .~ /I . C • a; <. c' -:r 
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Figure 7.14: Culture's module with evidence entered 
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7.5.3.3 Systems 
This module represent the expected performance of tIle 
compan~"s s~'st(,IllS SllPP(Jlt. 
This lwrforlllancc is affected hv the impact of tlw '"Novelt· f tl tIl .. . " . ,~o Ie eCll100gy (e.g. ('-
commerce), "Svstem failure rate~~ and "System's recovery pIa' ," S F' - I-. '11:-.. ee IgUIl' I. :). 
Figure 7.15: Sub-module Systems 
7.5.4 Controls 
This module represents the auditing controls, whether internal or external. of thf' fin3nciCl] 
institution. The auditing process depends, to a great extent, on the amount and qualit~· of 
the losses recorded. For this reason, as we discussed in chapter 2, company's management 
must ensure a clear line of reporting between employees and managers. Thus. the causal 
links between the organisational factors module and this one. We can also expect that 
different teams within a company will accommodate the company's culture to suit their 
tasks [78]. We have captured this "decentralisation" in the node called "Sub-culture". 
This node measures the extent to which company's culture applies to them. Figure 7.16 
illustrates this module. 
7.5.5 Combining Severity and Frequency 
In this part of the model we combine the frequency of the potential losses and their 
associated severity. The potential losses are a function of: 
• the GI of that BL and the percentage of risk events that that slip through the BL's 
controls 
• and from the quality of auditing controls whether internal or external to the firm. 
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Organisational Factors 
Figure 7.16: Module Controls 
The result of combining the potential losses and the controls gives us the forecasted 
frequency of events. Aggregating this frequency with the severity per event will give us 
the total amount of predicted losses for this BL. Notice that we have conditioned the node 
"Severity" on the quality of the firm's management. It is reasonable to think that a firm 
with strong controls will be able to handle the severity of the losses better than another 
one that has not previewed those losses or established contingency plans to contain them, 
(see Figure 7.17). Figure 7.18 in page 154 shows the final OpRisk model for the "Trading 
and Sales BL". 
Organisational Factors 
.f'orTrading 
& Sales 61.. f----------i>\ 
(AND) 
Figure 7.17: Joining the modules. 
7.6 NPTs 
Total Capital 
Charge = Sum 
of all BLs 
losses 
The techniques used to build the NPTs of this model were explained in chapter 5. The 
. f "¥ L w" nodes in this model are, by default, ranked nodes with 5 states rangmg rom ery 0 , 
,Sl'Jt~, .... 
Exposure 
Indicator · ' 01 
p~r, BL 
KRls for Trading !>l 





Figure 7.18: Final OpRisk model. 
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7.6. PT 15. 
"Low ;, "lVledium', H· 1 ,. t "y, 
Ig1 ' 0 ery High':' unless explicitly stated othenvi. e. Th amc 
applies to the probability distributions which are built using a TNormal di tributi n 
coupled with a fuzzy function. The following list provides an overview of the PT of 
this network: 
1. Exposure Indicator node. For lack of a better indicator and to make calculat ion 
simpler , we have assumed a GI for this BL to be between 26.000 and 27.000 euro 1 
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Figure 7.19: Normal distribution with a mean of around 26000 to 27000 euros. 
2. KRIs module. The assessment of the KRIs can be based on the historical loss data , 
when available, or on a subjective estimation using Scorecards , or the combination 
of both. This module is divided into two parts, . 
a. the potential risk arising from business processes and 
b. the controls available at BL level. 
Potential risks may arise in conjunction with other risks , i.e. "AND", or either of 
them, i.e. "OR". For the former case, the expected value, i.e. the mean for the 
TNormal, is calculated using a MAX function and the latter case using a MIN 
one. 
The "BL's control quality" node is a weighted function of the strength of the com-
pany's internal controls and the supervision management at BL level. The resulting 
distribution tells us the probability of capturing a potential risk. 
Thus we choose a binomial distribution to build the NPT for the node 'KRIs for , 
Thading and Sales" to forecast potential losses at BL level with the probability of 
success given by the "BL's control 's quality", see Figure 7.20. 
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KRls for trading and Sales o.oe 
Function: 
0 .06 
0 .0 4 
Binomial (n,p) 0 .02 
n = frequency of losses 0 .0 
p = controls finding <> '" .., (.) ". b b cr, N '" .. 0 0 b b 
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Figure 7.20: Binomial distribution for "KRIs for Trading and Sales". 
3. Organisational factors module. The NPT for this module is captured in the node 
"Organisational Factors". This NPT is an average sum of the other 3 sub-module: 
(a) People. This submodule is made up of 5 input nodes and 1 output node called 
"People". Vve have modelled the output node "People" as the weighted urn of 
its attributes. 
(b) Organisational Culture. The probability estimates usually come from either 
questionnaires as we did in our case study with NATS explained in chapter 6 or 
using a Scorecard approach. There is no predefine fun ction to build the NPTs 
of this submodule other than t.he one that better fits the given information. 
(c) Systems. This submodule is made up of 3 input nodes and 1 output node 
called "Systems". The measurement of the input nodes "System failure rate" 
and "System's recovery plans" can be obtained using statistical metrics from 
past failures while the factor "Novelty of the technology" can be obtained 
through a Scorecard approach. The relevance of these factors towards the 
system's performance are captured using a weighted-sum function. 
4. Controls module. This module is made up of 3 input nodes, an intermediary node 
labelled "Internal Auditing quality" and an output node labelled "Firms control 
quality". The NPT for the node "Firms control quality" is determined by a weighted 
sum of the auditing controls. 
5. Potential risks node. This NPT is a function of the percentage of events that slip 
through BL's controls times the volume of the BL's business. 
6. Forecast risk node. The NPT is built using a Binomial distribution who e proba-
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Figure 7.21: Fuzzy functions used to build the Organisational Factors module. 
cause losses. 
7. Severity node. This node is defined by a Chi-square distribution using the val lies 
from table 7.22 in page 158 as a guide. 
8. Total expected losses node. The NPT for this node is the result of aggregating the' 
distribution for the severity and forecast. The result obtained is the total losses for 
that BL. 
7.7 Validation 
In this section we carry out a similar validation process that we did in section 6.8. This 
process consists of identifying specific variables in the network, entering evidence and 
analysing the associated changes in the other variables in the network. 
The loss events and loss amounts used to quantify the variables in the model are 
not indicative of the actual values in a real financial institution. As a guidance, we used 
the values obtained from the second qualitative impact study conducted in 2002 by the 
Committee [165]' these are shown in tables 7.22 and 7.23 . 
• Scenario 1. The default settings for this model are (see Figure 7.24 in page 159) 
1. GI around 26.000 to 27.000 euros. 
2. The forecast individual loss events is between 1.100 and 1.300, see table 1.2:3. 
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3. According to table 7.22, the severity would be between 200 and 400 euros per 
loss event. 
4. Therefore, the total losses are on average 400.000 euros. 
Let us compare these default settings with other scenarios. To make this comparison 
easier we have drawn the probability distributions from the default scenario with 
bars while the distributions for the following scenarios are drawn using a line graph: 
• Scenario 2. Operational Factors is set to "Low" (see Figure 7.25 in page 159). 
1. The expected risk events coming from the BL have increased approximately 
30%. Observe how the tail of the distribution has now thickened. 











(1) Exposure Indicator. 
(3) Severity of of individual events. 
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Figure 7.25: Settings for scenario 2. 
20% per loss event ; 
3. the predicted total loss has increased by 60% to be around 600.000 euros. But, 
even more worrying is the thickening of the distribution tail. This can give 
way to unexpected major losses . 
• Scenario 3. Controls at BL's level and Firm's level are set to "Low" (see Figure 7.26 
in page 160). 
1. The loss events coming from the BL have more than doubled , from 10 to 25 
expected events. Observe the t ail of the distribution, the variance has also 
almost a doubled; 
2. The forecast losses increased slightly from 1100 events to 1200 but the variance 
widens by around 35%; 
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Figure 7.26: Settings for scenario 3 
3. thus unexpected risks are more likely as the tail of t he distribution gets thicker 
which , combined with an increase in the severi ty of approximately 30% per 
loss event , means that the expected losses are now around 534.060 euros for 
the BL. 
• Scenario 4 has the following settings (see Figure 7.27 in page 160): 
1. Report quality is set to "Low"; 
2. BL's supervision controls are "Medium", i.e. average; 
3. Transaction type is unauthorised "Very High"; 
4. Reconciliation miss match is "Very High". 
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Figure 7.27: Settings for scenario 4 
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1. The number of events slipping through the BUs controls has now increased 
3 times but more noticeable is the increase in the distribution variance which 
has more than doubled; 
2. The same can be said about the forecast risk. The variance has also more 
than doubled, thus making the likelihood of unexpected events increase. 
3. The severity, however, has not changed much. It has increased its variance 
and loss amount per event but not considerably. The reasoning behind this 
result is that the loss events come from the BL and the management of the 
severity is not directly link to the BL but to the firm itself. \Ye can think of 
instances, e.g. AlB discussed, where a financial branch commits fraud and the 
headquarters do not realise those until is too late. 
4. The total expected losses have increased on average to 40.000 euros but the 
variance remains approximately the same. 
From these scenarios we observe how unexpected losses are explained from the ex-
pected ones. This relation is more noticeable as the tail of the distribution increases, thus 
making major losses more likely. This validation exercise has shown that the impact of 
the organisational factors in the firm's losses can be captured and measured using a BN 
model. 
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Table 7. 8: AMA approaches 
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Chapter 8 
Summary and Conclusions 
The aim of this thesis is to show how large NPTs can be built using qualitatin' knowledge 
in a consistent and economical manner. Large NPTs are the consequellCl' of complex BN 
models. These models are needed to capture the many interactions among the risk factors 
in the safety critical industries and financial institutions. 
This thesis takes the view that risk factors, forming a causal chain. shape the organ-
isation's risk profile. These factors include the impact of the organisational culture, the 
quality of the staff and the infrastructure of the organisation's supporting s~'stcms, what 
we have termed as organisational factors. 
A deep understanding of these risks enables us to interpret them as causally related; 
measuring the probability of these latent failures along the causal chain gives us the 
opportunity to take steps to avoid, or at least to reduce the impact of active failures on 
the organisation [190], e.g. ENRON [194]' or on society as a whole, e.g. Bhopal chemical 
plant [145]. 
One of the most important challenges in modeling real world BNs for risk assessment 
is that of producing large NPTs. 
This thesis explains a method and implemented a semi-automated computer program 
to build them (see Appendix A) which is now part of the Agena Risk tool [134]. \Ye ha\'c 
found that in the case of the NATS project this approach and the program made the 
difference between being and not being able to build realistic a BN model within the 
constraints of time and costs. 
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8.1 The Ranked Node Approach 
As we discussed at the beginning of this thesis, one of the challenges in building BN 
models to solve real-world risk assessment problems is that of constructing large NPTs. 
To produce large NPTs we need to involve domain experts (who do not necessarily have 
knowledge on probability theory) whose time is sparse and costly. 
For these reasons, we need a method to construct NPTs using the minimal amount of 
expert elicitation. recognizing that it is rarely cost effective or feasible to elicit complete 
sets of probability values. 
In the experience of RADAR's group building BNs, we know that most of the time 
this relationships can be expressed as a weighted average function. Many so-called "self-
assessment" or "scorecard': [21] systems are based around little more than the weighted 
averages of attribute hierarchies. 
This weighted average function can be interpreted as a linear relationship between 
parent and child nodes. Simple linear models have shown to provide good forecasts as we 
discussed on Chapters 4 and 5. Furthermore, in some cases, complex statistical functions 
have shown to add little benefit to justify the time and cost put into it [79]. In the case 
of the NATS project we could not see techniques that elicit degrees of freedom or matrix 
of covariates as possible candidate methods [183] given the lack of statistical knowledge 
of the participants. 
Furthermore, when the assumption of linearity cannot be maintained we can use 
the WMin or WMax functions; for instance, a parent node that outweighs the impact of 
other parent nodes, this is explained in Chapter 5. 
Although this approach may seem coarse we must take into account that we are 
talking about uncertain domains and that scenarios are elicited, as Parsons and Saffiotti 
[173] comment 
... in the form "if we observe A then it is more likely that B is the case", 
we may be more interested in knowing the way in which the values change 
rather than in the values themselves. 
So the aim of this type of model is as Jensen [111] observes to find the patterns that 
can be extrapolated to future events given our current knowledge. 
8.1. The Ronked .Yode .-ip/JroaclJ 11;1, 
... correct findings originating from a coherellt case covered by the model 
should conform to certain expected patterns ... 
The question would then be whether these patterns are infonnative enough to the 
expert. Van der Gaag et aI's [219] research answers this Cluestl'on'l tl . \\ len . }(,\~. comment 
comment regarding their findings modeling oesophagus cancer: 
... we would like to note that the data collection used is knmvn to be 
biased, to contain inconsistencies and to be incompleted in a non-random 
way ... the percentage of correct predictions '" approached T()/(', Gin'Il 
that the probabilities used are rough, initial assessments and that the 
patient data definitely require large clearing out. the results from initial 
evaluation are quite encouraging. 
It is for these reasons that we advocated a general, flexible approach that C(\ll cH'-
commodate different types of relationships, rather than a bespoke distribution whose 
development would be lengthy and costly. A simple approach that captures t he expert's 
opinion and not their knowledge in statistics. 
As physicist S. Hawking [94] notes, writing about planet l\lercuris motion, that 
although Einstein's theory of relativity is more accurate predicting this motion than 
Newton's law of gravity, Newton's law is the one used for all practical purposes given 
that the differences between both predictions are small and 
Newton's theory also has the great advantage that is much simpler to 
work with than Einstein's! 
Note that using BNs the model's uncertainty is reduced as the system gathers data 
given that, as we discussed in Chapter 3, the expert's information is conditioned on the 
evidence at hand. As this evidence grows, any disagreement between expert's opinion 
and factual information is adjusted. 
This does not, however, mean to say that in all cases using rank nodes guarantees 
better results than using other approaches. Theses results are based on these constraints: 
1. The qualitative information as the main source of information; 
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2. The domain experts we worked with. who did not ha ·t·· .' 11 k ve:-., atl:-.,tlca I)ac ground. wen' 
able to huild amI bilor large models that effectivpl,' C' t 'd th " h I' f ". ap me en.e Ie swell: 
3. The time and budget allowance. Using rank nodes th I' 't,t' 1 'd . e e ICla IOn )111 en 1:-" much 
reduced lw silllply eliciting a small number of paramete sf, tl ' . r lorn Ie experb. 
8.2 Lessons Learnt 
These lessons are mainly drawn from our experiences developing the NATS project. 
These experiences helped to put into context the theory and the practicalities of hllilding 
a BN model; to consolidate the theory and also to question it. It consolidated the 
understanding of the elicitation process; knowing what to expect and how to manage it. 
It also questioned the methods reviewed in Chapter 4 to a great extellt. 
The early stages of building the model were daunting because of the steep learning 
curve for all participants. In the case of the NATS project, most of the PClrt icipallts 
were alien to the concept of conditional probability; they were more acquainted \vith risk 
management. 
The interpretation of BN as a causal model was helpful to establish a common 
language. However, some of the participants were reluctant to accept that node's rela-
tionships were causal. Their objection was that causality could not be ascertained even 
though they could conceive a relation as causal; for some causality owed more to the 
field of philosophy than it does to the domain of statistics, This objection changed when 
they understood how the BN model explained its outcomes and which causal factors were 
more important, e.g. pilot's skills, Culture. 
The model structure helped to understand this idea of causality. In a barrier model 
we can observe how the risks progress from one barrier to the other this progression is 
caused by a barrier not being able to contain the risk thus having an effect on the next 
barrier. 
It was also important to explain that there are many potential models t bat can 
explain a relationship. A relationship that is explained in probabilistic terms and whose 
outcome is interpreted as a best fit of the current model. 
With the conceptual model came the problem of overlapping concepts, e.g. How 
do we model the effect of weather on an air incident? is that an independent factor or 
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does it have an impact on other factors? Problems of overlapping concepts such as the 
weather were interpreted as contextual probability evenly dl·st ·b t d h C n u e among t e lactors 
(see section 3.6 in 35). 
When modeling the impact of culture in the organisation we had to challenge the 
idea that organisational culture could not be measured. This perception changed when 
the data from the research of our colleagues in this project, SRU ~ was put into context. 
Then, they acknowledged the importance of having this factor measured given its impact 
on the overall air-traffic strategy. 
Another issue of discussion was the level of detail. Detailed definitions meant that 
the expert is able to discriminate a variable's impact on the modeL can we differentiate 
the TCAS's input in an accident from that of the air-crew? The BN assumption of 
variable independence was a valuable tool on this case, e.g TCAS's advise is independent 
of pilot's skills, a pilot mayor may not follow its advise. However, we could not say the 
same about the pilot's skill and the aircraft's crew. Both are understood as part of the 
same definition. 
Finding a suitable model meant to re-make the network a few times before we agree 
on a final version. It was difficult to decide when to stop discussing the topology and 
concentrate on the probabilities. This decision had to take into account the time/cost of 
the model. 
It is certainly important to be in control of the modelling process and explain the 
reasons for modelling certain relationship, e.g. constraint the number of parent nodes to 
reduce NPT's size or omit some factors, e.g. weather. The aim was to restrict the number 
of variables to those the expert could explain using a feasible scenario and whose outcome 
could be tractable using the SSE data (although it was not easy to directly map incident 
data into the model because some incidents were incorrectly or ambiguously recorded). 
The constraints of time, budget and statistical knowledge implied the need for a 
flexible, general approach to capture expert knowledge. This is where the idea of ranked 
nodes originated from. 
I implemented a computer program using the ranked nodes approach (see Appendix 
A). This made possible to build large NPTS, modify node's weights and Normal dis-
tribution deviation and observe the overall impact. Following a sensitivity analysis [40] 
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approach we compared different inputs (see section 68 ill 114) Th l' . . page . e va IdatJOn was 
carried out comparing the averages of the model outcomes against SSE data. 
One of the findings by the NATS experts was that STCA T .t]l 
• '. j \\ as ac ua y more relevant 
in preventing a mid-air accident that previously thought """0 s h t I h 
• 1. ' uc an ex ent t lat t e 
HR director proposed the use of the BN model to support the C fi . I case lor nancmg t 1(' 
installation of the STCA system in other airports. 
8.3 Future Work 
• A second phase of this project should include an evaluation following SS11 criteria 
in terms of: 
- Efficacy. The model's advice has shown to have improved safety. 
- Efficiency. In economic terms: the ratio between the benefits of an improved 
safety record, derived from model's advice, and the cost to implement it. 
- Effective. Is the EN model's advice a good solution in the long run? Is it 
worth to invest on this solution? 
• If the ranked approach, based on qualitative information, is to be used to monitor 
changing performance and risks over time it will be necessary to establish proce-
dures for capture this information on a more or less regular basis. For instance, 
mechanisms to obtain subjectives assessment of the organisational culture, may 
need the introduction of routine reporting of some figures (e.g. SAQ question-
naire). Ideally to be able to obtain such data on-line and to introduce on-line 
monitoring. 
• The NATS model was, by necessity, the product of the views of a reduced number 
of the Air-Traffic com 
• On this latter point, we can see ontologies helping to unifying the criteria regarding 
different domains/concepts across an organisation. Future research should make 
use of tools like Protege to develop BN models and see the applicability of our 
approach on different domains. 
• To automate obtaining the weights f3 of expert's elicitated estimation. We can 
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interpret the scenarios er 't t d 
ICI ae as a s,vstem of equations, COI\TI'Ilg tIll' 
u ('qu, 1 r illli 
SYS1CIlI givTs US 1 he w('iglls or codficiPllts of ea'} , . 11 
" . '. ,( 1 \ ana) e, parent nodes. 
Eliciting different scenarios provicks a sVstc'm of, . t' f' . " cqu310ns lorn wIlIch \\'e CCUl IIj,Llin 
tlH' "Tights or coefficicnts f3. 
For example, on Figure 8.1 we observe that the parent d .. ,', E ' ,. no es ,\., xpenellce and "Z: 
Skills" condition the "Y: I\Ianagerial Quality" hereafter \\,D 1'el:el' t tl ' 11 
' '- 11 0 lese \'(\na ) ('S 
as X, Z and Y respectively, Let us assume that all of th " hI I ' ese Val la es lave these 
states: {very low, low, medium, high, very high }. 
Figure 8,1: Managerial Quality 
Note that following the ranked-node approach, explained in Chapter 5, these sLlt('S 
equate to ordinal values from 1 to 5, e.g. very low = 1, low = 2. and so forth, so 
that we can effectively treat X, Y and Z as random variables in their full right. 
A typical scenario to be elicited is for instance: given that the managers have no 
experience and have not got skills what is the expected managerial quality? i.e. 
"If Experience = low and Skills = low, what is the value of Quality?", If the 
answer to such questions is elicited as a drawing, a plausible set of data will look 
like Table 8.1, that also shows the mapping from the elicited drawings to their 
corresponding numerical values. 
In Table 8.1 we also observe that, if we assume a multivariate linear relationship, 
eliciting different scenarios provides a system of equations from which the values of 
the regression coefficients f3x, f3z can be obtained. These quantities act as "weights" 
showing the strength of the relationship between the parents and the child, 
In the case of this example, we observe that Experience is more important when 
8 . .1. Flltlll! WOll 171 













5f3x + 5f3z = 5 
1 f3x + 5f3z = 2.8 
5 f3x + 1 f3z = 3.8 
3f3x + 3f3z = 3.5 
1 f3x + 1 f3z = 1 
Solving the l\Iultivariate 
linear regression, 
we obtain 







Skills t (J~ A VH 
VL L M H VH 
tf\ B VH > 
VL L M H VH 
t D~ C VL 
VL L M H VH 
t ~ D M > VL L M H VH 
b E VL > VL L M H VH 
Table 8.l: Elicited drawings and values with their associated equation S~·stPlll. 
considering manager's quality than is skill, as the ratio of the coefficients shows: 
f3x/f3z = 0.625/0.375 r-v 1.6 . 
• Using higher degree polynomials to represent non-linear relations. If we think that 
the current observations are going to remain constant in the future, e.g. domain of 
engineering, then a higher degree polynomial can provide a better fit. Otherwise', 
using a straight line can provide better results as it can be extrapolated to future 
events with greater success, although this may mean loosing accuracy on present 
observations. Figure 8.2 illustrates this idea. 
Part of this work has been now incorporated into the Agena Risk tool [134]. This 
tool is the result of the continuous research carry out by the RADAR group at Queen 
Mary University. 
This thesis has shown with some degree of success how expert's opinion together 
with BNs can be used to forecast risks in the safety critical industry and in the financial 
institutions. 
It has produced promising results which, in view of the author, have warranted 
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Figure 8.2: It depicts the situation where a data set can be modelled using either a 
straight line or using higher degree polynomial. 
the need to carry out further research on the use of BN to assess risks. In particular, 
the author hopes to encourage decision makers to consider the use of BNs to handle 
organisational risks. 
Appendix A. MiniHugin 
Using MiniH ugin 
Part of this thesis wns to implement a computer program to elicit and build NPT~ putting 
into practice the ranked nodes approach. This approach is explained in detail in chapter S. 
Current BN tools like Hugin [13], Genie and Smile [65], Elvira [215] or Ba~"l'~i;1Il 
network tools in java [154] have not got the functionality required to develop the NPTs 
for the NATS project. \Ve needed a tool that could model NPTs b~' domain experb 
without statistical knowledge using a few cues. These tools focus on calculating the 
model's output rather than to ease the elicitation of probability values. 
The first protot~'pe implemented the weight-average-sum function and llsed t he odds 
function to calculate the deviation. This prototype was instrumental to realise a problem 
with the theory behind the odds function. This function failed to provide the exp('ct(~d 
resuls in the case of inter-causal reasoning. 
The second prototype used a Normal distribution instead of the odds function to 
capture the deviation. Although the Normal distribution was more difficult to implement 
we were more confident that it would produce the expected outcomes given the supporting 
research in similar areas. These areas refered to the use of Normal distributions in 
domains were data is available. 
Builiding this NPT using J\!IiniHugin requires only to go through the following simple 
steps (see Figure 8.3): 
1. Select a child node and define the NPT using an expression. This expression can 
be Average, Min or Max. The Normal distribution is selected by default. 
2. Enter the elicitated values for the parents (and their weights if the expert is certain 
about strength of the relationship) 
3. Enter the expected values for the child node given its parents and the "certainty" 
or variance value. 
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As part of this tool , we also implemented some of the eliciting techniques reviewed 
III chapter 4, in particular from R. Winkler [127] research using drawings and intervals 
to elicit expert 's knowledge, see chapter 4. These techniques are now explained: 
Normal Distribution. It helps eliciting the Normal 's mean and standard deviation, see 
Figure8.4. Using a slide bar the expert can select the mean and the deviation. These 
inputs are used to calculate the probability table for a given node . 
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Figure 8.4: Eliciting a Nomal distribution. 
17. 
Histograms. It use an histogram to help elicit prior di t l'l'blltl'on . Following th PDF 
approach experts are asked to provide probabilitv estimat l'ons f· I ' 1 
J Ol eac 1 mterva or n de' -
states. We calculate the mode, median , mean and standard deviation . 
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Figure 8.5: Histogram 
e Figur .5 . 
Bezier Curve. Another tool was built to allow experts to draw the shape of a distri-
bution. Using the control points experts can draw different shapes. see Figu re .G. Th 
distribution 's area is calculated and normalised. The number of intervals in thi tool 
vary from two, three to five. If possible, we approximate the distribution to a Binomial 
function. 
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Note that the Histogram or the Bezier Curve or the eliciting tool using a Normal 
distribution were not used to elicit estimates from NATS experts . They are the product 
of the lessons learnt during the model development and as a result of the thesis research. 
So, I cannot report how effective or otherwise these tools are. 
These tools are now part of the AgenaRisk tool [134] which has its own algorithm 
to calculate the model's NPTs. Agena Risk has super-seeded this prototype providing a 
\yider selection of methods to compute NPTs. 
l\liniHugin tool uses the Hugin [13] software library to calculate the network proba-
bilities. 
177 
Appendix B. Safety Attitude Questionnaire 
(SAQ) 
These are the collection of questions used by the SRA team to E'\'aluate a compan~"s 
safety culture. 
I Questions. Factor 1 
I feel satisfied with the safet~· information I get 
I am happy with the existing safety precautions for particularly haz-
ardous work 
I feel satisfied with the attention given to safety in any training I have 
had 
I am happ:v ~\\"ith the safety equipment specified for my job 
Generally I am happy with the safety in my asset area 
I know the results of safety inspections to do with my job 
The people I work with are satisfied with the attention given to safety 
in any training they have had 
The people I work \;vith are satisfied with the information they get about 
safe working 
If changes are made to the procedures for my job I know about them 
I feel I could tell my boss if I had worries about safety 
Table 8.2: Questions related to "Personal evaluation of the safety system" factor 
Questions Factor 2 
My safety representatives know about most aspects of safe working in 
their area 
My safety representatives know about safety procedures 
Safety committee meetings 
If the safety representatives in my asset area/plant/department saw any 
one breaking safety rules they would do something about it 
Table 8.3: Questions related to "Safety representative's perceived (knowledge of and) 
involvement in the safety system" factor 
Questions. Factor 4 
Management in the company encourage me to go to meetings which 
involve discussions about safety 
I am encouraged by my supervisors to go to meetings which involve 
discussions about safety 
\;Vhenever there are meetings which involve safety discussions I go 
them 
to 
The people I work with go to meetings which involve safet~" discussions 
I alII satisfied with the safety content of meetings \\T have 
The people I work with are satisfied with the input t hc~" have ,it meetings 
w here safety is discussed 
lVly workmates know what has been discussed at safety committee meet-
mgs 
Table 8.4: Questions related to "Workforce's perceived ('\"aluation and involn~lIlellt III 
safety meetings" factor 
Questions. Factor 5 
My supervisors know what safe working procedures people should be 
following 
My supervisors know what safety equipment people III my asset 
area/plant/department should use 
My supervisors know what has been discussed in safety committee meet-
mgs 
The supervisors in my asset area know how much safety training people 
in my area have had 
The management in the company know what safe working procedures 
people should be following 
The managers in the company know what is discussed in safety commit-
tee meetings 
Table 8.5: Questions related to "Management's perceived involvement (knowledge?) III 
the safety system" factor 
Qupstions. Factor 6 
To get their jobs done people in this asset area do not I . f 11 . a w(-\\'S 0 ow 
S(\tct~· procedures . 
The manager.s in t he company think that following all safe working pro-
cedures gets III the \Va~' of production 
I do m~T job in the same wa~T as my workmates even when it means not 
always following safe working procedures 
The management in t he company puts productivity before safe working 
::\ly supervisors would turn a blind eye is safety rules were broken 
The managers in the company do little to ensure that I follow safety 
procedures 
I take short cuts to get my job done 
I know of short cuts that would help me get my job done 
If the people in my asset area notice a safety hazard they tend not to 
report it 
.My workmates do not know what they should do to ensure they are 
working safely 
Table 8.6: Questions related to "Unsafe working practices" factor 
Questions. Factor 7 
My safet~· representatives are satisfied with the involvement the~' have 
in developing our safety training 
My safety representatives are happy with the backing they get from 
management 
My safety representatives are satisfied with their involvement in safety 
inspection 
M~' safety representatives are satisfied with the a.uthority they have to 
a.ct in safety matters 
Table 8.7: Questions related to "Safety representative's perceived evaluation of the safety 
system " factor 
Questions Factor 8 
My workmates would expect me to support them if they had a complaint 
about safety 
If I had a complaint about safety my workmates would support me 
I encourage people in my asset area to work safely 
The people I work with encourage me to work safely 
Table 8.8: Questions related to "Workforce's (perceived safety encouragement and) sup-
port" factor 
Questions. Factor 9 
The people I work with check allY safety equipment the' '.} t . 1 £ . . ~ IllIg 1 use )e ore 
startmg work 
Generally lll~' workmates keep the area they work in tidy 
M~' worklll,ltcs are satisfied with the safety procedures i;l gc]wral 
The people I work with know what safety training is needed for their 
jobs 
The people I \vork with understand the reasons for the safe working 
procedures they are supposed to follow 
Table 8.9: Questions related to "Co-worker's perceived involvement and cvaluation of the 
safety system" factor 
Questions. Factor 10 
l'vIy managers are satisfied with the safety procedures generally 
1\ly managprs arp satisfied with the results of saf('t\- inspections 
M~' supervisor::; arc gellerall~' satisfied wit II safety in Illy assd area 
My supervisors arc satisfied with the safety training given to their \York 
group 
Table 8.10: Questions related to "Managemenfs perceived evaluation of the s(dd~' sys-
tem" factor 
Questions. Factor 11 
My superVIsors encourage me to report any safety problems I might 
notice 
My supervisors talk to me about safe working procedures 
The management in the company encourage me to let them know of any 
worries I have about the safety of my job 
The managers in the company talk to me personally about safe working 
The managers in the company encourage me to do housekeeping directly 
related to my job 
Table 8.11: Questions related to "Participative communication" factor 
Questions Factor 12 
Before I start work I check the safety equipment I might need 
I know the written safe working procedures for my job 
Generally I keep the area I work in tidy 
Table 8.12: Questions related to "Personal involvement in the safety system (safe working 
practice?)" factor 
Appendix C. Contributions 
The paper Us'ing Ranked nodes to model qualitative judgement in Bayesioll .\(tU'o,.ks [1!:-; 
written by 1\11. Neil, N. Fenton and Jose Galan is the product of this thesis. 
The idea of using the Weighted Average Sum, \\'eighted ~Iin and \\'cighted .\lax 
functions to build NPTs corresponds to Norman Fenton and .\leu,tin Neil. I implemented 
the' tool that contributed to confirm and validate their use to building large probabilih' 
tables. 
The first implementation of this tool used the odds function to C<lpture the dp\'iation 
of these functions results. However, as we explained in Chapter 5 we had ;ls\"lllllldr~' 
problems during back-propagation. A Normal distribution was used instead. Although 
using a Normal distribution was a chanllenge, from the point of view of programming. it 
proved to be the right choice, as the NATS project have shown. 
I learnt about use of a Normal distribution from the book by Rusell and Norvig [197], 
in this case, I only applied their ideas in a framework \\'here onl.v qualitative information 
was available. 
This tool made possible building all the NPTs of the NATS project. The outcomes 
were validated in the first instance by the SSE data. Later, those results, were calibrated 
by the experts at NATS and approved by the SRU. M. Neil and I run sensitivity anal-
isys with the NATS's experts. This tool uses the Hugin machine library to make the 
calculations [13]. 
I was responsible for the NATS validation. This validation was done in terms of 
averages, e.g. at each barrier and at any given time a number of breaches are expected. 
The aim was to match the average of those breaches against the model's output. 
The development of the Culture sub-network was my own contribution. Our col-
leagues at the SRU in Liverpool provided me with the data from the SAQ questionnaire 
in excel format. It took me a great amount of time, I had to go back and forward until 
both the SRU and NATS agreed with the results. r..Iartin Neil overlook the whole process. 
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The Operational Risk chapter is the result of my own contribution. This was~ at 
first, the aim of my thesis. 1 studied to a great depth the work of Basel Committee 
regulating the financial institution's operational risk. However, \ve could not find a 
financial instititution that wanted to collaborate with us on the study of the impact of 
culture in the firm's overall risks. 
Note: During this PhD. 1 have benefited from the support and advise of my tutors 
Prof. Martin Neil and Prof. Norman Fenton. All the contributions I have personally 
made to this thesis give equal credit to my tutors who made them possible. Thank you. 
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